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 ABSTRACT 
 
 The nations of East Central Europe have traditionally been portrayed as “victims” 
of Nazi German expansionism.  In this work the foreign policies of Poland, Lithuania, 
Hungary, and Romania from 1933 to 1939 were examined through the paradigm of 
Hitler's major foreign policy achievements to explore this prevalent notion and to discern 
why the foreign policies of these governments failed. These included his rise to power in 
1933, the remilitarization of the Rhineland, the Anschluss with Austria, the 
dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, and the invasion of Poland.  Specifically, the 
reactions of these four nations to German action and their relationships with each other 
were examined.  It was found that their foreign policies ended in failure due to their 
inability to substitute shortsighted national objectives that focused on regional revision at 
the expense of their neighbors for regional security directed against German 
expansionism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1919 the victorious powers of the First World War convened at Versailles to 
decide the fate of the post-war world.  Before them was no easy task.  In their triumph, 
three great empires had collapsed under the strain of four years of the most horrendous 
warfare the world had yet seen.  It was now their job to reconstitute Europe from the 
rubble of the old.  New nations were created.  Existing ones were enlarged and expanded.  
All this was done primarily at the expense of the defeated Central Powers.  Poland and 
Lithuania were returned to the map of Europe and, with the dissolution of the Habsburg 
Empire, an independent Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Austria were created.  Romania 
also benefited, receiving Transylvania for its participation during the war.  All told, from 
the Baltic to the Black Sea in 1919, seven countries existed where three had been.  While 
unthinkable at the time, the treaty intended to preserve the peace would be shattered by 
war within twenty years. 
 On September 1, 1939, Adolf Hitler again plunged Europe into conflict in his bid 
to impose German hegemony across the continent and secure his Third Reich’s thousand 
year future.  His war would last until 1945, resulting in the deaths of more than forty 
million Europeans.1  Unlike the previous conflict, the Second World War was not the 
result of a complicated chain-reaction that dragged the continent into war.  Rather, it was 
initiated by Hitler, with the singular purpose of conquest and extermination.  The spark 
that characterized the origins of the first was also absent from the second, as the 
crescendo that led to the German invasion of Poland was long in duration.  Given Hitler’s 
focus on East Central Europe with an increasingly aggressive foreign policy, the question 
was when, not how. 
 This work focuses primarily on the foreign policies of four of those East Central 
European nations: Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Lithuania during the interwar period 
from January 1933 until September 1939.  During this period, each of the four countries 
followed the continent as a whole in the long, slow slide towards war.  Their relationships 
with the Hitler regime were, however, fundamentally different from those of the other 
European Great Powers, in that they were active participants in the revisionist process 
that eventually culminated in the Second World War and the region’s downfall.  This 
leaves us, then, with the question: why did these four independent nations, each either 
new to the map or newly configured by the treaty of Versailles, slowly succumb to 
Germany and Hitler from 1933-1939?  The answer is rooted in the complexities of the 
region. 
 The tumultuous aftermath of the First World War deeply affected the 
development of East Central Europe, with political power eventually becoming 
consolidated by reactionary, authoritarian regimes.  The governments of Poland, 
Hungary, Lithuania, and Romania were each fervently nationalistic and, through their 
political aims, sought to give expression to that sentiment.  For Hungary and Romania, 
this meant actively seeking or maintaining, respectively, their historic frontiers.  The 
Polish and Lithuanian regimes were equally committed to restoring their nations’ historic 
territories and influence.  Because their policies and political aims were directed against 
each other, however, as a whole, the region was profoundly committed to collective 
security as a means of protection from the ambitions of their neighbors.   
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 With Hitler’s appointment as German Chancellor on January 30, 1933, all that 
changed.  The relative stability that had characterized East Central European international 
politics was jolted by the emergence of a regime that, at its core, was expressly 
revisionist and committed to overturning the Treaty of Versailles.  Hitler’s Germany was 
a threat to the established order.  But in that danger, the governments of Poland, Hungary, 
Lithuania, and Romania each saw opportunity.  The dynamism of the Third Reich’s 
foreign policy could be utilized as a catalyst for their own national agendas.  Initially, the 
risks were minimal.  Germany, in 1933, was not yet the military power it would become 
later in the decade.  Hitler needed calm, amicable relations with his neighbors while he 
consolidated his hold on power at home.  This afforded the Polish, Hungarian, 
Lithuanian, and Romanian governments the occasion to advance their own foreign policy 
aims.  However, as the decade progressed and German foreign policy successes 
accumulated, each nation began altering its policy goals in response to Hitler’s advance.  
They began reacting to Hitler, and, in doing so, each found itself either outmaneuvered, 
outfoxed, or overpowered by the Third Reich.  In the end, all four countries became 
subjugated by Germany, willingly or not. 
 The opportunities provided by a revisionist Germany were, however, a double-
edged sword.  In working with Hitler in myopic pursuit of the rapid realization of their 
individual foreign policy goals, each became complicit in the undermining of the region’s 
already weak commitment to collective security.  Without this system of support, 
however weak or ineffectual it may have been, Hitler was able to exploit their national 
interests and regional aims for his own purposes and slowly but surely isolate them from 
each other.  United, perhaps they could have checked German expansionism.  Divided, 
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they hardly stood a chance.  Working with Hitler, they became instruments of their own 
downfall.   
 This process was gradual, taking place over six years in three distinct stages.  To 
reflect this progression, the work is divided thematically into sections that encompass 
each of those distinct phases.  The first, in which Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, and 
Romania began to move away from their western alliances and towards cautious 
friendship with Hitler, took place from 1933 until the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 
March 1936.  From the 1936 until the Anschluss, or union, with Austria in March 1938, 
the four governments had shifted their alignment to a place somewhere in between the 
two polemics.  While not committed to either the West or to Germany, their behavior was 
reflective of broader continental uncertainties.  The final phase, which lasted from the 
aftermath of the Anschluss until Germany’s invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, 
saw each nation become more directly involved with Hitler and the Third Reich.  This 
framework also serves a secondary purpose, and that is to demonstrate the importance of 
Hitler’s foreign policy to the region and the effect it had on East Central Europe.   
 It is also the intent of this work to comment on the ongoing intentionalist and 
functionalist debate.2  In specific ways, each interpretation of Hitler’s foreign policy has 
merit and validity in the proper context.  Broadly, the foreign policy that Hitler presented 
to Gyula Gömbös, the Hungarian Prime Minister from 1932-1936, during his state visit at 
Berchtesgaden on June 17-18, 1933, was identical to the policy outlined in the later 1937 
Hossbach memorandum.  The latter document is often regarded by intentionalist 
historians as proof of Hitler’s malevolent, expansionist objectives.3  Taking into account 
the similarities between the June 1933 conversation and the 1937 memorandum, it is 
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clear that not only did Hitler have definite objectives in mind at this early date, but 
expected to carry them out, as he eventually did, in 1938.   
 Conversely, the core of A. J. P Taylor’s argument forwarded in his Origins of the 
Second World War – that Hitler reacted just as much as he acted – has demonstrated an 
equal validity, although in a more limited way.  For instance, had Hitler manipulated 
events in their entirety during the Sudeten crisis in September 1938, the result would 
have been Czechoslovakia’s dismemberment in a localized war by her three neighbors: 
Germany, Poland, and Hungary.  The affair did not, however, go according to plan.  
Hungary’s armies were supposed to draw Czech forces from the German frontier, 
allowing the Wehrmacht to cross the mountainous Bohemian border with significantly 
less resistance.  However, when events reached their climax, the Hungarians developed 
an acute case of cold feet, and Budapest refused to do little more than engage in saber 
rattling.4  Their behavior was justified.  The Hungarian military was woefully unprepared 
for any offensive operations and had enough ammunition to sustain only two days of 
fighting.5  Even if war had broken out and the conflict remained localized, it is debatable 
how useful Budapest’s divisions would have been to the operation.  Poland’s 
participation in the Czechoslovakian crisis of 1938, while complimentary to Hitler’s 
plans, was not orchestrated by the German government.6  Berlin had been made aware of 
Polish designs earlier in the year, and since Warsaw’s political objectives complimented 
their own operation, the Germans related their approval.7  As it was with the Hungarians, 
Polish action turned out to be less in practice than promise.  Combined, the impact of 
independent Polish and Hungarian policy decisions prevented Hitler from achieving the 
fait accompli that he desired.  This forced him to the negotiating table in 1938.8  Even at 
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this late stage, the Poles and Hungarians were still acting largely of their own volition.  
By remaining inert when Hitler needed them to act, they retained their ability to act 
independently and forced Germany’s dictator to react to them.  This does not support 
Taylor’s thesis that the Second World War originated from a confluence of random 
events.  It does, however, demonstrate that his views still have their place if put in the 
proper context. 
   In researching this work, numerous sources, both primary and secondary, were 
consulted.  Interest in the region as a whole, and especially the foreign policies of East 
Central European governments, has increased substantially over the last thirty years.  
However, despite this, many of the primary sources remain economically and physically 
unavailable.  Fortunately, an excellent selection of secondary material that is drawn from 
the primary sources is readily accessible.  This has made it possible, in conjunction with 
German, Polish, and British official sources, to cross-reference the unavailable material 
with relevant secondary sources that base their argumentation on otherwise inaccessible 
documents, making it possible to verify the accuracy of the secondary material.  
Although an indirect approach, the methodology has proved to be reliable and accurate.   
 It is not a requirement for any nation to work with others for any reason.  Survival 
and the advancement of its own objectives are its mandate.  However, it is necessary to 
look beyond the present and into the future.  The weighing of distant possibilities, 
deciding upon desired results, and choosing a course of action to achieve those ends, are 
charges demanded of responsible leadership.  In this, the governments of Poland, 
Hungary, Lithuania, and Romania failed.  Although each regime understood the 
importance of regional unity and collective security, they eventually abandoned that 
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pursuit in favor of making gains at the expense of their neighbors.  This undercut the 
region’s strength, meager as it was, and eventually contributed to the nightmare of each 
national leader: being caught in the middle of a conflict between Germany and the Soviet 
Union.  All Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, and Romania had to offer to such an event was a 
theater of war and subservience to the victor. 
CHAPTER 1: AWAY FROM THE WEST 
 
Shortly after noon on Monday, January 30, 1933, Adolf Hitler and the new 
nationalist cabinet trooped into Reich President Paul von Hindenburg’s rooms at the 
Reich Chancellery, still arguing over Hitler’s continued demands for new Reichstag 
elections following his appointment as Chancellor.  Their meeting had been scheduled for 
an hour earlier, but bickering over this point had delayed Hitler’s “providential” moment, 
much to the annoyance of the aging Hindenburg.  Following formalities and a short 
speech by the President, Hitler swore an oath to fulfill his constitutional obligations for 
the good of the nation.  Only twelve years later, upon the shattered ruins of the Third 
Reich, would the hollowness of the words spoken that afternoon be clear.  That wintery 
January day was not, however, the downfall of Hitler’s Germany but the final death knell 
for the republic that had preceded it.  Democracy had been dead for some time, with only 
its façade remaining intact.  Its passing was not solemnly observed either.  Instead, it was 
mourned that day by an anxious, silent crowd gathered along the Wilhelmstrasse by 
Joseph Goebbels and given its funerary procession later that evening by torchlight.1  
Much as it eventually went down in flames, so was the Third Reich born. 
 For the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, that otherwise nondescript 
day and short, unremarkable ceremony was the culmination of more than a decade of 
struggle.  The violence in the streets, the fighting over how to achieve the party’s ends, 
the electoral victories and defeats, the political compromises and the near dissection of 
the party were all vindicated in that moment.  To the average German, its meaning was 
largely derived from an individual’s political persuasion.  Communists and socialists 
shortly came to view it as a day of dread, while to the political Right it was a triumph.  
For the rest, their ballot decision in November 1932 tacitly expressed their discontent 
with what the chaotic republican system had become and their ideological sympathies for 
National Socialism.2  To Germany’s East Central European neighbors, it equally was a 
day of mixed emotions. 
I 
 Poland, the recipient of vast swaths of German territory as a result of the 
Versailles settlement and perennial target of revisionist rhetoric, viewed this as merely a 
changing of the guard and expected a continuation of Berlin’s anti-Polish policies.3  
Relations between the two countries had, since Poland’s reemergence following the First 
World War, been strained due to their mutually antagonistic behavior.  At the heart of 
their rancor was the territorial concessions Germany had been forced to make to its newly 
created neighbor, a condition that successive Weimar governments never accepted.  
Consequently, a “Prussian” policy was actively pursued by Berlin throughout the 1920s 
and early 1930s, which aimed at recovering the Corridor, the small strip of land that 
provided Poland with access to the sea, and reuniting East Prussia with Germany proper.  
The return of Danzig (Gdańsk), which had become a Free City under the administration 
of the League of Nations, and the coal rich region of Upper Silesia was also desired. 4  
Because of the military limitations imposed upon Germany by the Versailles Treaty, 
Berlin was forced to pursue its revisionism peacefully.  On numerous occasions, though, 
the German leadership was keen to articulate that this was not their preferred 
methodology and that whenever the military option became viable, it could be pursued.5 
 This tense atmosphere over territory created a powder-keg-like environment in 
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which any minor incident seemed to have the potential to ignite an armed conflict 
between the two nations, although the bluster was more for international prestige and 
appearances.  One such incident on July 31, 1932, involved Baron von Rintelen, the 
German charge d’affaires in Warsaw, angrily removing a Polish naval ensign from his 
fence during a national celebration.  Von Rintelen had taken particular exception to the 
flag’s placement, because it reminded him that Poland had become a naval power at 
Germany’s expense.  The Polish government viewed this action as a direct insult to its 
national honor, and August Zalewski, Poland’s Foreign Minister, formally demanded von 
Rintelen’s resignation.6  Berlin attempted to smooth over the incident but found no 
sympathetic ear.  Even the normally moderate Colonel Józef Beck, who was vying to 
replace Zalewski and was conducting a shadow foreign policy different in character from 
his superior’s, was highly vocal in his condemnation and outrage over the incident. 
 As was characteristic of German-Polish relations during this period prior to 
Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor, this rather innocuous matter was blown entirely out 
of proportion by both sides.  National pride and bitterness aside, the behavior of the two 
governments in this instance was demonstrative of the antagonism between Berlin and 
Warsaw.  This downward spiral carried the indelible mark of Versailles but was more the 
result of conscious foreign policy decisions made by each government. 
 Germany had, since Gustav Stresemann’s brief Chancellorship in 1923, pursued a 
policy that fostered better relations with Britain and France and recognized the Reich’s 
western border while deliberately precipitating uncertainty and mistrust with Poland.  
This is evidenced in the 1925 Locarno treaties, specifically the Rhineland Pact portion 
signed by Germany, Italy, Britain, France, and Belgium, which renounced the use of 
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violence between the signatories and pledged mutual assistance by all parties in the event 
one was attacked by the other.  A similar treaty was signed with Poland, although it 
offered nothing in the way of territorial guarantees, only pledging to eschew violence in 
the resolving of differences and to subject disagreements to international arbitration.  If, 
in the latter half of the 1920s, Berlin remained true to the “spirit of Locarno” and worked 
for a general Western European détente, then the Reich government made only the most 
cursory efforts in the east.  No bullets were fired, but a war of words raged.  The German 
government had made a technical distinction between the requirements of the treaty and 
the geist that it was supposed to embody, noting that only war was forbidden, but that 
Locarno expressly said nothing about verbal assaults.7  It was with this attitude that the 
German government dealt with Poland, making liberal use of inflammatory rhetoric that 
was intended to for domestic consumption.  This tactic allowed Berlin to assuage public 
demands for border revision and portrayed the government as actively seeking that end.8 
 In reality, it was all Germany could do.  The Treaty of Versailles limited its armed 
forces to a strength of 10 divisions, 3 of which were arrayed on the Polish border.  Facing 
it across the frontier were five Corps (15 divisions), totaling half of the entire Polish 
army.  The German Defense Minister, the retired General Wilhelm Groener, even 
remarked that in the event of a conflict with Poland, the “German army would have to 
withdraw to the Oder” and would be unable to undertake offensive operations.  
Compounding the fear of a Polish surprise attack and the Reichswehr’s numerical 
inferiority to its potential adversary was a belief that any attempt at bringing about 
territorial revision in the east would unite the Locarno Powers against Germany in a war 
that it stood no chance of winning.  On the other side of the border, the Polish army was 
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in an equally defensive posture, held in check by the fear of a qualitative German edge in 
troop training and tactics.  In the event of hostilities, its battle-plan called for the 
elimination of the German exclave of East Prussia to ensure access to the sea, but no 
drive for Berlin.9 
 It was, equally, all Poland was capable of.  For all of Warsaw’s blustering and 
bravado, the horrendous state of the Polish economy prevented any possibility of 
launching and sustaining a major offensive against Germany.  The Stresemann-initiated 
tariff war had exacted its toll, compounding the effects of the Great Depression and 
exacerbating the nation’s socioeconomic woes.10  Poland’s trust in its once staunch ally 
France was also beginning to wane, and the construction of the Maginot Line raised 
serious doubts as to the true nature of French commitment to the region.11  If a conflict 
were to erupt, it was very likely that Poland would face Germany alone while threatened 
by massive civil unrest on the home front.  These were possibilities on which Marshal 
Józef Piłsudski, Poland’s dictator since seizing power in a military coup d’etat in 1926, 
was not willing to gamble. 
 Thus, on the eve of Hitler’s rise to power, the threat of war between the two East 
Central European neighbors was far more imagined than real, although the two sides did 
not behave as if that were so.  In Warsaw, it was generally expected that the fury of the 
Nazi movement would be directed against Poland first, and, consequently, the 
government warned all of its diplomats abroad about this likely reorientation of German 
policy.12  Hitler himself was equally fearful of hostilities, warning Colonel Walther von 
Reichenau in East Prussia in December that the uncertain political situation in Germany 
provided a conducive atmosphere for a surprise Polish attack.13  However, it is the 
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perception of reality rather than reality itself that ultimately influences behavior.  In the 
case of German-Polish relations in the months following Hitler’s appointment, this 
shaped the interaction between the Hitler and Piłsudski regimes and created the 
emergence of a new demeanor in Polish foreign policy. 
 The years of bad relations between Germany and Poland had created an 
atmosphere filled with tension and mistrust, and this mood carried itself over, 
inaugurating the new era with a crisis that was little more than a continuation of the 
problems of the past.  On February 15, 1933, the Danzig senate notified the Polish 
government that it intended to withdraw the Polish detachment of harbor police and 
replace it with a force under its own jurisdiction; coincidentally, on the same day, 
Colonel Józef Beck, the new Polish Foreign Minister, was presenting his first official 
address stressing calm in dealing with Hitler and National Socialism.14  As Warsaw had 
no control over this force, it was feared that this act was a precursory step to facilitate a 
Nazi takeover of the city through the infiltration of undetected Sturmabteilung (SA) or 
other German nationalist paramilitary units which, once gaining control of Danzig, would 
then ask Berlin to be annexed to the Reich.15  Rumors of an impending assault on the 
Polish garrison and munitions depot on the Westerplatte further fueled this concern, and 
on March 5, 1933, Piłsudski decided to reinforce the garrison with 120 additional 
troops.16  The next morning, the military transport Wilja landed at the Westerplatte with 
the reinforcements, bringing the total Polish presence up to 208 soldiers who secured the 
munitions depot.  The attack and takeover that prompted the action never occurred, and 
the entire matter was resolved through an emergency meeting of the Council of the 
League of Nations on March 13.17 
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 While on the surface this incident is nondescript and characteristic of German-
Polish relations as they had been conducted prior to Hitler’s rise to power, several 
important distinctions must be made.  Although the reinforcement sent to the garrison 
was little more than a token gesture, it was the first time that a German affront to Polish 
interests had been met with direct action.18  The response was not random but carefully 
calculated and conceived by Piłsudski as a lively “energetic act” that was intended to be a 
psychological and tactical test of Hitler and his regime’s mettle.19  Strategically, the 
move was designed to be provocative and elicit a response that could be closely observed 
so as to ascertain Germany’s actual state of readiness in the event of armed conflict.20  
The date for the action was also chosen for shock value, as it coincided with the German 
Reichstag elections.  To add yet another layer of complexity to the matter, Beck and 
Piłsudski had also intended for the move to serve as a message to Britain and France that 
Poland would no longer tolerate any ideas of border revision to satiate German claims 
and to indicate to the French that Poland would, in the future, be conducting an 
independent foreign policy.21 
 The cumulative effect of this scheming was twofold.  First, it dispelled the 
international belief that Poland was merely one of France’s numerous East Central 
European clients.22  This message was particularly directed at Great Britain, a nation that, 
according to Beck, Poland had no direct contact with before 1933, but it was equally 
intended for the international community at large.  Second, it was the first conscious step 
by the Polish government to assert itself as the Great Power that it was beginning to 
believe itself to be.  Although such a claim would not be made publicly by Warsaw, the 
behavior and decisions made by Piłsudski and Beck indicate that Poland was taking an 
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affirmative step in that direction.  The positive resolution of the incident, from Warsaw’s 
perspective, also initiated the process of psychological confidence in that reality-divorced 
schema. 
 On the heels of this modest success, Piłsudski apparently unleashed the boldest 
and most audacious Polish foreign policy initiative since Poland’s reconstitution in 1919: 
an offer of preventative war against Hitler to Warsaw’s principal ally, France.  But was 
such a proposal ever made?  Accounts of this offer permeate the historiography covering 
the period and, judging by the frequency with which references to this appear, it deserves 
special consideration.  Although the various accounts disagree as to exactly how far along 
Piłsudski’s scheme developed, it is clear that it was, at the very least, conceptualized.23  
As to the extent that consideration was given to this scheme, accounts differ wildly.  
Some sources relate that it was carefully considered before being rejected by Piłsudski 
himself, while others indicate that the proposal was formally extended to the French 
before being declined.  The truth lies somewhere in between. 
 According to Beck and his wife Jadwega, the Marshal considered the idea, 
weighing both the pros and cons and even going as far as to conduct an informal survey 
of opinion in government circles.  Ultimately, the relative weakness of the Polish military 
caused him to discard the notion of preventative war as a plausible policy line.24 
 The fact that Piłsudski even considered the issue seems odd, given that he was 
quite pleased with Hitler’s rise to power and believed him to be less dangerous to Poland 
than previous German leaders.  What Piłsudski truly wanted was an understanding with 
Hitler based on the existing territorial settlement, as his greatest fear was a further 
reduction of Poland’s territory.25  To achieve this end and bring the Germans to the 
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negotiating table, he purposely concocted and spread rumors of a preventative war in 
conjunction with France and Britain through diplomatic channels. 
 The entire episode, then, was a ruse.  Jules Laroche, the French Ambassador to 
Warsaw from 1926 to 1935, would have been the logical recipient and messenger in the 
event such a proposal was offered, but recorded in his memoirs that he received no 
communication to that effect.  Laroche found the entire matter unbelievable, as he could 
not see Piłsudski risking his military reputation on an uncertain war with Germany when 
he had already secured his warrior’s legacy by defeating the Soviet Union in 1920.  
Poland’s ambassador to Berlin, Józef Lipski, speculated that Piłsudski likely sent the 
offer through military channels, which the Marshal trusted for discretionary reasons, 
although no proof that the suggestion was floated to the French in this manner exists 
either.  Édouard Daladier, the French Defense Minister, was unaware of the proposal, as 
was General Maxime Weygand, the French Army’s Chief of Staff, who stated that he 
“never heard of any such overture of Piłsudski.”26 
 Naturally, the French could not reject something that they never received.  
However, the offer, or rather the rumor of it, was never intended for them.  The entire 
affair was a diplomatic follow-up to the Westerplatte incident and designed to be a 
continuation of Piłsudski’s new approach to foreign policy and furthering of Warsaw’s 
ongoing psychological test of Hitler.  Within that framework, from the Polish 
perspective, the ruse was a complete success.  Towards the end of the year, feelers put 
out by Warsaw began to indicate that the Germans were interested in reaching an 
understanding with Poland. 
This rising tide of amicability resulted in the January 26, 1934, German-Polish 
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non-aggression pact.  Although little more than a hollow expression of superficial 
goodwill, the temporary security it offered was exactly what Piłsudski wanted.  However, 
the Marshal was pragmatic in assessing the document’s true meaning, noting that it likely 
meant that Hitler had merely postponed his designs on Poland until Germany was as 
strong as the Führer wished before he would risk war.27  This was in agreement with 
Piłsudski’s conceptions of foreign policy, which predicted behavior based on a simple 
risk-return assessment.  Within this framework, Piłsudski and his protégé Beck were 
certain that internal and external forces precluded any chance of Germany gaining 
meaningful and lasting results from military action, leaving the Reich predisposed to an 
accord.28  Placing faith in prognostic formulas is always highly dubious, but in this 
instance, Beck’s instincts proved correct. 
 The degree to which the threat of preventative war played a part in bringing about 
the German-Polish rapprochement is debatable, as there were numerous factors that 
contributed to the conclusion of the agreement.  First and foremost was the state of affairs 
within Germany, which was no less chaotic in the inaugural months of Nazi rule than 
during the dying days of the republic.  The daily orgies of street violence instigated by an 
unleashed SA were spiraling out of control, resulting in public anger in even pro-Nazi 
circles.29  For political reasons, Hitler did little to rein in the Brown Shirts even though, 
as the year progressed, the organization began to constitute a serious threat to his power.  
Ernst Röhm, the head of the SA, was calling for a second revolution and, by the end of 
1933, had all but publicly split with Hitler.  Röhm’s continued calls for incorporating the 
SA into the Reichswehr were also creating difficulties for Hitler with the military, which 
was ramping up to its crescendo at nearly the same time the non-aggression treaty was 
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signed in late January.30  The German economy, for all the NSDAP rhetoric and 
propaganda to the contrary, was still in a relatively dismal state.  By January 1934, Nazi 
work programs had reduced unemployment totals by roughly 2 million, but this still left 
the overall figure hovering near 4 million.31  Rural areas were the main beneficiaries of 
the Battle for Work, with its focus on road construction and other unskilled, manual 
labor-intensive activities, while industrial and major urban centers felt little relief.32  To 
strengthen his position domestically and prepare for expansion on a grand scale in the 
east, Hitler needed calm and quiet, conditions that war with Poland certainly would not 
provide.   
 Piłsudski’s rumor of preventative war, which he began spreading in March, 
coincided with the initiation of both the German works programs and the escalating 
problems with Röhm and the SA, adding yet one more concern to an already extensive 
list.  This undoubtedly had some sort of psychological effect on Hitler, making him 
anxious to lessen the tension with his eastern neighbor, as he could not be entirely sure 
whether Piłsudski was bluffing or not.33  However, he would not cave to Polish threats.  
At a May 1933 meeting with Alfred Wysocki, the first Polish ambassador to Berlin, 
Hitler flatly refused to consider any special position for the Poles in Danzig but did 
emphasize that territorial revision could not be achieved by war, a position that resonated 
positively when it was related back to Warsaw.34  He followed this encounter with a 
speech at the Reichstag on May 17, 1933, that stressed his desire for peace in Europe and 
outlined a broad foreign policy that Germany would follow to that end, subtly aiming it in 
Warsaw’s direction.35  To demonstrate sincerity, Hitler restrained the Danzig Nazis, 
ushering in a period of relative calm and nullifying, for the moment, the most contentious 
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issue between the two countries.36  An ending of the Stresemann-instigated eight-year 
tariff war further sweetened the pot.  All of these gestures were contrary to the advice 
Hitler was receiving from Constantin von Neurath, Germany’s Foreign Minister, and 
Herbert von Dirksen, the German ambassador to Moscow, who both stressed that only 
continuous revisionist agitation with regard to Poland rather than conciliation could effect 
a proper territorial settlement.37  Germany’s Führer did not, however, heed their council, 
as his main objective was rearming the Reich and preparing it for war.  An arrangement 
with Poland, like all other foreign policy matters, would be a temporary exigency that 
was not intended to outlast its usefulness.  A deal would be made. 
 Piłsudski and Hitler were both seeking the same end but by contrary means and 
for drastically different purposes.  It was Piłsudski who took the first step toward 
rapprochement, sending Lipski to Berlin in late autumn with orders to speak directly with 
Hitler on the matter.  The diplomat and the dictator met on November 15, with Lipski 
relating Piłsudski’s critical message about “the necessity” of taking “steps to reinforce 
security” not only for the present, but for the future as well, as anything less would result 
in “the loss of a security factor in German-Polish relations.”38  The threat was implicit 
and, although no direct reference to the possibility of preventative war was made, it was 
fear of that scenario that Piłsudski hoped to conjure in German minds.  It was not 
necessary.  At the meeting Hitler spoke of his desire to work with Poland bilaterally to 
resolve differences between the two countries and even alluded to a future settlement of 
certain problems via compensation, and, unknown to Lipski, a draft non-aggression 
agreement had already been drawn up by the Auswärtiges Amt, or German Foreign 
Office.39  The draft was presented to Piłsudski in Warsaw the next week on November 27 
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at the same time Lipski received a copy from von Neurath.  Piłsudski gave no immediate 
reply and departed the same day for Vilnius to mull the proposal over. 
 Given the context of the German document, it is understandable that the Poles 
were less than enthralled.  The draft, in its opening paragraph, offered a direct insult to 
Polish national honor, alluding to the fact that Poland owed its very existence to the 
Treaty of Versailles and in further paragraphs made numerous references to the need for a 
“just” settlement between Germany and Poland.40  Such innuendos pertaining to the 
lands stripped from Germany were not unnoticed, nor was the fact that the “important 
problems” were left undefined and vague, theoretically enabling either party to elevate 
any issue to that level and pursue arbitrational recourse without guilt.41  Whether the 
language of the draft was specifically chosen by Hitler to test Poland’s upper-limits of 
accommodation or the text was inserted independently by hostile bodies within the 
Auswärtiges Amt intending to kill the agreement is unclear, as either possibility was 
equally plausible.  Whatever the case may have been, Piłsudski remained mute on the 
issue and made no counterproposal until January 9, 1934.42   
 Talks continued until January 20, with the Germans growing anxious for the 
finalization of the declaration.  It was during this period of intense negotiations over 
highly technical but immensely significant language that Lipski truly shined as a 
plenipotentiary, gaining Berlin’s acquiescence to virtually all the Polish demands, 
including Piłsudski’s requirement that the agreement be short and devoid of “chancery 
devices.”43  On January 24 the document was complete, requiring only signatures to 
make it official.  
 In a rare instance of mutual satisfaction with a negotiated agreement, both the 
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parties involved were able to leave the table contented.  Hitler had achieved his main 
objective, a temporary détente with his eastern neighbor, which freed his hand to focus on 
other equally pressing foreign and domestic issues.  He also added a significant reference 
of peaceful intent to his resume, which he could, in the future, exploit.  Piłsudski was 
equally pleased with the outcome, as he had had to give up nothing to secure the 
arrangement.  Further, the declaration, coupled with Warsaw’s similar 1932 non-
aggression treaty with the Soviet Union, placed Poland in a position the Marshal felt was 
favorable, as it allowed for some semblance of balance between Poland’s historically 
hostile neighbors.44  More important and dangerous for Poland was yet another 
confirmation that Warsaw’s new approach to foreign policy was correct, as it was based 
on the belief that Great Power posturing had effected the results rather than the specific 
circumstances that actually did.  Piłsudski may have been pragmatic about the whole 
episode, but success is like liquor: the more one tastes, the drunker one becomes.  The 
Marshal may, in this instance, have been stoically holding his vodka, but his protégé 
Beck was certainly becoming emboldened by its effects. 
II 
 In Hungary, the initial reaction to Hitler’s appointment as chancellor was 
generally positive in government circles.  The Prime Minister, Gyula Gömbös, was one 
of the first world leaders to send a letter of congratulations to the Nazi leader, alluding to 
the common principles and ideology of the two regimes and urging closer trade relations.  
In that letter, Gömbös also expressed a desire for closer cooperation between the Magyar 
and German minorities in the various successor states of East Central Europe, as this was, 
in his mind, essential to any future political collaboration.45  Although the latter point 
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never materialized in any concrete fashion, the ideological similarities to which Gömbös 
alluded would shortly form the cornerstone of a very complicated and deeply intimate 
relationship that was to last until the fall of the Third Reich. 
 Hungary, like Germany, had been divested of much of its historic territory by the 
Treaty of Trianon in 1920, with almost two thirds of the kingdom being either awarded to 
neighbors that had fought with the Allies during the First World War or used to create the 
successor nations of the defeated Dual-Monarchy.46  Every country that shared a frontier 
with Hungary profited in some way from the redistribution of its lands, although 
Romania was by far the greatest beneficiary, receiving a larger portion of Hungarian 
territory than what remained of the Magyar state itself.47  The economic impact of 
Trianon was equally devastating, stripping Hungary of 59 percent of its transportation 
infrastructure and incredible amounts of natural resources.48  Hungarian manufacturing 
and industry were not affected nearly as much in terms of lost capacity potential as most 
of its factories were in and around Budapest.  However, its industry was severed from its 
primary raw material supplies and markets, placing the nation largely at the mercy of its 
neighbors.49  To add further insult to injury, more than 3 million ethnic Magyars were 
expatriated from their homeland and placed under the rule of foreign governments.50  
While the combined effects of Trianon did not specifically predispose Hungary to 
eventual collaboration with Nazi Germany, the indelible mark the treaty left on the 
national psyche all but ensured that revisionism would never be more than a fleeting 
thought away. 
 This was especially true and made manifest in all aspects of political life in 
Hungary throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, where Trianon revisionism enjoyed 
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virtually unanimous support and endorsement on both sides of the political spectrum.  
The only dissenting voices came from the few Social Democrats who were generally 
willing to accept the loss of the non-ethnic Hungarian lands but still demanded revision 
of the treaty to bring the Magyar majority areas outside Budapest’s domain back under 
Hungarian control.  Such sentiments were limited in their acceptance, failing to permeate 
down to the working classes or their parties, and were entirely absent from the dialogue 
of the conservative and radical Right, which called for, and actively sought, revision of 
Trianon.51  Revision was, however, well nigh impossible to achieve in any material way.  
The Treaty of Trianon had severely reduced Hungary’s military, limiting its size to 
35,000 men and prohibiting the retention of a General Staff, rendering the institution 
largely a glorified police force.52  Hungary’s neighbors Yugoslavia, Romania, and 
Czechoslovakia were also arrayed in a defensive alliance, known as the Little Entente, 
which was directed at preventing Hungarian revision and aggression, providing for a very 
real deterrent against such hubristic inclinations. 
 This inability to effect the desired revision did little to quiet the voices calling for 
its realization within the country, resulting in a slow but steady increase in the 
radicalization of populist right-wing domestic politics.  The crass nature of these quasi-
fascist movements had a limited influence on the aristocratic and traditionally 
conservative elements that dominated Hungarian society, as the aspirations of the 
national elite were already directed at restoring the glory of the kingdom’s historic past. 
As border revision was implicit in their thinking, this lead to a certain degree of 
intermingling between the factions based solely on the ends they wished to achieve.53  
Still, by the autumn of 1932, economic instability and the effects of the global depression 
23 
 
forced Admiral Miklós Horthy, the Hungarian regent and much clichéd naval commander 
without a fleet, to incorporate elements of the radical Right into the government; and in 
October he asked Gömbös to accept the position of Prime Minister and form a cabinet.54   
 Despite Gömbös’ advocacy for the reorganization of Hungary as a one-party state 
along totalitarian lines, the aristocratic conservatives that put him in power effectively 
curtailed his more extreme positions once he assumed the driver’s seat.  As a condition of 
his appointment, Gömbös was forced to publicly disavow his rabid anti-Semitism and 
place members of the rightist, conservative István Bethlen era political machine in key 
administration positions.  He had to promise to maintain the current governmental 
structure, theoretically limiting his freedom of action in an effort by Horthy to purchase 
his services, rather as Hindenburg and von Papen attempted to do with Hitler three 
months later.55  Although similarities between the two situations seemed parallel, Horthy, 
unlike Hindenburg with Hitler, was indebted to Gömbös, whom he had come to know 
and respect during the tumultuous year 1919, when the latter sponsored his command of 
the Hungarian counterrevolutionary army and later directed the more violent aspects of 
the “white terror” that followed in the wake of the Hungarian Socialist Republic’s 
collapse.56  Whatever the true nature of Horthy’s personal feelings, the move was entirely 
tactical on his end and only really intended to placate the growing extreme-right.  
However, once in power, the energetic Gömbös wasted little time in making his presence 
felt, forwarding a ninety-five point national work plan that was entirely fascist in 
character, promising, among other things, national unity and economic reform.57  In the 
realm of foreign policy, he followed up the April 4, 1927, peace and cooperation 
agreement Bethlen signed with Mussolini, by reaffirming its general position and 
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extending the treaty’s trade aspects to provide relief for Hungarian farmers desperate for 
markets to offload their surplus wheat.58 
 The next major foreign policy initiative for Gömbös would come in June 1933, 
when he worked out a trade and compensation agreement between Hungary and 
Germany.  Although a rather mundane matter, the deal was significant for two important 
reasons.  The first was that it further alleviated the national economic woes by providing 
another outlet for agricultural surplus, and the second because it inaugurated the new 
Southeast European policy of Hitlerite Germany.59  With regard to the former, the 
benefits for Hungary were obvious.  The nation had been virtually isolated internationally 
until the late 1920s, with the Bethlen-Mussolini deal marking the first diplomatic step 
towards ending that status and providing Budapest with an ally that could potentially 
assist Hungary in realizing its revisionist aspirations.  This new deal further extricated 
Hungary from international pariahdom and bolstered domestic support for Gömbös and 
Horthy by casting their lot with an international figure who was dedicated to the 
destruction of Versailles and the existing European order.  For Germany, it was an 
important inroad into the region, which held vital resources that were essential to Hitler’s 
autarkic policies and the first tentative move toward economic domination of 
Southeastern Europe.60 
 Fifteen days later, on June 17, Gömbös claimed another international first, 
meeting Hitler at Berchtesgaden to discuss potential future political and diplomatic 
collaboration between the two countries.  As was the German dictator’s style, Hitler 
monopolized the conversation and frankly related to Gömbös the future course of 
German foreign policy.  Specifically, Hitler told the Hungarian Prime Minister that the 
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current European peace settlements could only be revised by force and that, even if 
concessions were wrested from the powers that be, his true aims could only be realized 
through war.61  Conflict with the French would be inevitable and Czechoslovakia would 
be smashed in due course as well.62  Being somewhat of a Hungarian exploratory mission 
in and of itself, Gömbös sounded Hitler out on several issues important to Budapest, 
placing particular emphasis on the state of German-Austrian relations and Berlin’s 
intentions toward its southern neighbor.  The Hungarian leadership viewed an Anschluss, 
or union, between the two German states as something of an inevitability, but, as it was 
expressly forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles and Austria was a vital trading partner 
and conduit for Hungarian goods, such an event was not highly desirable.63  It would, in 
effect, give Germany great power over Hungary through the absorption of one of the 
nation’s key markets and thereby limit its international activities unless Budapest decided 
to forsake a major outlet for its agricultural products.  However, these fears were allayed.  
According to Hitler, there would be no immediate Anschluss.64  On the subject of 
Hungarian revisionism, Gömbös was bitterly disappointed.  Germany would not support 
Hungary in any attempt to regain Transylvania from Romania and would accede to the 
return of only its former lands that contained Magyar majorities in Czechoslovakia.65 
 If Hitler’s rejection of Hungarian aims was a bitter pill to swallow, then the 
uproar, both domestically and abroad that awaited Gömbös when he returned to 
Budapest, was equally difficult to ingest.  At home, many thought that the visit had 
occurred too soon, as the disposition of the West and Little Entente in regard to Hitler 
was still to be seen, and it might elicit a negative international response from those 
sectors.66  Of equal concern was the reaction of Mussolini, who considered Hungary and 
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the Danubian region very much within the Italian sphere of influence.  Moreover, the 
Italian leader was uneasy about any extension of German power in this direction.  Despite 
his initial apprehensions, Mussolini was soon assuaged by Hungarian overtures 
confirming Budapest’s commitment to Rome.  It is probable too that the fact that 
Gömbös left Bavaria with little to show other than personally impressing Hitler with his 
bravery for making the trip amid the uncertainty of its international reception contributed 
to the clamor.  He had risked much and only returned with vague promises to extend the 
trade agreement signed earlier in the month, which would not be completed until 
February 1934.67  As a consolation prize, Hitler reciprocated the Hungarian gesture of 
goodwill by sending von Papen to Budapest in September.  The meeting was of little 
consequence and simply reaffirmed Germany’s position on Hungarian revision, stressing 
the need to focus it northward against Czechoslovakia and to accept the loss of territory 
to Romania and Yugoslavia.68 
 For the remainder of 1933 and into the early months of 1934, Hungarian-German 
relations were courteous in character and the demeanor of their exchanges reserved.  
Budapest’s major concern, German annexation of Austria, seemed like a remote 
possibility for the moment, and Gömbös used this period of relative calm in an attempt to 
further consolidate his domestic position.  He pushed to create the position of vice-prime 
minister and a new economics ministry that would be under his direct control, allowing 
him to shape the economy along fascist lines, but these moves were met with resistance 
by Bethlen conservatives within the business sector, and Gömbös was forced to abandon 
these schemes.69  Ironically, for all his efforts at expanding his own power, the only 
political victory he scored during this period was a measure that greatly extended those of 
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the regent. 
 This brief respite was shattered on July 25, 1934, with the assassination of the 
Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuß by members of the Deutsche 
Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei (DNSAP), the Austrian wing of the Nazi party, in a 
botched coup attempt.  Hitler’s involvement in the putsch was limited and, although it is 
clear that he was aware of it and had given the attempt his tacit approval, it seems that his 
judgment was based on faulty information provided by the Austrian Nazis.  There was to 
be no general uprising and the Austrian military, which Theo Habicht, the titular head of 
the DNSAP, had promised Hitler would support and participate in the putsch, instead 
acted in defense of the government and rapidly subdued the insurrection.70  Mussolini’s 
mobilization and deployment of forces to the Brenner Pass provided a further deterrent 
for any possible action by the Reichswehr, should the situation have developed into a 
full-blown attempt at Anschluss. 
 Although the assassination and July Putsch was largely an internal German affair, 
its occurrence and aftermath placed the Hungarian government in an awkward position 
between Hitler and Germany on one side and Italy and Mussolini on the other.  Gömbös 
had been working on a policy directed at facilitating cooperation and collaboration with 
both Berlin and Rome, aiming towards an eventual tripartite arrangement that included a 
fascist Hungary dominating all of Central and Southeastern Europe.71  The botched 
putsch put a major kink in those plans, generating animosity and discord between the two 
powers that Gömbös wished to bring together.  Equally problematic were Hungary’s 
relations with each country in regard to Budapest’s position on union between Germany 
and Austria.  Acquiescence would improve relations with Berlin and move Hungary 
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closer to Germany, which was exactly what Gömbös desired.  It might even win Hungary 
enough favor with Hitler to regain the Burgenland, a strip of territory lost to Austria as a 
result of the Treaty of Trianon.  However, Mussolini was still opposed to such an event, 
and any outstanding support from the Hungarians in favor of an Anschluss was all but 
certain to complicate relations with Rome.  The sentiment of conservative circles within 
Hungary was equally reserved, as an independent Austria, to a degree, afforded the 
government some latitude in dealing with Germany and maintained the country’s 
freedom of action.  Fortunately for Horthy and Gömbös, no decision on the issue was 
required and the entire matter largely resolved itself.  In this instance, inaction was the 
obvious choice to make amid two equally bad alternatives, and this was exactly what the 
Hungarians did, preferring to defer action until it became clear as to how the situation 
was likely to play itself out.  This would, in the future, become characteristic of 
Budapest’s political behavior, only there would be much more on the line and serious 
consequences for remaining inert when called to act. 
III 
 Lithuania, situated on Europe’s cold Baltic coast, reacted to Hitler’s appointment 
as Reich Chancellor with surprisingly little fervor, treating the Nazi “seizure of power” as 
merely a personnel rotation.  There were no demonstrations, no protests or even outward 
expressions of concern by the government.  General Petras Kubiliūnas, the head of the 
Lithuanian army, related his belief that he did not foresee Germany being a threat to 
Lithuanian interests.72  In fact, it seems that the event only served to confirm the 
prevailing notion that a major shift in the European political climate was occurring and 
that the Lithuanian government had only to decide whether it wished to be part of it or 
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pursue a course in line with the political mainstream.73  However, this was a somewhat 
paradoxical crossroads, as, in its compositional character, Lithuania’s government was 
already part of that discernable rightward movement. 
 Democracy in Lithuania had died on December 17, 1926, during a coup instigated 
by the military and ultranationalist conservatives that toppled the leftist government of 
Kazys Grinius, under the pretext that a communist takeover and invitation for Soviet 
occupation of the country was imminent.  This excuse was a sham, given the fringe 
position occupied by the communist party in Lithuania and its active repression by the 
government.  Widespread enmity for Russian imperialism and a strong sense of 
nationalism, tempered by the war fought between the Bolshevik forces and the nascent 
republic from 1919 to 1920, further made this scenario untenable.  In all probability, the 
entire affair was prompted by a gross overreaction on the part of the “secret association 
of officers” to an unfounded belief that the Siemas, or national parliament, was selling 
out the farmers and peasantry.74  After a brief two-day struggle, Antonas Smetona, 
Lithuania’s first president and one of the primary leaders of the coup, was restored to his 
former office and inaugurated a period of dictatorial rule that was to last until the 
country’s fall and occupation during the Second World War. 
 One of Smetona’s first acts as president was to install Augustinas Voldemaras as 
prime minister.75  Strong-willed, fervently nationalist, and farther to the right in his 
ideology than Smetona, Voldemaras soon molded Lithuania into a state almost entirely 
dependent upon himself, Smetona, and the military for its direction and defense.  Political 
opponents were dealt with through extra-judiciary use of the Geležinis Vilkas, or Iron 
Wolf, organization, which was quasi-fascist in character and loyal to himself and the 
30 
 
paramilitary guard of his Tautininkai, or Nationalist Party.  During his tenure as prime 
minister, he crafted a foreign policy that was centered on Lithuania’s two most vital 
issues: the recovery of the historic capital Vilnius from Poland and maintaining the status 
of the Memel (Klaipėda) region. 
 Memel had been detached from Germany following the First World War and was 
administrated by the French from February 15, 1920, until January 10, 1923.  During this 
three-year period, there had been an ongoing debate as to how the territory would be 
administered in the future, with the arguments being entirely derived from the national 
outlook of the interested parties.  Germany desired the reunion of the region with the 
country proper, and these sentiments were echoed by the large German minority that 
resided there, although free city status was considered a viable alternative, with Poland 
calling for the latter as well.76  The Lithuanian government wanted the Memelland for 
itself, as it would largely unite the majority of Lithuanians under one flag and, perhaps 
more importantly, provide the nation with a desperately needed port.77  The entire 
situation was further complicated by Lithuanian fears that Poland, which Kaunas had had 
no real relations with since the disastrous 1920 war that cost the country Vilnius and one-
third of its territory, may have been willing to exchange the Corridor and Danzig for 
Memel.78  Within the region itself, an organization known as the Supreme Salvation 
Committee of Lithuania Minor provided agitation for annexation to Lithuania proper and 
clandestinely organized the citizenry for a future uprising. 
 On January 10, under the cover of Germany’s default on its war reparations and 
subsequent occupation of the Ruhr industrial region by the French, the Supreme 
Salvation Committee and detachments of the Lithuanian army, disguised in civilian 
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clothing, invaded the Memelland and took control of the local government.79  There were 
protests of the action by the British, French, and Germans, but, as each was encumbered 
by the Ruhr crisis, Lithuania was able to present them with a fait accompli and 
consolidated its gains in relatively short order.  The annexation was later confirmed by 
the League of Nations with the provision that the Memelland be administrated as an 
autonomous region within Lithuania proper, with that status being guaranteed by the 
Great Powers.80 
 This action and the manner in which the Memel territory was administered by 
Lithuania became the focal point of German-Lithuanian relations, with each side using 
the region as leverage against the other for its own ends.  Germany utilized rumors of an 
exchange of the Polish Corridor for acquiescence to Polish acquisition of Memel and 
threatened to refer instances of ill-treatment of the German minority to the League of 
Nations, both matters to which Kaunas was highly sensitive, to extract concessions for its 
expatriates.81  In this way, Berlin was able to block and reverse attempts by Smetona to 
dissolve the regional Seimelis (Landtag for the Germans) in 1927 and 1930, respectively.  
The Lithuanian government was equally opportunistic, dangling promises of better 
treatment for the Memel-Germans in return for Berlin’s support in regaining Vilnius from 
Poland. 
 As a part of the “Voldemaras Course,” the foreign policy scheme that Lithuania 
followed from roughly 1927 until the early 1930s, the conciliatory gesture had almost no 
discernable impact on the country’s relations with Germany.82  Certainly Lithuanian 
prima facie adherence to the League of Nations statues guaranteeing the autonomy of the 
Memelland brought about a degree of amicability in their interactions, but the Reich’s 
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desire for the territory’s return never dissipated.  Germany needed no impetus to 
stimulate its anti-Polish rhetoric, and the cumulative result of the convenience friendship 
was a one-sided bargain that gave Berlin a potential ally to safeguard East Prussia in the 
event of a conflict with Poland without necessitating any reciprocity.83  This made 
Lithuania somewhat dependent upon the Soviet Union for help in regard to the Vilnius 
issue, although in reality little tangible assistance was offered.84  Overall, the 
“Voldemaras Course” was a dangerous charter for Lithuania, as it actively sought the aid 
of two countries, Germany and the Soviet Union, that had very specific designs on the 
Baltic nation that were detrimental to the nation’s health.  Further, collaboration with its 
two neighbors severely undermined Lithuania’s credibility in the West, particularly in 
France, although its true impact was negligible in this regard, as Paris favored Poland 
over Lithuania in the region.85   
 In 1929, Voldemaras was dismissed from office while in Geneva and replaced by 
Juozas Tūbelis.  This was in response to Voldemaras’ increasing involvement with the 
Geležinis Vilkas and movement to the political right, which threatened Smetona’s 
position and was in conflict with his own ideological preferences.86  The installment of 
the new prime minister had little practical bearing on national policy, as Tūbelis was 
Smetona’s brother-in-law and the appointment only served to cover Smetona’s seizure of 
absolute power.  This move also signaled a fundamental change in Lithuanian foreign 
policy, which, under the guidance of Foreign Minister Stasys Lozoraitis, was to favor 
policy coordination with Lithuania’s neighbors and, more importantly, to attempt to 
restore diplomatic ties with Poland.87 
 In theory, the scheme ensured Lithuanian security through a clash of German, 
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Soviet, and Polish interests predicated on each country’s aversion to Lithuania being 
drawn too far into any one sphere.  Should that occur, Lozoraitis assumed that the other 
two would oppose the aggressor.  In practice, affairs were far more complicated.  The 
“Lozoraitis Concept,” as the policy came to be called, did not adequately account for 
Vilnius, which was the lynchpin of Lithuanian policy, but merely served as an 
exploitative issue to Germany and the Soviet Union.  Both countries signed non-
aggression pacts with Poland in 1932 and 1934, respectively, which, for Lithuania, 
dictated that policy coordination entail a détente with Warsaw.  The Lithuanian 
government regarded the return of Vilnius as a prerequisite condition for any easing of 
tensions, but on this issue, the Poles were not to be moved.  Attempts at rapprochement 
were further stymied by Smetona’s insistence that Germany and Russia continue to be 
solicited for support in the Vilnius issue, as the continued attempts only provided Warsaw 
with a pretext for rebuffing Lithuanian overtures.88 
 The “Lozoraitis Concept” and Smetona’s own Viduraine Linija, or non-alignment 
schema, lost their momentum and viability with Hitler’s rise to power, due to his lack of 
immediate interest in Lithuania and Germany’s steadily improving relations with Poland.  
Lithuania, along with the rest of the Baltic region, was a part of Hitler’s Lebensraum 
concept, but that was work for the future.  For the time being, the German dictator needed 
a period of international calm while he consolidated his domestic position and, to this 
end, he signed a trade agreement with Lithuania in 1933 that provided a modest boost to 
the Lithuanian economy and partially repaired flagging relations.89 
 By the winter of 1933 and early 1934, affairs between the two countries had taken 
a decided turn for the worse as a result of increased National Socialist activity among the 
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Memel-German population in Klaipėda.  The Lithuanian government suspected that the 
agitation was being orchestrated from Berlin and began a series of crack-downs on the 
NSDAP affiliated groups, arresting local party leaders and banning the parties on July 13, 
1934.90  The situation continued to simmer for the remainder of the year and into 1935 
when, under the auspices of preventing a National Socialist revolt, the Lithuanian 
authorities arrested and imprisoned many leading figures in NSDAP associated circles.91  
In all, 128 Germans were put on trial for treason against the Lithuanian state and 
undesirable association with the Third Reich, which outraged Hitler and brought about 
economic reprisals.92  The actions of the Lithuanian government may have also 
contributed to the ultimate downfall of an “Eastern Locarno” treaty, as when that issue 
was being discussed by Hitler, Anthony Eden, and John Simon in Berlin on March 25, 
1935, Hitler flew into a spastic rage at the mere mention of Lithuania.93 
 The remainder of 1935 passed in similar fashion, with Germany continuing to 
exert economic pressure on Lithuania with little effect.  However, by the spring of 1936, 
it became clear to Germany that its attempted punishment of Lithuania was having a 
negligible impact and was only really affecting Memel-Germans, as Kaunas had offset 
the economic blow by seeking out new trading partners.94  This forced a reappraisal of 
the situation in Berlin, although Germany’s options were limited.  Hitler had withdrawn 
the country from the League of Nations on October 21, 1933, which became official on 
that same date in 1935, leaving no recourse through that body.  Even if Germany had still 
been a member, it is unlikely that protests would have accomplished much, as the League 
Council had all but given Lithuania carte blanche to handle affairs in the Klaipėda region 
as it deemed appropriate.95  Appeals to the Memelland statute signatories also proved 
35 
 
fruitless, with little more than stern warnings being issued to the Lithuanian government, 
all of which were ignored.96 
 Were Germany a lesser power, this would have been a tremendous setback, but 
such was not the case.  In the greater scheme of Hitler’s foreign policy, this difficulty 
with Lithuania was a subplot, adding only a contextual layer.  The German dictator’s 
gaze was fixed elsewhere and his attention devoted to matters far bolder and more 
audacious.  Lithuania could wait for the moment. 
IV 
 Hitler’s coming to power was viewed as a serious threat to national interest and 
security in Romania, although this attitude prompted no immediate reorientation of 
Bucharest’s policy towards Germany.97  The Third Reich was a distant menace with 
which Romania shared no common border, affording the country a measure of security, 
both physical and psychological.  An alliance with France, still in force, offered further 
comfort.  However, events soon conspired to draw Romania into a position that 
necessitated direct interaction with Hitler’s Germany and an adjustment of policy to 
accommodate the changing international landscape. 
 As a member of the Allies during the First World War, Romania benefited 
immensely from its participation in the conflict.  It had entered the war in 1916 after 
sitting on the fence in cautious neutrality for the first two years, considering offers by 
both the Allied and Central Powers and, after gaining the acquiescence of the Entente for 
possession of Transylvania through the secret 1916 Treaty of Bucharest, invaded the 
Habsburg Empire on August 27.  The offensive was a disaster and resulted in the 
occupation of nearly the entire country by German forces.  After Russia withdrew from 
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the war, Romanian options were severely limited and the government was forced to make 
peace with Germany, signing the Treaty of Bucharest on May 7, 1918.  In accordance 
with that document, the Dobrudja region was ceded to Bulgaria and several mountain 
passes in the Carpathians to Austria-Hungary.98  The collapse of the German war effort 
later in the year provided an opportunity to make significant gains and strengthen 
Bucharest’s position at the bargaining table.  To that end, on November 10, Romania 
reneged on its treaty with the Central Powers and launched a new offensive into 
Transylvania in the closing moments of the conflict.  This invasion was far more 
successful than the first, given the meager resistance offered due to the utter collapse of 
the Austro-Hungarian state, and the entire region was occupied with minimal military 
effort by December.99  Formal annexation followed later that month.100   
 The experience of the Great War had a profound effect upon Romanian foreign 
policy over the next two decades, shaping its framework and providing guidance for its 
course.  Occupation and defeat imbued a conviction among the country’s leading 
statesmen that peace could only be preserved through collective security and, in that 
endeavor, Romania actively participated in the League of Nations.  In that forum, the 
country’s permanent representative and sometimes Foreign Minister Nicolae Titulescu 
continually pushed for diplomatic resolutions to international disputes and argued for the 
need to maintain good relations among all nations, both large and small.  Altruism aside, 
there was a calculated rationale behind the position.  Titulescu believed that the only way 
in which Romania could ensure its continued independence was through international 
order and, based on this scheme, he pursued that agenda with great zeal.101  In 
accordance with that objective and in an effort to guard against Hungarian irredentism, 
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Romania, along with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, formed the Little Entente in 1921, 
with France supplementing the defensive arrangement.102  Bucharest was also concerned 
about Soviet designs on Bessarabia, as Russia had never accepted the region’s union with 
Romania during the confusion of the Russian Civil War.  Although the two neighbors had 
pledged to resolve the matter peacefully, an air of suspicion lingered.103 
 Romania held to this policy for the duration of the 1920s, primarily focusing its 
attention inward in an attempt to master the country’s myriad of social and economic 
woes.  Land reform was instituted by the government in an attempt to ward off 
communism and, although drawing criticism from some medium sized landholders, the 
redistribution policy was mostly effective.104  The economic benefits from this policy 
were, however, not forthcoming.  Overall agricultural yields during the decade and into 
the 1930s were significantly less than their pre-war levels, and the government’s 
emphasis on manufacturing and heavy industry dictated that insufficient capital was 
earmarked for the new smallholders, leaving them in the lurch.105  The reform process 
also encumbered the recipients of plots with debts to the previous land-holders, although 
the mechanics of redistribution technically made them indentured to the state.106  This, 
coupled with low international market prices for wheat and cereals, Romania’s primary 
crops, negated any profit, however meager, for the peasantry and inclined Bucharest to 
seek out trade agreements that would keep the country fiscally solvent. 
 Expansion of the nation’s borders at the end of the war drastically remolded the 
compositional ethnography of the country, creating considerable minority friction that the 
Romanian government found difficult to manage.  Alien nationalities such as Hungarians, 
Germans, Jews, and Ruthenians were never truly integrated into the larger societal 
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construct or accepted by the Regateni (Romanians who resided within the pre-World War 
I borders, or the old-kingdom) and faced discrimination at the hands of the Romanian 
bureaucracy.  Anti-minority policies were enacted and, in Transylvania, demagyarization 
was encouraged among all groups.  Germans in the region quickly took to the spirit 
embodied in the effort and, with alacrity, began to rediscover their cultural identity while 
Jewish residents responded with far less enthusiasm, outwardly demonstrating a fondness 
for the old Magyar administration that they believed to be fairer and more efficient.  The 
considerable Hungarian minority was especially feared for its political acumen and 
subsequently became the target, both direct and indirectly, of Bucharest’s xenophobic 
onslaught.  Although harsh in tone and direction, the effects of the Romanian 
government’s policies were mitigated by the inefficacy of the country’s highly 
centralized and clumsy bureaucratic system.  However, the slack was compensated for by 
the younger generation of Romanians who, having seized the banner of nationalism, put 
the governmental line into practice, much to the detriment of Magyar, Jew, and German 
alike.107  This created a cycle of antagonism that compounded already existent internal 
division, which, in turn, was detrimental to relations with both Germany and Hungary. 
 Thus, when Hitler came to power, the Romanian disposition towards Germany 
was decidedly negative.  Poor treatment of the ethnic-German minority played a role in 
souring relations with the Nazi regime, although attempts by the NSDAP Auslands-
Organisation, or Foreign Organization, to meddle in Romanian domestic politics had an 
equally detrimental effect.108  Initially neither side displayed any interest in rectifying the 
situation, and Titulescu, ever the opportunist, used the unfriendly atmosphere and 
perceived menace from the Reich as an expedient in his designs to make the Little 
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Entente a more cohesive alliance.  The “Pact of Reorganization” was signed in Geneva in 
mid-February 1933, theoretically inaugurating a new period of cooperation between the 
Entente members, who now swore to respect and consider each other’s vital interests 
when conducting foreign policy.  In reality, little changed.  The alliance was still only 
aimed at Hungary and remained strictly defensive in nature.  Titulescu’s primary 
motivation for the reorganization was his concern about the possibility of Czechoslovak 
and Yugoslav rapprochement with the Soviet Union, which would undermine Romania’s 
position in the long-standing dispute with Moscow over Bessarabia.  To gain support on 
that particular issue, he had to agree to a wide-ranging statute that encompassed all the 
member states’ foreign policy concerns as well, which, due to the continuing animosity 
between Germany and Czechoslovakia, made Bucharest party to Berlin and Prague’s 
mutual hostility without any real cause.109   
 At this early stage of the Hitler-era in Europe, this action had no significant 
impact on the general course of Romanian foreign policy, but it is demonstrative of the 
manner in which Bucharest conducted and would continue to administer its relations.  
The “reorganization” of the Entente was a stopgap measure intended to fulfill a specific 
and immediate need in Romanian policy, and Titulescu pursued the matter with that aim 
strictly in mind.  At the time, the cards seemed to be in his favor.  The Little Entente was 
supposedly more cohesive and viable as an alliance, which, in keeping with Titulescu’s 
principle of collective security, offered a measure of protection in international relations.  
France, the broker of Eastern Europe, was still interested and participatory in the region, 
providing a further defensive bulwark against aggression.  However, the house was 
flimsy.  Romania’s alliance, for all its propaganda of being a “superior international unit” 
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that constituted a multinational Great Power, was a far cry from that status.110  The 
Entente was capable of handling Hungary or punishing Bulgaria, but incapable of 
warding off a concerted effort by a major European power.111  Relying upon the French 
was equally a gamble.  Although vocally pledged to the security of East Central Europe, 
political divisions within the French government and an uncertain British commitment to 
its once erstwhile ally made dependence on Paris a risk.112  Further, the entire affair 
subtly placed Romania in a position between Germany and the Soviet Union, exactly 
where Titulescu believed it foolish to be, lest the country be swallowed by either.113  
Still, the short-term gain was enough to justify the endeavor. 
 Relations between Germany and Romania remained cool for the rest of 1933 and 
into 1934, with Hitler finally taking steps towards rapprochement that autumn.  In 
October, he instructed Hermann Göring to inform the Romanian government via their 
minister in Berlin, Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen, that the Reich had no interest in supporting 
Hungarian irredentism and was committed only to revision of the non-territorial aspects 
of the Versailles treaty.114  The move was intended to facilitate a rapprochement with a 
message tailored to Romanian concerns and meant to diffuse responsibility for revisionist 
clamor onto Italian shoulders.  As further enticement and to demonstrate Germany’s 
sincerity, an offer was made to increase the level of German trade with Romania from 5 
million to 25 million Reichsmarks.115  The overtures were treated with skepticism, as 
both Titulescu and King Carol II feared this was a cover for German political penetration 
of the country.116  However, despite these concerns, economic need won out and the two 
sides entered into a series of negotiations, with a deal finally being concluded on March 
23, 1935.117   
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 The German-Romanian Commercial Treaty was beneficial to both sides, 
alleviating some of Germany’s grain needs and inserting much needed foreign capital 
into the Romanian market.118  Berlin also achieved its desired economic penetration of 
Southeastern Europe, which it hoped would lead to increased political influence.119  
However, absent from the agreement was the one resource vital to Hitler’s clandestine 
rearmament program: oil.  Romania and Germany had had a preexisting treaty for 
petroleum signed in June 1930 and, because of this arrangement and Bucharest’s 
insistence that petroleum be purchased with currency rather than industrial equipment, no 
provision for its delivery was worked in to the new treaty.  Because of this snag and the 
lack of resolution on the issue, it appears that the Germans assumed that oil would still be 
received as per the 1930 deal until a satisfactory work-around could be devised, whereas 
the Romanians behaved as if the new arrangement replaced and invalidated it.  Owing to 
the duration and detail of the negotiations, it is highly unlikely that the issue simply fell 
through the cracks and was lost amid the shuffle.  Rather the Romanians purposely 
stalled on the issue, using promises of future resolution and numerous accusations of 
German recalcitrance to offload their grain without making any concessions on oil.  This 
was Titulescu’s method of maintaining freedom of action and staving off a German 
monopolization of Romanian trade.120 
 As a Francophile, Titulescu was very much interested in seeing Romania continue 
to be aligned towards France, although circumstance made this a difficult course.  French 
economic needs did not mesh well with Romanian output, whereas the German market 
was complimentary to its Southeastern European counterpart, which led to a gravitating 
of the two countries towards each other due to mutual interest.121  The trade agreement 
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exemplified this and, from 1935 onward, German imports from Romania steadily 
increased.122  Still, Titulescu tried to keep his government from sliding too far into the 
German orbit and, while conducting the economic negotiations, he actively tried to 
facilitate an expansion of the French alliance system in Eastern Europe by pushing for 
Soviet inclusion.  By adding Russia to the pact, he hoped to kill two birds with one stone, 
by creating a formidable deterrent to potential German aggression and to deprive the 
Third Reich of a possible ally.123  The scheme never came to fruition as Titulescu 
planned, despite the conclusion of French-Soviet and Czechoslovak-Soviet mutual 
assistance agreements in May 1935, since King Carol and the majority of the Romanian 
government were opposed to any involvement in the arrangement because it would 
require allowing the Red Army to transverse Romanian territory.124  Consequently, Carol 
forbade Titulescu to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union, and Romanian 
participation in the Paris-Prague-Moscow axis was stifled. 
 This did not immediately produce a wave of relief in Berlin, even though the 
rumor of Romania becoming party to such an arrangement was cause for concern.  
German diplomats were continually requesting updates regarding Titulescu’s views on 
rapprochement with the Soviets, and the issue almost completely dominated relations 
between the two countries for the remainder of 1935.125  Even confirmation that no 
negotiations were taking place from King Carol failed to diminish German interest in the 
issue, and it would not be until December that Titulescu himself publicly denied the 
rumors in the Romanian parliament.126  Titulescu had, by this time, virtually no domestic 
support for what was quickly becoming a personal crusade but was still vocal about the 
plan until February 1936, when he finally put the matter to rest.  From his vantage point 
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in Berlin, Hitler could only have viewed the turn of events with a certain degree of 
delight.   German fears of encirclement by a ring of French allies were reduced and, with 
Soviet troops unable to reach the Reich directly without illegally entering either Romania 
or Poland, cover was offered for a major foreign policy endeavor that he was about to 
unleash. 
V 
 Following the conclusion of the 1934 German-Polish non-aggression pact, 
relations between the two countries became less tense, and attempts were made by each 
nation to portray each other positively at home.127  Still, serious issues remained 
unresolved.  Specifically, the long-standing tariff war and minority difficulties, both 
complications that were sidestepped in the effort to negotiate the pact, needed to be 
addressed promptly lest the goodwill personified by the agreement should ebb 
prematurely.128  The former was settled in relatively short order with a supplemental 
trade agreement signed on March 5 that ended the customs war and was intended to 
bolster the general upswing in public sentiment in both Germany and Poland, while the 
latter remained a thorny matter.129  However, amid the more positive atmosphere, doubts 
were being raised on the Polish side as to the longevity of the pact.  Lipski in particular 
believed that internal forces within Germany would eventually counteract the 
agreement’s spirit and that Warsaw would do well to continue to approach relations with 
Berlin with caution.130 
 The Polish ambassador’s concerns were not unfounded, although for the 
remainder of 1934, German-Polish relations were more or less amicable with the only 
contentious issues arising between the two countries being disputes over attempts by the 
44 
 
German government to economically control coal mines in Silesia and Polish 
management of German industrial assets.131  Even the issue of Danzig failed to surface, 
but not for lack of effort.  On this issue, Hitler chose to fund the city and restrain the local 
Nazis, earmarking roughly 1.1 million Reichsmarks monthly for this purpose.132 
 Discussion of an “Eastern Locarno” treaty, similar in structure and thrust to the 
series signed in 1925 by Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Belgium, prompted 
further collaboration between Warsaw and Berlin in November.  The concept was not 
well received in either capital, although for markedly different reasons.  For Hitler, the 
proposal would require him to accept multilateral restrictions on German freedom of 
action and was tantamount to soliciting his acquiescence to and participation in a pact 
largely directed against himself.133  The latter sentiment was shared by Beck, who 
believed the whole affair was little more than a thinly veiled French attempt to forge an 
anti-German bloc under the guise of collective security that pushed Eastern Europe closer 
to the Soviet Union.134  This presented the Polish foreign minister with a dilemma.  To 
reject the proposed arrangement would curry favor in Berlin but alienate Poland from its 
traditional ally and possibly antagonize Russia unnecessarily.  Because Beck was 
intimately familiar with the German position, he knew that accepting the French plan 
would incur Hitler’s enmity and likely torpedo all that had been accomplished over the 
past year.135  Inaction and maintenance of the status quo was the pertinent course to 
follow and, to that end, he hinged Polish participation on Germany’s and refused to 
provide any guarantees for Czechoslovakia.136  This effectively killed any chance that 
Poland would play a further part in Eastern Locarno discussions and helped to sink the 
entire affair, which was shelved altogether in the autumn of 1935.   
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 German-Polish relations continued to improve throughout 1935, building upon the 
goodwill born over the previous year.  Both countries remained solid in their opposition 
to the Eastern Locarno agreement despite French pressure for its realization, and strove to 
maintain their fragile détente.  Danzig was still the primary issue that, at any juncture, 
could cause a hiccup in relations, but so long as the Nazi regime respected Polish rights 
to the city and restricted its activities to meddling in matters that only affected ethnic 
Germans, Warsaw was content to look the other way.  Even Hitler’s announcement of 
open German rearmament and the reintroduction of conscription on March 16, both 
measures that were flagrantly in violation of Versailles, failed to elicit any significant 
reaction from the Poles.  Certainly both Beck and Piłsudski were less than ecstatic about 
the German move but realized that, given Poland’s own armaments deficiencies, it would 
be imprudent to take any action.137  However, events beyond Warsaw’s control soon left 
the Polish government in the lurch. 
 The Final Declaration of the Stresa Conference on April 14, which reaffirmed the 
Locarno treaties and provided for a united front against further German violations of 
Versailles, placed Warsaw in an awkward position.  The Polish government, which 
considered its nation among the ranks of the great European powers, felt slighted at not 
being invited to participate at Stresa, as this was both an affront to that self-perception 
and a not so subtle indication that this image was not widely accepted.138  As a result, 
Beck was faced with a dilemma.  He could act as a leader of the great power he professed 
Poland to be, and have his country constitute the lone voice of support for German action 
by standing in opposition to the Stresa Front, possibly sacrificing Warsaw’s alliance with 
France in the process.  Alternatively, he could bow to Western pressure and tow the 
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conference line, which would complicate relations with Germany and slightly diminish 
Polish prestige.  Prevalent sentiments within the country made the second option the 
more sensible and, consequently, Beck decided to join the Western Powers in a united 
front against Hitler.139  This came as a shock to Berlin, as conversations between the 
German ambassador to Warsaw, Hans Adolf von Moltke, and the Polish Deputy Foreign 
Minister, Count Jan Szembek, in early April had confirmed Poland’s negative disposition 
to multilateral arrangements and a desire to build upon what had already been 
accomplished in the East.140  In a possible retaliatory move, on May 2 the German 
government decided to suspend its subsidization of Danzig, which instigated a trade and 
currency crisis that was not resolved until the end of August 1936.141 
 The economic predicament was not sufficient in and of itself to seriously damage 
German-Polish relations, but the flaring of Danzig issues and the revival of talk about an 
Eastern Locarno pact over the remainder of 1935 and into 1936 served to create tension 
between the two countries.  In May, Beck reaffirmed to Moltke the long-standing Polish 
position on any eastern multilateral arrangement and since France had just recently 
concluded bilateral treaties with both the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, he 
considered the matter dead.142  During a subsequent conversation Beck clarified the 
situation further, relating to the German ambassador that discussions with Pierre Laval, 
the French Foreign Minister, had resulted in a clearing of the air of Franco-Polish 
difficulties and he had gained Laval’s acceptance of Poland’s special circumstances, 
which now afforded Warsaw a free hand in the handling of its affairs without risk to its 
alliance with France.143  This, coupled with a requisite period of amicability following 
Marshal Piłsudski’s death from liver cancer on May 12 and assurances from Beck that 
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Poland intended to continue its late leader’s policies, stemmed any abrupt deterioration in 
relations but could not indefinitely halt that process.144  Questions over the Danzig 
currency issue remained unresolved and, by August, the entire matter had morphed into a 
larger discussion of German-Polish trade discrepancies.145 
 Specifically, the Polish government believed that it was owed 29.5 million złoty 
in rail-transit dues, which Warsaw believed the Germans were withholding in an attempt 
to extort Poland’s acceptance of National Socialist revision to the Danzig constitution.146  
Arthur Greiser, a member of the Schutzstaffel, or SS, and eventual Obergruppenführer 
within that organization, had been elected president of the Danzig senate, and his 
confrontational methods of administration created an atmosphere that raised Polish 
concerns about possible infringement upon the nation’s vital interests in the port.  In a 
tactical move, Hitler chose not to restrain the Danzig Nazis as he had done in the past and 
let the situation play itself out, even going so far as to propose an alliance against Soviet 
Russia and offering the Ukraine and control of Lithuania as a way of testing Warsaw’s 
limits.147  Poland was not, however, to be moved by promises without guarantees, 
rebuffing the proposal and sticking to its position.  Eventually, the Polish government 
suspended all rail traffic across the Corridor in its own effort to bring the Germans to the 
negotiating table, although by February 1936, discussion of the issue was becoming more 
infrequent due to Hitler’s attention being focused on other pressing business. 
VI 
 In the aftermath of the botched Austrian Nazi coup attempt and murder of 
Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuß on July 25, 1934, the Hungarian government sought to 
gather as much information as it could on German intentions as regarded Austria.  The 
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reply recieved to its official inquiry from Hitler was lengthy, idealistic, and overtly 
neutral, expressly desiring a manifestation of popular will, much like himself, to lead the 
country, but doubtful that such a scenario would come to fruition.148  Contained within 
the message were subtle undertones to the effect that an Anschluss was inevitable and that 
Hungarian acquiescence to such an enterprise would not be forgotten.  Although not 
specifically expressed, Hitler’s message was clear: resign Austria to its fate and focus 
Hungarian attention elsewhere.  The locale the German dictator had in mind was 
Hungary’s northern neighbor, Czechoslovakia, and directing Budapest’s attention there 
served two distinct purposes.  First, it would shift Hungarian revisionism away from 
Yugoslavia and Romania, and second, it would allow for combined pressure on Prague.  
As an added benefit, collaboration with Germany would afford Hungary protection from 
the Little Entente.149   
 For Gömbös, the Hungarian prime minister, the scheme was a hard sell 
domestically.  National irredentism was largely Danubian in focus and there was a 
prevalent skepticism as to the true nature of German intentions.  The warming of Berlin’s 
relations with Yugoslavia and the negative portrayal of Hungary in the German press 
seemed to confirm this duplicity.  Despite these obstacles, Gömbös saw his country’s 
future aligned with Germany and, once the international fervor over the assassination of 
the Yugoslav King Alexander and French Foreign Minister Jean Louis Barthou by the 
Croatian Ustaše, or revolutionary movement, had dissipated, he began to take steps to 
move Hungary in that direction.  In late 1934, he sacked twenty-two generals and 
replaced them with cronies loyal to himself, ensuring the military’s support of his 
policies, and in 1935 he signed a grain for arms deal with Germany.  Gömbös continued 
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to press his luck, forcing Béla Imrédy and Miklós Kállay, two key supporters of the 
Bethlen opposition faction, to resign from the government, which facilitated its rapid 
collapse and prompted Admiral Horthy to call for new elections in March.150 
 The scheme, while producing the absolute majority Gömbös had hoped for, 
quickly backfired on him.  Bethlen, his staunch opponent, was re-elected and able to 
attract enough support from conservative circles to block the Prime Minister’s plans to 
reorganize the country as a corporate state along the Italian model, forcing Gömbös to 
drop the plan altogether.  This precipitated a split in the fascist coalition, with the more 
extreme faction of the Hungarian right moving away from Gömbös, believing him not to 
be truly committed to the ideology’s tenets.151  The cumulative result was an unstable 
parliamentary majority that could only rarely be brought together on specific issues and 
the slow but steady isolation of Gömbös within the government. 
 Hungarian foreign policy was also becoming increasingly impotent due to 
Germany’s reorientation of its own policies.  Budapest’s guarantee of Austrian 
independence in the March 1934 Danubian Agreement had never sat well with Hitler, and 
the support he had once given to Gömbös was now becoming a hindrance to friendship 
with Romania and Yugoslavia due to their concern over Hungarian revisionism.152  A 
late 1935 meeting between Hitler and Gömbös confirmed this new German attitude, and 
the message then was the same as it had been in June 1933, although now Hitler stressed 
the need for Hungarian rapprochement with its neighbors.153  Despite running counter to 
national aims, Gömbös related to Hitler that this could be made domestically palatable 
regarding Yugoslavia, as the Vojvodina territory ceded to the southern Slavic kingdom 
was miniscule in comparison to Hungary’s other territorial adjustments.  However, any 
50 
 
easing of the tensions with Romania would be difficult due to Titulescu’s 
untrustworthiness.154  Though not explicitly stated, it is likely that Gömbös was making 
reference to the Romanian government’s treatment of its Hungarian minority.  Whatever 
the case may have been, the result of the meeting was that revision would only take place 
within a German approved framework and that Berlin’s goodwill was becoming 
increasingly tied to economic and military concessions.  The German-Italian détente that 
resulted from Hitler’s support of Mussolini during Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia earlier in 
the year further boxed the Hungarians in, removing Budapest’s only viable source of 
support. 
 For a man like Gömbös who believed that domestic political support was 
intrinsically related to the ability to achieve foreign policy success, this was more of a 
death-sentence than were his rapidly deteriorating kidneys.  The political base Gömbös 
once had been able to count on was now abandoning him, and he was losing Horthy’s 
confidence.155  In government circles, there was also a growing fear that, should Admiral 
Horthy suddenly die, Gömbös would declare himself regent with unlimited power, 
establish a Hitler-esque dictatorship, and throw Hungary headlong into an alignment with 
Germany at the expense of the country’s vital interests.156  Plans were made to remove 
him from power, but Gömbös saved them the effort.  In March 1936 he left the country to 
seek treatment for his kidney disease in Munich, and in Budapest it was decided to let 
him expire there, which he did on October 6. 
 His death marked the end of a specific chapter in Hungarian foreign policy that 
saw the Hungarian government move closer to Germany in a manner that, in the 
immediate aftermath of Gömbös’ departure from power, was beneficial for Hungary in 
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the short-term.  Increased trade had initially brought high prices for Hungarian 
agricultural surpluses and, after 1935, armaments and industrial capital.  This helped to 
stabilize the national economy.  It also contributed to stemming the rising tide of fascism, 
much to the dismay of Gömbös and his supporters, but to the relief of the traditional 
conservative Magyar elite who were loathe to see their grip on power erode.  There were, 
however, long-term risks that came with these gains.  Prosperity was largely the result of 
Gömbös tying the German and Hungarian economies together, which gave the Third 
Reich an incredible amount of power over Hungary and made disengagement nearly 
impossible.157  By 1936, this process was well underway but by no means complete, and 
if Budapest had so chosen, escape from the German orbit was still an option, although a 
difficult one.  At the time, though, there was no need to consider such a contingency, as 
the European political landscape was testy but not odious or threatening.  However, 
shortly after dawn on March 17, that atmosphere would drastically change. 
VII 
 Relations between Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Lithuania over the period 
from January 1933 to March 1936 were highly subject to the particular national aims of 
each country and dependent upon how a potential partner fitted those plans.  With the 
exception of the Polish and Lithuanian governments, which were in a de facto state of 
war, each country remained in diplomatic contact with the others, with either 
ambassadors or ministers occupying posts in the various national capitals.  The 
mechanics of their intercourse were also polite, and no institutional dysfunction inhibited 
their interactions.  This created a diplomatic environment that was every bit as active as 
that of the western powers and just as well connected: perhaps even more so, given that 
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regional politics in east central Europe were highly subject to the actions of the traditional 
powers.  On the periphery of Europe, the Soviet Union was also an omnipresent actor in 
these nation’s considerations due to Russia’s proximity, requiring Moscow to be treated 
with more gravitas than in the west.  The effect of this was that, as a region, there was a 
strong focus on collective security beyond that of the League of Nations or French and 
British guarantees and a strong desire to base that on internal strength without “great 
power” assistance. 
 Lithuania was perhaps the exception to this generalization, although not for lack 
of need or effort.  The 1920 war with Poland and subsequent loss of its historic national 
capital, Vilnius, injected a degree of rigidity into Lithuanian foreign policy, which 
became entirely directed at regaining the city and subordinated all other considerations to 
that aim.158  Consequently, the cultivating of relations with Hungary and Romania 
suffered, as neither country was interested in helping Lithuania achieve its objective, and 
both were more favorably disposed to Poland anyway.  This forced the Lithuanian 
government to attempt to utilize Soviet and German pressure as leverage against Warsaw, 
although this was a dangerous proposition, as both powers had interests of their own in 
the Baltic, which were detrimental to the region’s continued independence. 
 The failure of both the “Voldemaras Course” and the “Lozoraitis Concept” by the 
time Hitler had ascended to the German Chancellorship, caused President Antanas 
Smetona to drastically reappraise Lithuania’s current policy and to discern the country’s 
true friends and foes.  The options were few.  Great Britain had long lost interest in the 
region and the French were in alliance with Poland, offering no potential for the return of 
Vilnius.  Earlier schemes that had involved both Germany and Russia had resulted in 
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failure and, like the Lithuanian gestures, their friendship was little more than thinly veiled 
opportunism.  Turning to the other Baltic nations, Latvia and Estonia, was a possibility, 
but there were complications there as well.  Neither governments had any interest in 
embroiling themselves in the ongoing conflict between Lithuania and Poland over a city 
in which they had little interest.  Estonia even went so far as to rebuff Lithuanian 
advances in 1934 so as not to damage its relationship with Warsaw.  Faced with a myriad 
of poor prognoses, Smetona decided that the only viable option was to seek a 
rapprochement with Poland, despite the outstanding Vilnius issue.159 
 Initial Lithuanian attempts at restoring relations in 1934 through indirect and 
unofficial means were rebuked out of hand by Piłsudski, who refused to deal with the 
Lithuanian government in any manner other than official.160  However, the Marshal soon 
relented, realizing that with the state of German-Polish relations being as good as they 
had been in years and German-Lithuanian relations suffering due to increased NSDAP 
agitation in Klaipėda, this would be an opportune moment to normalize relations between 
the two countries.  Unofficial talks began in late January, but nothing came of them.  The 
discussions became stalled over Vilnius and Lithuania’s insistence that Poland at least 
recognize the legitimacy of Lithuanian claims to the city, which was not forthcoming.  
No further movement occurred on the issue until a year later in January 1935, when 
Smetona and Foreign Minister Lozoraitis decided on a new approach to the same issue.  
Reestablishing relations with Warsaw would become the primary goal of Lithuanian 
policy, and to this end, the two men favored a plan that worked in gradual steps, avoiding 
any direct discussion of Vilnius while at the same time not relinquishing national claims 
to the city.161  Despite these conciliatory gestures, the effort ended in failure. 
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 In reality, it was unrealistic of Smetona or Lozoraitis to believe that any offer, no 
matter how finely worded or delicately packaged, would move the Poles on the issue.  
Piłsudski and Beck had no obligation to do anything, as Poland controlled Vilnius and, 
consequently, held the trump card in negotiations.  Certainly, Warsaw desired normal 
relations with its northern neighbor, but on its own terms.  However, in 1934 and 1935, 
these were somewhat unclear.  There were those within the Polish government, Piłsudski 
among them, who wished to see the old Commonwealth of the seventeenth-century 
reconstituted and thought that if Vilnius was denied to Lithuania, Kaunas would 
eventually warm to the idea of union along that historic model.  Others went as far as to 
deny the legitimacy of the Baltic republic itself.162  Although such extreme sentiments 
were pervasive within the Polish government, they had little bearing on Piłsudski, who, 
despite his vacillating tactical approach to the situation, ultimately desired reconciliation 
with the Lithuanians as part of his greater Międzymorze, or between the seas, concept.163 
 Piłsudski had long been a proponent of Prometheism, the notion that the best way 
to destabilize the Soviet Union was to support non-ethnic Russian nationalism within that 
country’s borders, but events in the early 1930s had caused him to change his views 
regarding the pursuit of that agenda.164  Specifically, the 1932 non-aggression pact with 
Moscow and the rise of Hitler in Germany made it clear to the Marshal that a shift of 
focus was required, and, consequently, the entire project lost steam.165  Still, Piłsudski 
did not let the slow, gradual demise of Prometheism deter him from actively seeking to 
facilitate the creation of his Polish-dominated Międzymorze bloc, to which Lithuania and 
the entire Baltic region was integral.  By the time of his death in May 1935, both 
governments were on the verge of normalizing relations, and the project seemed one step 
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closer to realization.  The détente was, however, short-lived, and in January 1936 the 
Marshal’s protégé Beck berated Lithuania in a public speech, eliciting a similarly harsh 
response from Smetona and effectively slamming the door on any further improvement in 
relations between the two countries.166 
 This did not put an end to Polish aspirations for a Międzymorze alliance in East 
Central Europe; rather, it merely signaled a change in the tactical approach that Beck, as 
Piłsudski’s foreign policy protégé and successor, would adopt in his prosecution of the 
scheme.  Although Lithuania could be crossed off the list of potential allies, Latvia and 
Estonia, two nations with which Poland had good relations, were still possibilities.  
Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, the Scandinavian countries, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, 
Italy, and Greece were all equally positively disposed to Poland and, in mid-1935 and 
early 1936, were potential alliance partners should Międzymorze be presented 
properly.167  However, this was nearly impossible.  Disputes between the various 
countries proved to be insurmountable obstacles and Beck, although a talented diplomat, 
had neither the charm nor charisma to unite such a broad bloc under any kind of 
leadership, let alone manage to get it to agree to look for direction from Warsaw.  As a 
result, he began to shift his own focus and that of the whole Międzymorze concept to 
something far more realistic: his “Third Europe” project. 
 Technically, Beck envisioned a “Third Europe” bloc to be no less expansive than 
Piłsudski’s Międzymorze, encompassing much of the same territory and still to be 
dominated by Poland, although there were key differences.  First, Czechoslovakia, a 
country whose existence Beck was not entirely wedded to, was to be excluded from the 
concept, as was Lithuania.168  The Polish Foreign Minister had also decided to narrow his 
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focus to Poland’s southern neighbors, Hungary and Romania, working to establish good 
relations with each.  To that end, his task was eased by Poland already possessing an 
alliance with the Romanians, having signed a series of defensive treaties with Bucharest 
in 1921, 1926, and 1931, although differences between Beck and Titulescu had soured 
the relationship considerably by 1934.169  Conceptually, the two were not far removed 
from each other, both holding collective security to be fundamental to regional safety.  
Where they differed was in tactical demeanor.  Titulescu sought to include the whole of 
Europe in containing a revived Germany, whereas Beck desired to see the creation of an 
independent bloc that was capable of providing for its own protection and able to abstain 
from the affairs of the Great Powers.  An effort was made to incorporate Poland into the 
Little Entente before Piłsudski’s death, but even Romanian mediation proved unable to 
reconcile the territorial dispute between Warsaw and Prague.170  Further complicating 
matters were rumors of Titulescu’s attempts at rapprochement with the Soviet Union, a 
fundamental violation of the 1931 defensive treaty’s spirit and an undermining of Beck’s 
scheme.171  This left Polish-Romanian relations by early 1936 in a state of steady decline, 
although the damage was not irreparable. 
 In contrast to Warsaw’s relationship with Romania, Polish-Hungarian relations 
had taken an opposite course from 1933 to 1936.  Due to historic bonds, the two countries 
harbored impressions of each other that were generally positive, and their diplomacy was 
courteous and cordial.  Though long in gestation, Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor in 
1933 prompted Piłsudski to reach an understanding with the Hungarians, as the nation 
formed both an integral part of his Międzymorze concept and offered an opportunity for 
Polish influence to penetrate beyond the Carpathians.172  Kálmán de Kánya, the 
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Hungarian Foreign Minister, and Gömbös both held international designs similar in scope 
to Piłsudski, envisioning a similarly large bloc consisting of Hungary, Poland, Austria, 
Germany, and Italy.  Working towards this end, official meetings were held in Warsaw 
during October 1934 to strengthen the ancient bonds between the two countries, but 
ultimately nothing significant was accomplished.  Gömbös and the Hungarian delegation 
returned to Budapest with little more than assurances from Piłsudski that Poland would 
never take up arms against Hungary and the lingering echoes of the Marshal’s lecture on 
the need for Hungary to mend its relations with the Romanians.173 
 This latter point, centered almost entirely on Romania’s acquisition of 
Transylvania in the aftermath of the First World War, proved to be a huge obstacle in the 
development of Hungarian-Romanian relations.  The stakes were too high for any simple 
fix, and the fact that the region was regarded by the Magyars as the ancient cradle of their 
civilization all but ensured that Budapest would be loathe to temper its irredentist 
clamor.174  At the time, this was of little consequence to the Romanian government, 
which could rely on the relative safety the Little Entente provided and combined German 
and Polish pressure on the Hungarian government to seek reconciliation with its neighbor 
as further insurance.  However, it was a tenuous security guarantee, as in principle, 
neither Warsaw nor Berlin recognized the validity of the Treaty of Trianon and it was 
only their conflicted views on exactly how East Central Europe should be politically 
oriented that prevented that particular issue from surfacing.175 
 Regional scheming was at the collective heart of East Central Europe and each 
nation pursued its international agenda with its own vital interests in mind.  Although the 
dividends gained, if any, from January 1933 to early 1936 were few, they were 
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significant because they set the precedent for future activity.  Poland, with its foreign 
policy becoming almost exclusively directed by Beck, worked toward the realization of 
his “Third Europe,” a tactical restructuring of Piłsudski’s Międzymorze project and 
domination of the region.  By 1936, he still had far to go in that endeavor, but it is clear 
from those first tentative steps that this was the direction in which the pseudo-Great 
Power was being steered.  The Hungarians were thinking in broadly similar terms, with a 
grand Central European alliance system central to both Gömbös and Kánya’s plans.  
National weakness made such machinations unrealistic and, compounded by German 
economic penetration, began the slow process of drawing Budapest to the brink of an 
unalterable decision, although that point of no return was still in the future.  Romania was 
in an equally unenviable position, faced with the allure of German currency and capital 
for its fragile economy, but wary of the consequences of intimate dealings with the Third 
Reich.  Circumstances were, however, favorable to Bucharest.  The Reich was still 
distant, and faith in the Little Entente and collective security embodied in the League of 
Nations provided a measure of comfort.  As it had done before, Romania could hedge its 
bets and make its decisions without haste.  Only Lithuania was hemmed in by 
circumstance.  Three of its neighbors were hostile, and the Baltic Entente, created in 
1934, was inadequate to counter a serious threat by any of them.  Poland, Lithuania’s 
arch-nemesis and possessor of Vilnius, was unfriendly, but the possibility of 
rapprochement offered the potential to reintegrate the country into the region.  However, 
the Lithuanian government’s rigidity on the Vilnius issue provided Beck with the 
initiative and control of the entire situation, leaving Kaunas subject to international 
whims.  Further muddling the picture for the region’s governments was Hitler and his 
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Third Reich, which on Saturday, March 7, 1936, entered the demilitarized Rhineland in 
violation of Versailles. 
CHAPTER 2: IN THE MIDDLE 
 
Shortly after one in the afternoon on March 7, 1936, elements of the newly 
rechristened Wehrmacht crossed the Hohenzollern Bridge in Cologne.  Their arrival was 
unannounced, but as word began to spread throughout the city, an air of excitement soon 
spread.  Men and children greeted the force with cheers and applause, while all along the 
soldier’s path women strewed flowers.  The reoccupation of the Rhineland had begun.  
Although the selective press coverage by Joseph Goebbels depicted the scene as a 
veritable triumph of German will and a bold, brazen stroke by Hitler against Versailles, 
the situation was far removed from the confident reconquest shown on newsreels 
throughout the country and around the world.1 
 The move had been a gamble and, during the immediate forty-eight hours 
following the Rhineland’s remilitarization, Hitler and the German high command were 
wrought with anxiety over the possible Western response.  Their fears were not 
unjustified.  The force that had been ordered into the demilitarized zone numbered only 
30,000 men in total, with a scant 3,000 advancing into the region in depth, and faced a 
potential adversarial force that, with French allies included, was nearly 200 divisions 
strong.2  With German rearmament only recently begun as outlined by the army High 
Command in 1933, the Wehrmacht in 1936 was not yet the formidable force it would 
demonstrate itself to be in 1939 and, being ill-equipped to face such massive opposition, 
had been ordered to offer no resistance and withdraw if confronted by the French.  Even 
Hitler later confided that “we would have had to withdraw with our tails between our 
legs”3 in the event of any reprisal from Paris.  However, the repercussions that 
Germany’s dictator and his Minister of War, General Werner von Blomberg dreaded, 
were not forthcoming. 
 Unknown to the Germans, the French government had already made the decision 
not to oppose any move by Berlin into the Rhineland, eliminating the principle threat that 
Hitler and his generals had expected and rendering their concern unnecessary.4  Although 
the German force that eventually marched into the region was only 30,000 men, the 
French military included SS, SA, and other Nazi organizations among its combatant 
projections and estimated German actionable strength to number roughly 295,000 men, 
far more than the skeletal active army France maintained along its eastern frontier.  Those 
soldiers already in the field were intended to do no more than defend the border while the 
army was mobilized, which would take seventeen days to complete.  This afforded the 
Germans precious time to consolidate their gains and prepare a defense with their 
phantom army for a French offensive that its psychology, spirit, and capabilities 
precluded.  Further, the military possessed no plan for any action in the event Germany 
moved to remilitarize the Rhineland.  This, coupled with a lack of will to fight by the 
British and an indication from Mussolini that, as far as he was concerned, both Locarno 
and Stresa were dead, left France isolated in its resistance to German revision of 
Versailles and restricted its possible responses accordingly.  Indeed, for Hitler, it truly 
was the psychological moment to act.5 
 On the other side of Europe, all eyes were trained westward with great interest in 
how the aftermath of Hitler’s fait accompli would resonate on the international scene, for 
each country was very interested in the result.  What was dismissed as a domestic 
political act in the West and explained away to minimize its broader impact was viewed 
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quite differently by Germany’s East Central European neighbors due to their differing 
relationships with the Third Reich.  Hitler had thrown down a gauntlet, and France and 
Britain failed to accept the challenge.  This fact did not go unnoticed by the regional 
governments and began the process of pushing them towards Germany.6 
I 
 In Budapest, the Hungarian government’s reaction to Hitler’s “Saturday surprise” 
was generally positive, although it did not come as much of a shock, as Kálmán de 
Kánya, the foreign minister, had been made aware of the move the previous day.  
However, others within the government were less well informed.  Gyula Gömbös, by 
now Prime Minister in name only, applauded the German move from his hospital room in 
Munich with satisfaction, although he was unable to influence Hungarian policy from 
what was to become his deathbed.  Admiral Miklós Horthy, the widely popular regent, 
was equally impressed by the bold stroke and thoroughly pleased with the manner in 
which he believed Locarno to have been rendered void.  As Hungary was too weak to 
follow Germany’s example, Horthy hoped that this reassertion of German might on the 
world stage would lead to benefits for Hungary.  Specifically, he wished to see Hitler 
pursue a Danubian policy much as Bismarck had, with the Magyars to be utilized as 
proxies for German hegemony in the region.7 
 Oddly, the enthusiasm expressed by members of the Hungarian government failed 
to disseminate into the country’s foreign policy, since, following the remilitarization of 
the Rhineland, Budapest began to institute a program that attempted to move the country 
away from Berlin’s influence rather than closer to its erstwhile friend.  Known as the 
“Free Hand” policy, it was designed to keep Hungary aloof from not only Germany but 
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from the western Allies as well until one side emerged dominant.  This was in stark 
contrast to Gömbös’ policy that sought alignment with Germany and his and Kánya’s 
later abortive plans to incorporate both Hungary and the Reich into a larger European 
bloc consisting of the two along with Austria, Italy and Poland.8  Kánya, surprised only 
by the timing of Hitler’s action, saw the potential danger for Hungary shrouded in the 
otherwise broader positive ramifications, for though the current international order 
appeared open for reinterpretation, it was limited to German designs.9 
 The name “Free Hand” belied the policy’s reality, as it was conceived out of 
necessity rather than choice.10  With Kánya’s previous attempt to check growing German 
power having ended in failure, it was the only option that was left.  However, technically 
another still existed: pushing Hungary directly into Berlin’s orbit completely on German 
terms, which was no choice at all.  That would have rendered Hungarian aspirations of 
regaining Transylvania from Romania and the Vojvodina district from Yugoslavia 
subject to Hitler’s whims, based upon how those goals fit his particular needs at a given 
moment when the issue was broached.  Consequently, Kánya formulated his policy 
purely out of pragmatism, though it was not entirely devoid of creative merit.  
Theoretically, alignment with Britain was still possible in 1936, although such a drastic 
reorientation of national foreign policy only truly existed in Horthy’s delusions.11  Britain 
was too far away and uninterested in Hungary for any tangible results to be yielded and 
tended to defer to France, which was allied with Budapest’s enemies, in regard to 
Danubian politics.  For the scenario to retain any viability, Hungary likely would have 
had to renounce, or, at the very least, tactically set aside its irredentist aims, which the 
government was unwilling to do. 
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 Conversely, working with Germany held several advantages.  Unlike Britain, the 
Reich was within close proximity and had expressed interest in Hungarian affairs within 
the context of its greater regional strategy.  This made Berlin exploitable for the pursuit 
of Budapest’s own designs in a way that the West was not.  The similar social and 
political development of the two countries since the end of the First World War had also 
produced regimes that were complimentary in their political outlook and shared the same 
basic regional goals, namely Danubian border revision and hegemony.12  No firm 
German commitment to any other nation offered potential that alignment with the West 
did not, as Hungary could become a principle collaborator with Germany without being 
forced too deeply into the arms of the Third Reich.  Still, there were risks.  Moving 
Hungary towards Germany required a delicate balance that, if not properly maintained, 
could throw the country headlong into Germany’s orbit by alienating Budapest from the 
rest of Europe.  However, this was deemed worth the risk in the interest of revision. 
 Once the initial fervor over the remilitarization of the Rhineland had died down, 
Kánya sought to influence Hitler regarding the duration of the non-aggression pacts he 
had offered to each of Germany’s neighbors in his Reichstag speech of March 7.  Of 
concern was the twenty-five-year term, which, if allowed, would have conflicted with 
Hungarian interests.  Certainly Hungary was not, in early 1936, in any position to act on 
its revisionist aims, but with the assistance Budapest expected from the Third Reich, 
Kánya undoubtedly assumed that the country would be by 1961.  His mind was, in 
particular, on Czechoslovakia, and he pushed Hitler to consider a ten-year offer similar in 
structure to the treaty between Germany and Poland.  In his thinking, this would afford 
Hungary the time to rearm and eventually participate, along with the Germans, in the 
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destruction of the Czech state within the framework discussed by Hitler and Gömbös in 
1933 and 1935.  Based upon his concern and lightning quick inquiry regarding the 
extension of a pact to Czechoslovakia, it appears that even the well informed Kánya was 
deceived as to Hitler’s true intent and actually believed the offers to be genuine.  He 
pestered the Wilhemstrasse until the end of April regarding that issue before finally being 
given confirmation that the entire matter was nothing more than a “utopian delusion” and 
that the Reich had no interest in pursuing it further.13 
 During this time, the Hungarians were also probing the Germans for an official 
expression of friendship or consultation, preferring a document that encompassed both 
notions as a reward for their hitherto Germanophile policies.  Their groping was flatly 
rebuffed on the grounds that the aftermath of the Rhineland action was not an opportune 
moment for such a gesture and that it would be Germany, not Hungary, that would 
determine when such an hour had come.  This left the Hungarians in the lurch, since for 
all their shows of support and friendship toward the Reich, the government in Budapest 
was left with little tangible benefit.  Although the economic deals signed in 1933 were 
still in effect, they did not offer the kind of capital Kánya, Horthy, and the new prime 
minister in waiting, Kálmán Darányi, desired.  Even a meaningless extension of gratitude 
in the form of a friendship pact would have served the Hungarian government well to 
raise its international standing, but the Germans would not budge.14 
 This did not deter the Hungarian government from its course, which was slowly 
becoming very much counter to its official “Free Hand” policy.  However, in the interest 
of revision, Hungary needed to remain on good terms with Germany to secure 
armaments, even if this meant being relegated to a subordinate position in the 
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relationship.15  Still, the Magyars saw opportunity in this, as even from their subordinate 
position they were very much a part of Hitler’s Danubian scheming and felt that they 
were advantageously placed to influence German policy in the region.  Of particular 
interest to the Hungarian government was the continued independence of Austria as well 
as the Czechoslovakia question, and in August, Horthy made an unofficial visit to 
Berchtesgaden to sound Hitler out on both issues.  In a meeting that lasted nearly three 
and a half hours, the Admiral stressed patience in regard to Anschluss with Austria, 
noting that it was only the older generations that hindered union with Germany and that, 
when they died out, the younger would invariably seek to become absorbed into the 
Reich.16  Ostensibly Horthy was attempting to persuade Hitler to allow what the 
Hungarians viewed as inevitable occur organically, but Hungarian national interest was 
what he was actually attempting to preserve.  An independent Austria guaranteed an 
alternative outlet for Hungary’s agricultural produce and staved off German domination 
of its market, leaving Hungary with some room to maneuver.  Horthy also reaffirmed 
Hungary’s position that Czechoslovakia was a “cancerous tumor” and that Budapest was 
still committed to action against Prague in conjunction with Germany as long as British 
or French intervention could be prevented.17  Although the meeting dealt only in broad 
generalities, both Hitler and Horthy walked away from the encounter pleased. 
 Gömbös’ death from kidney failure on October 6, 1936, in Munich and the lavish 
funeral arranged for the Hungarian Prime Minister in Budapest presented yet another 
opportunity for the two governments to come together.  In a tribute to the morbid setting, 
Herman Göring, the morphine-addicted, multi-titled and utterly corrupt head of the 
Luftwaffe, presented Kánya with Germany’s Danubian plans that threatened to suffocate 
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Hungary’s own regional policy.  Much of what had been stressed to Horthy by Hitler in 
August was reiterated, although this time the German message carried a more sinister 
undertone.  Hungary was to settle its border disputes with Romania and Yugoslavia and 
focus its revisionism on Czechoslovakia, which was to be occupied and Austria annexed 
to the Reich.  The matter of Germany’s rapidly accumulating debt to Hungary was also 
broached by Göring, but rather than seeking to work towards a balancing of the deficit, 
the Germans instead demanded more foodstuffs in exchange for increased armaments 
deliveries.  Kánya, undoubtedly expecting simple pleasantries and official sympathy, was 
taken aback by Göring’s brashness and could only promise that Gömbös’ policies would 
be continued.  For all his many faults, Gömbös, in the last days before his death, made a 
final and rather astute observation about the Third Reich.  Germany was friendliest when 
it was weak, but when it regained its strength, Hungary would no longer be a vital partner 
when other suitors sought Germany’s affection.18  Göring’s words to Kánya confirmed 
the dead Magyar’s prediction. 
 This left Kánya, Horthy, and Darányi in a serious predicament, for how could 
Hungary justify revision against Czechoslovakia if it peaceably settled equally 
outstanding disputes with both Romania and Yugoslavia?  The Hungarian regime did not 
enjoy the total national political control that the Nazis commanded, further complicating 
matters for Budapest.  Any overt renunciation of revision, even if purely for tactical 
expedience, would bolster domestic support for the rapidly growing fascist movements 
within the country that possibly could directly threaten the government.19  However, the 
fear of alienating the Reich was an even greater concern and, with few international 
friends, Hungary could not afford to slight Germany. 
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 With Budapest thrust between a rock and a hard place, the Hungarian government 
fell back upon the tenets of its “Free Hand” policy and attempted to split the difference, 
balancing its own and German prerogatives throughout the end of 1936 and into 1937.  
The balance, though, was precarious and could be thrown off-center at any given 
moment.  Such a destabilization occurred following a November 1 speech by Mussolini 
in which he expressed solidarity with the Magyars in their revisionist aspirations.20  His 
words sparked a frenzy in Hungary and led to a brief elevation of the public imagination 
that, with Italian assistance, restoration of the kingdom’s historic borders might be at 
hand.  This was cause for concern in Germany, as Constantin von Neurath, the German 
foreign minister, and Hitler feared that were Budapest to act on public sentiment, it could 
bring the Little Entente powers closer together.  This would wreck all previous German 
efforts to wrench the alliance apart.21 
 In an effort to prevent any such action, Alfred Rosenberg, the head of the Nazi 
party’s foreign section and principal intellectual, penned a November 15 article for the 
Völkischer Beobachter, that openly chastised Hungarian aspirations.  The same 
sentiments were expressed in person a week later in Berlin to Budapest’s minister, Döme 
Sztójay, by the German Foreign Minister.  According to von Neurath, the Hungarian 
government needed to understand that total revision was impossible and that its aims 
were unachievable through peaceful means.  For all of Mussolini’s rhetoric, von Neurath 
made it clear that he did not believe that any assistance would be forthcoming from Rome 
unless the Hungarians were willing to accept political gestures as capital.  Germany was 
the only nation that could, within reasonable limits, help Hungary to realize its goals and, 
with that in mind, it would be prudent to focus Budapest’s attention on Czechoslovakia.22 
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 The writing was on the wall and, while the Germans in late 1936 and throughout 
1937 were still not able to force Hungary to abide strictly by Berlin’s revisionist scheme, 
their increasing economic domination of the kingdom ensured that Hitler’s word was 
heeded.  To further rein in the Hungarians, Hitler stepped up his support of the German 
minority in Hungary, ostensibly in response to Horthy’s continuing Magyarization 
policies, although the measure was more akin to political blackmail.  In a communiqué 
issued to Hungary’s foreign ministry on December 1, 1936, Hitler effectively tied the 
future of German-Hungarian relations to an immediate cessation of Budapest’s 
assimilation policies and further upped the ante by ordering Nazi agitators to infiltrate 
Hungary under the guise of tourists.  So as not to alienate the Hungarian government, 
whose help the Germans believed they needed to take apart Czechoslovakia, Berlin later 
softened its approach, veiling the demand for ethnic-German political autonomy within 
Hungary in a geopolitical rationale.23 
 If, so went the German argument, Magyarization ceased and the treatment of 
Hungary’s ethnic minorities improved, then the national groups whose territory 
Hungarian revisionist aspirations encompassed would be more positively disposed to 
return to the kingdom.24  Such a scenario was highly unlikely, but it was conceived with 
German, not Hungarian, interests in mind.  While Berlin was courting the Hungarians, 
similar overtures of friendship had been made to the Romanian and Yugoslavian 
governments.  According to the proposed German policy, a tempering of Hungary’s 
forced assimilation of its minorities would further Germany’s strategic aim of stabilizing 
Southeastern Europe and bringing the region under German sway.  Realizing they needed 
the Reich to have any hope of overthrowing Trianon, the Hungarians quietly agreed to 
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the German demands and, although Magyarization of Hungary’s other minorities 
continued, its German population received a reprieve. 
 The minority issue notwithstanding, 1937 passed relatively quietly, with German-
Hungarian relations focused primarily on Czechoslovakia.  Specifically, Budapest was 
concerned about Hitler’s still open offer for a non-aggression pact with Prague and how, 
if the signing of such a treaty were to occur, this would impact Hungarian revisionism.  
Several official requests for updates on the matter were made by Kánya through Sztójay, 
much to the annoyance of von Neurath, who grew weary of continually reiterating the 
unchanging German position.  According to von Neurath, the offer remained on the table 
as a matter of diplomatic good faith, although he believed the likelihood of any 
movement on the issue to be nil, as Berlin’s relations with Prague were too poor to be 
revived in the short-term.  However, if the Hungarian concern proved to be too great, 
both he and Hitler gave their consent to a Hungarian-Czechoslovak rapprochement but 
stressed that this might not be best for Hungary’s long-term interests.  Czechoslovakia 
was now little more than a satellite of the Soviet Union and, although von Neurath did 
not explicitly state it to Sztójay, working towards a détente with Prague would be akin to 
siding with Bolshevism.  The allusion was likely intended to conjure memories of 
Hungary’s brief experience with communism under the short reign of Béla Kun and, 
given that the Horthy regime owed its hold on power to portraying itself as a reactionary 
bulwark against Bolshevism, subtly present the Hungarians with a black or white 
decision.  An alternative strategy, with German interests at its core, was provided.  Von 
Neurath argued that Romania was a country with which Hungary had equally poor 
relations, but if the Hungarian government was serious about rapprochement with its 
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neighbors, that nation was the most promising candidate.  Though not overtly stated, a 
modus vivendi could be arranged regarding Transylvania, which would be requisite for a 
general improvement in relations between the two governments.  Certainly, that would be 
a bitter pill to swallow domestically, but appropriate measures could be taken to 
minimize the public uproar.25  In this endeavor, Hungary would not be acting alone, as 
the Reich was also actively attempting to alter Bucharest’s disposition towards Germany 
and move the country away from the Little Entente.  A similar demonstration of goodwill 
by Budapest was likely to have an equally positive effect and would contribute to the 
realization of a scenario in which Czechoslovakia would be isolated from its former allies 
to the benefit of both Germany and Hungary.26 
 When this line was related to Kánya, he took it to heart, and for the remainder of 
the year based Hungarian policy on this framework.  In February and June he rebuked 
advances by the Czechoslovakian government for an understanding with Budapest.  
Although he undoubtedly had German strategy in mind when doing so, Prague’s attempts 
to link general rapprochement to a Czechoslovak-Hungarian non-aggression pact in 
exchange for a formal recognition of Hungary’s right to rearm made rejecting the 
proposals much easier.  Hungary had already begun that process and the right to do so 
was considered to be inherent, rendering the Czechoslovakian offers strategically useless.  
Hungarian rearmament, although slow and strictly within the nation’s tight budgetary 
constraints, was common knowledge and had already been given de facto approval by the 
other members of the Little Entente through their lack of protest regarding that violation 
of Trianon.  The non-aggression pact would have been equally worthless, as Prague was 
unwilling to make an explicit promise that would have taken precedence over 
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Czechoslovakia’s Entente obligations, leaving Hungary in virtually the same relatively 
poor strategic position it currently occupied.27 
 By June, no movement had been made on either the Romanian or Yugoslavian 
fronts, leaving Hungary exactly where it stood at the beginning of the year, with the 
diplomatic impasse continuing through late summer and into autumn.  Then, during the 
fall, Hitler sent a message to Budapest and requested that both Kánya and Darányi come 
to visit him at Berchtesgaden.  Upon their arrival, they were informed that decisions had 
been made to annex Austria and intervene militarily in Czechoslovakia, to which neither 
man offered any objections.  In an effort to entice the Hungarians, Hitler offered an 
undefined portion of Czechoslovakia in exchange for participation in the attack and 
improvement in Budapest’s relations with Romania and Yugoslavia.  Even in the absence 
of firm compensation for their participation, the two leaders left satisfied and, upon 
returning to Budapest, related the information to Horthy, who later wrote a letter to Hitler 
expressing his satisfaction with the plan, emphatically noting that Austria was a part of 
Germany.28  However, despite being aware of German intentions, Budapest did not 
anticipate the speed with which Berlin was prepared to move.  Foreign Minister Kánya 
had expected that Czechoslovakia would be the Reich’s first victim, with both it and 
Austria being swallowed sometime in 1940, and the messages received throughout the 
close of 1937 and into 1938 seemed to only confirm this assumption.29  Thus, the 
Anschluss with Austria on March 12, 1938, came as a mild surprise to the Hungarian 
government due to its timing, although its leadership was aware of its imminence and had 
already resigned the country to its fate.30  When official word was communicated to 
Sztójay from Göring, the Hungarian minister did not even mention Austria in his reply.  
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Rather, he asked when Czechoslovakia’s turn would come. 
 
II 
 The remilitarization of the Rhineland thoroughly impressed the Lithuanian 
government, and its hopes for improved relations with the Reich were buoyed by Hitler’s 
peace speech that same day, March 7, 1936.  In his address to the Reichstag, Hitler 
applauded the conciliatory steps taken by the Lithuanian government regarding the 
Memel-Germans, specifically citing the government’s allowing of an autonomous 
legislature and easement of restrictions on the minority.  As a consequence of these 
measures, German opposition to the future treaties with Lithuania was ostensibly dropped 
and a non-aggression pact offered.31  However, this apparent rising tide of goodwill was 
as shallow as Hitler’s words were hollow. 
 Given Lithuania’s relatively weak international position and poor relations with 
its powerful neighbors, Kaunas took the proposition seriously and, when no official 
extension was forthcoming, contacted the Wilhelmstrasse in May to explore the matter 
further.  A meeting on the fifteenth between von Neurath and Jurgis Šaulys, the 
Lithuanian minister in Berlin, highlighted the disingenuity of Hitler’s offer.  The German 
foreign minister side-stepped the matter, focusing instead on issues related to the 
supposedly resolved Memel dispute from the previous September.  According to von 
Neurath, “all kinds of disagreeable things” had resurfaced in the region, which had led 
the German government to believe that Lithuania was not serious about rapprochement.  
Although the statement was likely intended to remain vague, the matter of lingering 
German resentment from espionage conducted by Lithuanian governmental agencies on 
74 
 
Reinhold von Saucken, Berlin’s Consul General in Memel, was brought up to provide 
something substantive at a time when, in the wake of British mediation of the dispute 
during the previous autumn, affairs in the region were corrected.  The tactic worked and 
the entire conversation devolved into a tit-for-tat exchange of grievances that, upon 
parting, each minister promised to work towards remedying.32   
 In truth, the Germans did not want a non-aggression pact with Lithuania, as a 
treaty would inhibit Hitler’s freedom of action in the Baltic region.33  However, they 
were interested in the conclusion of an economic treaty with Lithuania, for which 
negotiations had been ongoing since the Memel elections in September 1935.  At issue 
was what the Lithuanians viewed as an advantageous slant in the German proposal in 
favor of the Reich pertaining to the purchase of pigs, an issue on which Berlin refused to 
budge.  The remilitarization of the Rhineland and Hitler’s offers of a non-aggression pact 
inadvertently provided the Germans new leverage in the resumption of those 
negotiations.  They were now able to make the finalization of that agreement requisite for 
the general improvement of relations deemed necessary to the non-aggression treaty.  The 
Lithuanian government did not see the link between the two issues as the Germans did, 
but, without recourse, could force neither.  Finally, after nearly a year of intermittent 
negotiations, in early August the Lithuanians relented and signed the economic treaty 
with the understanding that the agreement was the first step towards a détente and would 
ultimately lead to the conclusion of the non-aggression pact offered in March.34 
 There is no indication that the Lithuanians were deceived into signing the trade 
treaty on August 5, but the entire episode exemplifies the manner in which, due to its 
increased strength abroad, Germany was able to exert pressure on Lithuania to bring 
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about its own ends.  The traditional Lithuanian strategy of utilizing good, or at least 
amicable, relations with either Germany, Poland, or the Soviet Union as a balance to 
encroachment by the other powers had broken down to such a degree that Kaunas was 
forced into a purely dichotomic relationship with the Third Reich, exposing its inherent 
weakness and leaving the country with little room to maneuver.  With no other options 
and a desperate need for security, the government could only sign the treaty with the hope 
that it would inspire a magnanimous German gesture.  The German government 
understood this, realizing that with the West increasingly uninterested in the region, it 
now had a free hand to conduct its affairs as it pleased as long as it refrained from 
violence.  British mediation in the Memel dispute brought an international eye to a 
technically resolved but still irresolute situation that was only further complicated by the 
reoccupation of the Rhineland.  This tempered Germany’s conduct of its relations with 
Lithuania.  For the time being, tact and restraint were necessary, but Hitler’s aims were 
set and required only a more opportune moment to be acted upon.  The Lithuanians could 
be strung along until then. 
 For the remainder of the year and into 1937, German-Lithuanian relations saw no 
further improvement, with direct contact between the governments limited to a single 
meeting that occurred on March 9.  The Lithuanian Foreign Minister Stasys Lozoraitis, 
on his way to the French Riviera, stopped in Berlin and, accompanied by Kaunas’ envoy 
to Berlin, Jurgis Šaulys, called on von Neurath to discuss the state of relations between 
the two countries.  While all parties agreed that relations had seen a steady improvement 
since the signing of the economic treaty the previous August, there were still matters that 
the German government considered outstanding and in need of redress before any further 
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rapprochement could proceed.  In particular, von Neurath noted that the continued 
imprisonment of pro-Nazi German Memellanders was a hindrance to reconciliation, and 
he made their release a new precondition for better relations.  Judging by Lozoraitis’ 
evasion of the issue during the ensuing conversation, he was surprised by this demand 
and, rather than address it further, sought instead to probe the German foreign minister 
for the German government’s stance on broader European matters.  Specifically, 
Lozoraitis was interested in Germany’s relations with Spain, Austria, the Little Entente 
and Great Britain.  He was particularly interested in the impact British rearmament would 
have on Berlin’s relations with London.  For his efforts, Lozoraitis received little more 
than a restatement of the official German position regarding each matter and departed 
with only the new German demand for the release of its political prisoners.35 
 Again, just as the Germans the previous year had forced the economic treaty, they 
were now utilizing the same tactic to pressure the Lithuanians into meeting their demands 
in exchange for vague promises with little concrete value.  Although Hitler had no 
intention of signing a non-aggression pact with Lithuania and, over the past year, that 
idea had almost entirely disappeared from their discourse, as a theoretical end it remained 
on the table.  This contributed to an easing of what had previously been tense relations, 
with the Lithuanian government eventually yielding, though not without considerable 
chagrin, to all of Germany’s demands.  Considering the worsening of Lithuania’s already 
poor relations with both Poland and the Soviet Union and an increasingly distanced 
affiliation with the Baltic Entente, Lozoraitis and Smetona had few options.36  The 
Germans were able to take advantage of this and treat the Lithuanians casually for the 
remainder of 1937 and into 1938, offering no concessions as a counter to their increased 
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pressure, while content to string the Smetona government along until circumstances were 
favorable for action.  Following the events of March 12, 1938, such a situation presented 
itself. 
III 
 In Bucharest, the government of King Carol II reacted to Hitler’s reoccupation of 
the Rhineland in a necessarily duplicitous manner.  Nicolae Titulescu, the foreign 
minister, expressed his congratulations to Hitler through Berlin’s charge d’affaires, 
Wilhelm von Pochhammer, praising him on the ostensibly peaceful content of his 
accompanying speech, while at the same time expressing regret over the decision.  So as 
to not offend Hitler, Titulescu couched Romanian security concerns amid the trappings of 
international law, subtly reprimanding the German leader for acting without the consent 
of the Locarno Powers or the League of Nations and indicating that his government 
would staunchly support the ultimate decisions of the latter body in the interest of 
preserving its legitimacy.  As diplomatically as possible, he even went so far as to 
question the German justification for the move, noting that unilateral action was 
premature and that it demonstrated to the international community an unwillingness to 
work with arbitrative bodies.  Given the diplomatic storm he believed to be rising against 
Germany, Titulescu announced his desire to move closer to the Reich, but noted that, as a 
result of Hitler’s aggressiveness, he was forced to follow a different path.37 
 Confident that he had balanced the need to warn Berlin of the consequences of its 
actions while not burning any bridges, he later related his true beliefs and intentions to 
the American minister in Bucharest, Leland Harrison.  Titulescu felt assured that there 
would be repercussions from the League, likely in the form of economic sanctions similar 
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to those imposed upon Italy following Mussolini’s invasion of Abyssinia in 1935.  There 
might even be a call for the forceful expulsion of the Wehrmacht from the Rhineland, 
although he believed the time for the latter had already passed.  The sanctions, though, 
were of great necessity, for if there were none and Hitler learned from this experience 
that international order could be flaunted, then the entire system upon which European 
security was based would shortly see its end.  This would inevitably lead to conflict, “not 
today, not to-morrow, perhaps – but, if the situation is allowed to continue, war is bound 
to come.”38 
 While making this assessment, Titulescu had not only collective security, which 
he had spent his entire career championing, but his own eroding grip on power in mind, 
for the two were intrinsically linked.  Failure for the League would be his downfall, a 
proposition he understood.  To prevent this, he took affirmative measures to prolong his 
relevance.  Though ill, he traveled to Geneva for a summit of representatives from both 
the Little and Balkan Ententes and, under the auspices of speaking for the alliances as a 
whole, issued a hastily conceived dispatch imploring the League of Nations to strictly 
interpret the relevant treaties that Germany had violated.  He threatened an official 
distancing of the Entente member states from the League should no punitive action be 
forthcoming.  Even before the hollow condemnation of the League Council that he 
feared, his scheming with the powers of both Ententes began the end of his political 
career.  The dispatch he had issued came before any of the representatives of the two 
alliances had an opportunity to consult with their governments on the matter and, shortly 
thereafter, Belgrade, Ankara, and Athens each issued communiqués repudiating 
Titulescu’s, labeling it unrepresentative of their views, and each privately informed 
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Berlin of their intent to remain neutral in the event of any international dispute.  
Previously, the Romanian foreign minister had been able to speak with authority for five 
nations.  Now only Czechoslovakia remained loyal to him.  This left him virtually 
discredited and, along with him, Danubian faith in collective security.  So began the 
region’s slide away from that concept and towards the pre-1914 international order.39 
 Caught up in his own idealism and world-view, Titulescu underestimated the 
impact of German economic penetration in Danubian Europe, which greatly contributed 
to his being jettisoned as regional spokesman in international affairs.  By this time 
Turkey had accommodated its economy to the Third Reich and, in the aftermath of the 
remilitarization of the Rhineland, moved to further that process, accepting German goods 
to the detriment of trade with other nations, while providing Hitler’s expanding war-
machine with vital chrome and other resources.  Yugoslavia and Greece were equally 
under the German sway, with the Reich representing the majority market for their exports 
and an equally significant source of capital.  Siding with Titulescu’s combative 
communiqué would have been tantamount to economic suicide should Germany have 
sought new, more politically friendly partners.  The lack of a direct perceived threat, 
coupled with a weak regional economy based primarily on agriculture and a few raw 
materials for which the Germans were willing to pay handsomely, made siding with 
Titulescu dangerous and unnecessary.40  
 Despite this particular failure, Titulescu was able to extend his tenure in office 
until August 1936, when a confluence of factors precipitated his downfall.  Most 
significant was his controversial policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union, which 
was unpopular both at home and abroad.  Domestically, his diplomatic style and 
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perceived sacrificing of Romania’s traditional international friendships created numerous 
critics, who viewed him as little more than a Soviet agent.  It was feared that should the 
country move closer to communist Russia as the foreign minister desired, the territorial 
gains Romania had made following the First World War might be jeopardized, possibly 
along with national independence.  Certainly, Germany would be alienated and, with its 
growing power, many Romanian moderates like Gheorghe Brătianu and Grigore Gafencu 
feared that this would draw Romania into the conflict they believed to be brewing 
between fascism and communism.  There was also domestic concern that extreme-right 
organizations like the Iron Guard would threaten the government if provided with such an 
impetus.  Although economic reforms enacted in the 1920s had held off widespread 
communist agitation, the continued poor state of the Romanian peasantry ensured that 
concern about its influence remained.  The fascism of the green-shirts was equally 
undesirable, but, if the current balance were maintained, the Iron Guard could be utilized 
as bulwarks against communism’s further spread.  This would have the added benefit of 
directing extreme-right attention away from the government.41 
 Internationally, Titulescu’s policy of shifting Romania towards the Soviet Union 
created as much enmity abroad as it did at home.  The Germans were particularly 
concerned about the growing intimacy they perceived between Bucharest and Moscow, 
as they feared that should even the permission to fly over Romanian territory for military 
purposes be given, French encirclement of the Reich would be completed.  As long as 
Titulescu still held influence over Romanian policy, Berlin believed that grandiose 
political promises would be ineffectual.  Consequently, another strategy had to be 
employed to ensure that Germany was “more seen and felt.”42  What this meant were 
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veiled threats and a subtle assertion of the country’s growing power.  To avoid alienating 
its desired partner, these came piecemeal and concurrent with overtures of friendship, but 
the intent was to present stark black or white alternatives.  Germany was willing to forego 
an alliance with Hungary and recognize the current status of Transylvania as final if 
Romania accepted Berlin’s friendship.  However, the German government was equally 
content to align with countries that harbored revisionist aspirations towards Romania, 
should these advances be rejected.43  At the very least, Berlin wanted Bucharest to 
remain neutral in the brewing German-Soviet conflict.  No guarantees or incentives 
would be offered to entice the Romanians, only the express understanding of what the 
consequences were for choosing wrongly.44 
 By the end of the summer of 1936, Romania was at a crossroads.  Following 
either path was fraught with uncertainties and, in his first decisive act as king, Carol 
chose the one that led to Germany.  In a tactical move intended to discredit Titulescu and 
prevent his expected future criticism of the government from holding any merit, he was 
dismissed rather than being allowed to resign.45  Although there were reasons that made 
the move desirable on a purely domestic level, the manner in which Titulescu was 
relieved of his duties was also intended to be a symbolic gesture to Germany, indicating 
the future direction of Romanian foreign policy.  The decision was momentous, as it was 
the beginning of what would eventually develop into a total alignment with Hitler and the 
Third Reich.  However, at the time, none of this was apparent.  Caught between Germany 
and the Soviet Union, Romania viewed Germany as the less dangerous power and, with 
the placement of sufficient safeguards and astute diplomatic maneuvering, the 
government of King Carol believed that Romania would be able to resist any mounting 
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pressure from Berlin.46 
 To replace Titulescu, Carol elevated his finance minister Victor Antonescu to the 
post of foreign minister, although in reality it was the king who was now in charge of 
Romania’s foreign policy.  Realizing the dangers inherent in aligning his country with 
either power, Carol attempted to maintain friendly but uninvolved relations with both 
Germany and the Soviet Union.  Such a course was believed to be the only way in which 
Romania could avoid becoming a “theater of war” in the conflict towards which he feared 
the current political climate was moving.  To safeguard the country from this potentiality, 
Romania would, in addition to limiting its dealings with both Germany and the Soviet 
Union, take a less active role in European affairs so as to prevent the possibility of being 
indirectly drawn into a conflict.47  In order to accomplish this, it was necessary to undo 
much of what Titulescu had achieved during his tenure. 
 The first step was to bring the burgeoning rapprochement with the Soviet Union 
to a halt, a task only complicated by Carol’s desire to do so without torpedoing the 
friendly atmosphere Titulescu had fostered.  This was accomplished by sinking the 
discussions pertaining to a mutual-assistance pact the former foreign minister had begun 
the previous year.  However, in doing so, by mid-1937 the Romanians quickly returned 
relations between the two countries to the same simmering hostility that had 
characterized their intercourse during the 1920s.48  Though unintended to the degree that 
the retrogression eventually reached, this crumbling of Romania’s Eastern policy was 
buoyed by an improvement in Bucharest’s relations with Germany. 
 On September 24, 1937, three economic treaties were signed with the Reich and, 
during an October 6 meeting between Carol and Wilhelm Fabricus, the new German 
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minister in Bucharest, the king expressed his desire to build upon those agreements and 
have closer, friendlier relations with Berlin.  However, despite this wish, he related 
numerous concerns that prevented the adoption of a policy that would move Romania in 
that direction.  Of all the factors prohibiting such realignment, Germany’s friendship with 
Hungary was the most disturbing, for as a power that had a vital interest in maintaining 
the current territorial integrity of Europe, it was difficult for Romania to reach out to a 
nation that support revisionism, let alone revision directed against itself.  In an attempt to 
allay the king’s fears, Fabricus noted that despite Germany’s own truncation as a result of 
the post-war settlements, the Reich had never put forth a claim for the restoration of 
Hungary’s former dominions.  The friendship was one of sympathy and, given 
Budapest’s anti-Bolshevik stance, common purpose.  In that fight Europe needed to be 
united regardless of whether a nation was irredentist or not, for the only true division of 
any importance was Bolshevism and those governments that were aligned against it.  To 
this end, other considerations must not be viewed as impediments to the cultivation of 
relations between states.  Such an argument may as well have come from Hitler’s own 
mouth based upon the manner in which Fabricus juxtaposed the two unrelated strategic 
considerations.  However, it resonated with the king.  Carol emphatically put forth his 
own anti-Bolshevik stance, but because of Titulescu’s policies, related that he was unable 
to “put about the helm and steer a different course forthwith.”  Placing the onus of 
shifting his country’s foreign policy on Germany, he warned Fabricus that Berlin needed 
to pursue its agenda with Romania cautiously – a subtle indication that threats could 
potentially have the opposite effect Hitler sought – lest the Reich ruin what both it and 
Carol wished to see come to fruition.  The king also made it clear that while Romania 
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wanted to improve its relations with Germany, it would do so on its own terms and any 
rapprochement was to fit within the tenets of a Romano-centric policy.  This entailed 
maintaining Bucharest’s alliances with France, Poland, and the Little Entente.  The 
easiest way for Germany to bring about closer relations with Romania would be to 
establish good relations with France and work towards reconciliation with 
Czechoslovakia.  Such a demonstration of good faith would enable the Romanian 
government to come forward more openly.49 
 Although the king was speaking honestly from his own considerations about the 
best way in which both his and what he believed German goals to be could be achieved, 
he inadvertently committed a tactical blunder.  By explicitly outlining his foreign policy 
strategy, he gave the Germans an advantage.  Berlin now knew the lynchpin of Romanian 
strategy – the Little Entente – but also recognized how delicate a business it would be to 
implement it.  If the Little Entente were wrenched apart and Romania’s confidence in 
France shaken, ends which the Reich had already been working towards in its efforts to 
isolate Czechoslovakia, then the country could easily be drawn into the German sphere.  
There was no need to conduct affairs gently.  As long as Romania was not treated too 
roughly, it was unlikely that the country would be pushed towards the Soviet Union.  
Until the moment was ripe to pounce on Czechoslovakia and snatch its ally, Romania 
could be brought closer to Germany through slow, gradual, economic dependence.50 
 To accomplish this, Germany needed to prevent Romania from becoming part of 
the Franco-Czech-Soviet alliance, a plan originally forwarded by Titulescu and now 
resurrected by the Czechoslovaks with French support.  Little assistance was needed, as 
widespread public abhorrence to the proposal had, by mid-November, forced the new 
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foreign minister Brătianu to abandon the plan.51  However, the vague promises offered by 
the Romanian government that the proposed alliance was dead did not satisfy Hitler, as 
Germany had nothing to use as leverage against Bucharest to prevent another 
reorientation of its policy.  In an effort to gain such insurance, in December Göring called 
upon Bucharest’s minister in Berlin, and during a conversation with Nicolae Petrescu-
Comnen, reiterated his October proposal.  This time, the exchange of a security guarantee 
for long-term economic agreements and a prohibition on entering into arrangements 
directed against Germany was given an underlying threat.  If the Reich were refused, the 
German government would be compelled to enter into friendship with Romania’s 
revisionist enemies.52 
 In the short term, Göring’s meddling backfired and drove the Romanians to 
consider a secondary French proposal, which entailed reorganizing the Little Entente into 
a defensive alliance that included France within its framework.  This placed Bucharest in 
a temporarily advantageous position.  The French offers forced Germany to relax its tone 
and focus its efforts on bringing the Romanians into the fold through economic means 
with promises of even more lucrative trade deals.  This in turn tempered mounting French 
pressure to harangue the Romanian government into its new conception of the Little 
Entente for fear of driving it towards Germany.  In the end, economic considerations won 
out over security, and by April 1937, Brătianu related to the Germans that the French 
proposal was dead.  This was all the Germans needed to hear and, with the threat of 
Romania aligning with the Reich’s enemies removed, all further discussion of a security 
agreement was dropped.53 
 Although Hitler wanted Romanian friendship, amicable relations were secondary 
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to his desire for the country’s resources.  It was only this motive that dictated German 
policy towards Romania.  When it appeared that Bucharest might turn in another 
direction, generous offers were made to entice Carol and his government, but when that 
threat passed they were rescinded because the situation no longer required such 
beneficence.  The result was that for the remainder of 1937 and into the early part of 
1938, there was little movement on relations between the two countries.  There was no 
need.  Economically, trade was at the largest volume Bucharest would allow without 
further guarantees from Berlin, which would only be forthcoming if there was a threat to 
the status quo.  With France mired in its own problems and the British uninterested in the 
region, the danger of that occurring was minimal.  With German affairs in the Danubian 
region stabilized, Hitler was free to turn his attention closer to home. 
IV 
 To the Polish government, the remilitarization of the Rhineland was a test of 
strength that its foreign minister Colonel Józef Beck understood was to have far-reaching 
consequences, although it was a situation that he knew could not be indefinitely 
sustained.  The move should have come as no surprise, as Józef Lipski, Warsaw’s 
minister in Berlin, had been informed of Hitler’s intent to violate the Versailles treaty 
several days earlier by the Italian ambassador to Germany, Bernardo Attolico.  However, 
due to illness, Lipski did not transmit a report of this conversation before March 7, which, 
though allowing Hitler to catch Beck and the Polish government unprepared, did not have 
any negative impact on Warsaw’s immediate response.54 
 The Polish government, which until this point had been pursuing a subtle dual-
policy both domestically and abroad, had prepared a carefully thought-out response in 
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case Hitler made precisely this move.  Beck privately thought that, if presented with a fait 
accompli, the French response would be limited.  In this case it would be necessary to 
demonstrate to Paris that Poland still held its alliance obligations seriously.  
Consequently, before any official word on the French reaction had been received, Beck 
summoned Léon Noël, the new French ambassador in Warsaw, to the Raczyński Palace 
and informed him that he might communicate to his government that, “should it come to 
any clash under conditions in accordance with the spirit of the alliance, Poland would not 
hesitate to carry out her obligations as an ally.”   Noël’s account of the meeting presents 
Beck quite differently, appearing anxious that morning and, in the communiqué issued to 
the Quai d’Orsay, he couched this declaration in vague language.  In either case, it seems 
that the official Polish line was dictated in part by a statement made by André François-
Poncet, the French ambassador to Germany, who, just days before the remilitarization of 
the Rhineland, assured Lipski that if the Rhineland Pact resolutions of the Locarno 
treaties were violated, “ce sera la mobilization générale, ce sera la guerre.”55 
 However, Poland was not prepared to participate in any conflict, even if it were in 
conjunction with the French and, presumably, Great Britain and Belgium.  Hedging his 
bets that, unlike in 1923 when Paris had sent its forces in alone to occupy the Ruhr to 
ensure the payment of reparations, the government of Pierre Laval would not act without 
support, Beck played both sides.  Following his audience with Noël, he personally drafted 
a contradictory statement for both German and Polish consumption.  In it, he indicated 
that Poland had no interest in the matter and, consequently, would abide by its 1934 
agreement with Germany.  This incited a flurry of remonstrances from Noël, who felt 
betrayed by the policy discrepancies between what he had related to Paris and the true 
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Polish position.  The French Ambassador blasted Beck and his justifications, noting that 
the matter was directly related to Polish security, as now, without France able to quickly 
penetrate into Germany’s industrial heartland, it would be less able to come to Warsaw’s 
aid.  Embarrassed, Beck could only respond by stating that the situation had not worked 
itself out when he had issued his press statement.  Coming to the Foreign Minister’s aid 
and defending his own institution’s honor, Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły, the head of 
Poland’s military, later contacted Noël and argued that the reason Poland was not able to 
stand by France was Paris’ refusal to grant Warsaw desperately needed credit to rebuild 
its military.  Rydz-Śmigły insinuated that France was directly responsible for Poland’s 
consequent policy line through the violation of the moral tenets of the two countries’ 
alliance by hindering Polish rearmament, absolving Warsaw of French scorn.56 
 If Beck’s objective was to test the French alliance, then he achieved his goal, 
although at the cost of generating discord between the two allies.57  It is doubtful that 
Polish actions during this time had any substantive effect upon the crisis before 
Germany’s invasion of Poland in 1939.  In the wake of Czechoslovakia’s 
dismemberment, a move which confirmed Hitler’s disregard for the agreement signed in 
Munich, French action was all but guaranteed.  For the moment, the only real damage 
was to Beck’s pride.  France had called upon Poland to act the part of the power Beck 
pretended his country to be, and Poland had failed. 
 While dealing with the various aspects of Poland’s French commitments, Beck 
sought to maintain amicable relations with the German government, permitting the 
reoccupation of the Rhineland to pass without incident.  The only concern he lodged that 
day with Hans Adolf von Moltke, Germany’s ambassador to Poland, pertained to the 
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twenty-five year duration of the non-aggression pacts Hitler offered in his Reichstag 
speech.  He feared that the difference between those proposals and the length of the 1934 
German-Polish agreement might lead to public mistrust of the German government.  
Concerns over outstanding trade issues were also broached, although for the moment the 
matter was put on hold.  Following a subsequent meeting with von Moltke on March 12 
when he promised to represent Germany’s views to the upcoming Council of the League 
of Nations in London, Beck traveled to the British capital for what he expected was to be 
a toothless recrimination of Hitler’s actions.  On March 13, the Locarno Powers, the 
supposed guarantors of Western security, had already balked in response to the German 
challenge and offered only a weak resolution that, while finding Germany in violation of 
Articles 42 and 43 of the Versailles treaty, deferred the matter to the League Council for 
adjudication.58  
 At the conference, differences of opinion and political realities helped to assure 
Hitler that the German success would be complete.  Despite recognizing the dangers 
highlighted by the French, the British were unwilling to risk war over the affair.  
Economic sanctions were also ruled out, as many of the smaller powers relied heavily 
upon German trade for the maintenance of their own economies.  Even if such punitive 
measures had been adopted, it was unlikely that many would have adhered to the 
resolutions anyway.59  To a degree, Poland fit into this latter category, but political 
considerations were of equal importance.  Beck was primarily interested in gaining an 
extension of the existing German-Polish agreement and sought to do so by 
overrepresenting Warsaw’s interest in the affair so as to be in a position to temper the 
Council’s declaration, gambling that his beneficence would be reciprocated by Hitler.60  
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In the end, it is unlikely that the Polish delegation had any significant impact upon the 
course of events, as backing either Germany or France too openly risked alienating 
Warsaw from either power.  All that could be done was to ensure the situation did not 
escalate into an armed conflict, for war would have brought Beck’s policy crashing 
down.  When it came time to vote on the resolution, Poland abstained.61 
 In the following months, the Polish government sought more earnestly to ensure 
its own security, particularly in the face of weakening French resistance to German 
aggression.  Over the summer, Warsaw began receiving subsidies from Paris for 
rearmament, and the two governments provided each other with mutual reassurances that 
their alliance was strong and still viable.  However, despite French pressure, the Polish 
government refused to move away from its cautious friendship with Germany or be 
drawn closer to Czechoslovakia.62  Doing so would have contradicted the underlying 
principles of the policy Beck had been pursuing, along with casting serious doubt upon 
Warsaw’s Great Power posturing.  It also would have required Poland to make amends 
with the very nation against which its irredentism was directed against.  In the end, the 
French need to produce a show of strength in the face of a foreign policy defeat prevailed 
over any serious policy reorientation, and the Poles were able to walk away from the 
negotiations gaining much while giving little. 
 Concurrently with those negotiations, Beck approached the Germans about the 
possibility of including the Reich in a larger collective security scheme, with the 1934 
non-aggression pact being worked into such a system.  The idea of an “Eastern Locarno” 
treaty had resurfaced in Geneva and, in light of a perceived British and Italian hesitancy 
to act as guarantors for such an arrangement, he may have been probing whether the 
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Reich, in conjunction with Poland, would assume that role.  Aside from the inclusion of 
Germany, the formation of a regional collective security bloc would have been a shortcut 
to Beck’s pet “Third Europe” project, making use of the German Peace Plan framework 
forwarded at the end of March, which, according to the Polish foreign minister, had 
aroused much interest.  If this was Beck’s intent, it would have provided an additional 
measure of security against both Germany and the Soviet Union.  However, for it to be 
viable, the Soviets would need to be included unless it were specified that defense against 
Soviet attack was a principle tenet of the agreement.  The latter sentiment may have had 
broad regional ideological sympathy, but as a practical measure, it was impossible.  This 
is all, of course, speculation.  Beck never clarified his strangely abrupt, short-lived 
change of heart regarding collective security, and by the end of May he had again taken 
an unfavorable disposition to both the concept and an Eastern Pact.63  The lack of 
German interest in his proposal certainly contributed to its quick abandonment, as did 
Berlin’s cold-shoulder to similar British inquiries.  With the fervor over the 
remilitarization of the Rhineland dissipating and it becoming clear that the move would 
be allowed to stand, the Germans no longer needed to maintain the façade of commitment 
to an ideal that they had no intent of honoring.  By June Berlin had resumed its more 
aggressive stance. 
 This entailed a resumption of the Danzig issue, instigated this time by an 
international slight to the League of Nations High Commissioner to the city, Sean Lester, 
when the German cruiser Leipzig put into port and failed to call upon the League 
representative.  Ostensibly, Captain Schenk was ordered to refrain from calling upon 
Lester to prevent a recurrence of what the German government considered the “tactless” 
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invitation of Danzig opposition party members to the officer’s reception as had happened 
when the Admiral Scheer visited the city the previous August.  In reality, the indignity 
was part of a calculated scheme designed to precipitate Lester’s downfall and test Polish 
resolve.  Coinciding with the formal affront, a scathing article by Albert Forster, the Nazi 
Gauleiter in the city, was published in both the German and Danzig press.  The piece was 
intended to incite Lester to refer the matter to the League Council in Geneva, which he 
did.  A hearing was scheduled for July 4 and, to take advantage of the international stage 
with which he was presented, Hitler sent Arthur Greiser, the hotheaded President of the 
Danzig Senate, to deliver a well-coached tirade against not only Lester but also the 
superfluous position of the High Commissioner and League itself.64 
 Greiser’s inflammatory and highly theatrical performance made it clear that the 
episode was less about Lester and more about German dissatisfaction with the 
administrative character of the city.  Although Poland’s interest in Danzig was limited to 
the safeguarding of its own interests, such a threat to the governmental structure that 
ensured Polish rights were respected was too great a risk to Poland’s fundamental 
position in the city.  The consequences would certainly have been dire, for without the 
presence of the League and High Commissioner, Germany would have a free rein to 
Nazify the area, which would have amounted to virtual annexation.  However, 
championing the League carried the risk for Poland of becoming a defender of the 
Danzig-German minority that opposed National Socialism, a group Warsaw had no 
interest in protecting.  Though in many ways the two were aspects of the same issue that 
Beck tried to separate, they were too intrinsically linked to be dealt with separately.65 
 The delicacy of the situation mandated a careful and measured response.  Beck 
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desired a compromise, but in seeking one was encumbered by the need to demonstrate 
firmness in dealing with what he viewed as a violent German attack on the foundation of 
Danzig’s political structure.  Too resolute a defense of the existing status quo risked 
inciting a political conflict within the German population of the city that Poland had no 
hope of winning.  On the other extreme, conflict between Berlin and Warsaw in Danzig 
could lead to war.  However, Lester was negotiable.  It was not the person but the 
position that Poland wished to preserve.  After a month of negotiations between the two 
governments, it was finally agreed that both sides would be satisfied with a new face in 
the same role, and the crisis was resolved.66 
 Germany had pushed and Poland pushed back.  Based upon the Polish response, it 
quickly became evident to Hitler and the German government that only a slight 
modification to the status quo in Danzig was acceptable to the Poles, although that was 
itself a success.  By disposing of Lester, the last authority that was expressly concerned 
with the political independence of the Danzig-Germans had been eliminated, and coupled 
with a lack of Polish interest on that facet of the issue, it was now possible for Berlin to 
exercise complete tactical control over the domestic situation in the city.  Further changes 
would have to wait for circumstances that were more favorable.  Such opportunities were 
bound to occur, as the Polish government was now the body charged with the 
management of Danzig-German relations according to the deal that resolved the crisis.  
As long as the city’s bureaucratic structure maintained intact, Polish objections to 
German activities were likely to remain negotiable.  With the office of High 
Commissioner preserved, Beck could also claim success, although his was a pyrrhic 
victory.  The charge given to Poland could certainly be viewed positively in terms of 
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prestige, as Warsaw now, in Beck’s own words, was to “screen the League” and, through 
this responsibility, could prevent it from “fleeing the battlefield in Danzig before some 
new form of additional guarantee for Polish interests had been found.”  Whether this 
could be translated from theory to practice remained to be seen.  Screening the League 
required that Poland deal directly with Germany over matters relating to Danzig, which 
advantaged the Reich, as Hitler was able to treat the situation more aggressively and with 
the understanding that any deterioration in relations could only reflect upon the German 
and Polish governments.67  
 Following a brief respite during August for the Berlin Olympics, Danzig 
continued to be the flashpoint of German-Polish relations throughout the autumn of 1936 
and into 1937.  The German government alternatively ordered Forster to instigate an 
incident and then, when Polish resistance to the challenge became firm, restrain his 
activities.  The difference in character following the remilitarization of the Rhineland 
from previous incidents was that, with Germany’s consolidation of continental power, it 
could afford to be more aggressive in working towards its objectives and make attempts 
at real gains rather than simply test Polish resolve.68  For the moment, these were modest 
successes.  The League presence in the city had been effectively marginalized and, as a 
consequence, Hitler was able to dismantle the remaining political opposition to National 
Socialism.  However, Warsaw would let Berlin go no further, insisting that the High 
Commissioner remain, if only to retain an alternative outlet of protest should the two 
governments be unable to resolve disputes.  Assurances from the German government 
that it had no desire to violate Poland’s interests in the city helped to prevent such an 
impasse from occurring and resulted, by September 1937, in a détente that placated 
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Warsaw and afforded Hitler the time needed to prepare for other foreign policy actions.69 
 
V 
 The alteration of the European political landscape following the remilitarization 
of the Rhineland, in addition to changing the dynamic between Germany and its eastern 
neighbors, changed their relations with each other as well.  The move was not an 
imminent threat that needed to be countered, but the statesmen of East Central Europe 
were perceptive enough to realize the balance of power was shifting in favor of Germany 
and away from the Western Allies.  Britain and, more importantly, France had failed to 
act decisively and, though there were numerous factors that contributed to their mutual 
decision to allow Hitler’s fait accompli to stand, the signal sent to the other side of 
Europe did not include the details that resulted in that decision.  Reliance upon either 
power now carried risks similar to those that trusting Hitler did.  Additional measures 
would be required to ensure peace and security in the region.  Fear of the Soviet Union 
and a hesitancy to completely trust Mussolini’s government limited the options available 
to the governments in Warsaw, Kaunas, Budapest, and Bucharest, forcing them to look to 
each other in order to prevent Germany from completely filling the vacuum left by the 
Western departure from the region’s affairs. 
 This occurred haphazardly among the national leaders and reflected more of an 
attempt, from March 1936 until March 1938, at collusion to maximize potential gains in 
response to the impetus provided by Hitler’s foreign policy.  Following the Rhineland 
reoccupation, the Polish and Hungarian governments initiated discussions that built upon 
the groundwork laid by Gömbös and Piłsudski in late 1934.  During a state visit by 
96 
 
representatives of the Polish government to Budapest in 1936, it was agreed that the 
creation of a common border would be greatly beneficial to future relations, although 
there was no concrete resolution.  Still, the foundation for a coordinated policy had been 
laid, and during a conference in February 1938, discussions were held in Warsaw that 
expanded upon these points.  An ascendant Germany that was rearming and exerting 
what Beck described as “maximalist pressure” in Danubian Europe prompted him to 
pursue his “Third Europe” project more vigorously and, with Horthy and Kánya as week-
long guests, he broached the subject for the first time.70 
 The Hungarians were receptive to the idea, agreeing that in order to counter the 
threat of German and Soviet expansion, the governments of Poland, Hungary, Italy, 
Romania, and Yugoslavia needed to align together and oppose the Third Reich.  In 
previous talks with the Italians, they had indicated an interest in the proposal, noting with 
chilling accuracy that unless such a non-aligned bloc came into being, Italy would shortly 
become the lesser power in the Rome-Berlin Axis.  The first step then was achieving a 
common border between Poland and Hungary, an idea that Count Galeazzo Ciano, the 
Italian Foreign Minister, echoed during his visit to Budapest shortly after the conference 
in Warsaw.  Although there were differences of opinion in exactly how the proposed bloc 
would posture itself – either German friendly but not dominated by Berlin or explicitly 
united in opposition to Hitler – it was significant that all sides saw the need for an 
alternative to the existing European polemics.71  
In order to accomplish this prerequisite for the “Third Europe” bloc as it was 
conceived, Czechoslovak territory needed to be acquired.  Both the Polish and 
Hungarian governments saw an opportunity for this in what they expected to be Hitler’s 
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next foreign policy conquest, as since the late summer of 1936, Berlin had been exerting 
varying degrees of pressure on Prague for resolution of the Sudeten-German minority 
question.72  Signals from Germany, particularly those directed at Budapest, led to the 
belief that action was imminent and, rather than oppose a move both the Hungarian and 
Polish governments viewed as inevitable and positive, they chose to take advantage of it 
instead.  They only disagreed as how to approach the situation so as to serve both 
individual and mutual interests simultaneously and justify their activities to the 
international community.        
At this early stage of their collaboration on Czechoslovakia’s dismemberment, 
both governments harbored ambitious and contradictory aims.  As the Slovak lands were 
a portion of Hungary’s historic territory, Budapest naturally wished to reincorporate 
them into its expanded realm.  Beck had other designs on the eastern portion of 
Czechoslovakia, wishing to transform it into a Polish-dominated protectorate to serve as 
a buffer between Germany and Poland and an exploitable economic dependent.  On this 
particular issue, neither side was able to come to an agreement.  However, rather than 
deal with the issue directly, Beck persuaded Horthy and Kánya to make contacts with 
the Slovakian separatists, ostensibly so that any future action could be coordinated with 
the groups there.  This was a ruse.  From his own sources in Slovakia, Beck was aware 
that there was little desire to return to Magyar domination and, since Budapest preferred 
to have its forces invited rather than invade, knew that this would prevent any Hungarian 
move until a more profitable situation was presented.73 
 While collaborating with Hungary, Beck also took steps to reinvigorate Poland’s 
waning relationship with Romania.  The process was begun shortly after the reoccupation 
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of the Rhineland, with negotiations that eventually produced a warming of the waning 
alliance between Warsaw and Bucharest.  However, this was limited to no more than a 
reaffirmation of the existing alliance due to the constraints placed on Romanian policy by 
Soviet threats and Carol’s own policy on non-alignment.74  This was sufficient for the 
moment and with the two governments’ attention directed elsewhere, strengthening an 
arrangement that neither side desired to be more than defensive was unnecessary.  The 
perceived threat of growing German power prompted each government to action in 1937, 
with an exchange of official visits that led to renewed discussion of collective security 
issues, but nothing concrete.  Divergent views on how best to effect that end prohibited 
any agreement, with Beck’s initial proposal of the formulation of a new Entente 
consisting of Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, working in concert with 
Germany being received warmly by Victor Antonescu, the Romanian foreign minister, 
but rejected by Carol.  The latter, wishing to preserve freedom of action in Romanian 
policy, viewed the arrangement as restrictive of that principle and, as Beck’s plan did not 
include Czechoslovakia, a violation of Bucharest’s existing alliance system.  Carol 
eventually let himself be persuaded by Beck and agreed to consider loosening Romania’s 
relations with the Little Entente and France, although still he would not push the country 
firmly in the direction the Polish foreign minister wished.75 
 Beck’s attempts at gaining support for his “Third Europe” concept during this 
time were met with modest success.  As a response to the political threat that both 
Hungary and Romania thought Germany to be, the idea was certainly attractive.  It 
required no surrender of national independence and, as Beck presented it, was defensive 
in nature, involving no foreign policy risks that held the potential for detrimental results.  
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Inherent in the arrangement, though, was a moratorium on revisionism between the 
potential member states, which was a bitter pill to swallow for Hungary, as the possibility 
of Transylvania’s recovery in the short term would rely entirely upon Romanian 
beneficence.  Although a suspension of irredentism was unlikely to raise objections in 
Bucharest, the addition of Bulgaria, another power with eyes on Romanian territory, in 
exchange for Czechoslovakia, did not sit well.  As an extension of Piłsudski’s 
Międzymorze doctrine, Beck’s “Third Europe” was designed to serve Polish interests first 
and foremost.  A large, fairly powerful regional bloc would accomplish this primary goal 
of security for Warsaw and, by association, afford the same protection to the other 
nations.  However, in working towards this one particular goal, Beck failed to account for 
the myriad of differing ambitions that needed to be accounted for in order to even begin 
moving the project forward. 
 During the period of March 1936 until March 1938, this was complicated by the 
poor state of Hungarian-Romanian relations, which, despite German suggestions of 
rapprochement, failed to develop.  Berlin’s interest in fostering a temporary détente was 
ulteriorly motivated, but even those attempts proved insufficient to alleviate the root 
causes of Hungary and Romania’s differences.  This left affairs between the two 
countries much as they were before German troops entered the Rhineland.  To an extent, 
this mutual mistrust was beneficial to Hitler, as it enabled him to execute a policy of 
divide and conquer, easing the long-term strategic German objective of economic 
domination of Southeastern Europe and delaying a choosing of sides.  Although this was 
a desultory method of managing foreign policy in a region of such importance to his 
greater European designs, it was entirely consistent with Hitler’s tendencies, and allowed 
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both sides to come to him.76  The Hungarians were already moving in this direction and, 
though there was some Romanian resistance to German overtures, the Germans continued 
to make steady inroads with the latter as well. 
 Lithuania continued to remain diplomatically isolated from the rest of Europe.  
The de facto state of war still existed between it and Poland, and despite secret 
negotiations between the two, no progress was made to break the deadlock that would 
allow the resumption of normal relations.  At issue was still the status of Vilnius, as the 
desire for its return had not dissipated.  However, the Polish government refused to 
consider relenting in its official cold-shouldering of its Baltic neighbor unless the existing 
status of the city was recognized by the Smetona regime.  For domestic reasons, this was 
impossible, and consequently, by the beginning of March 1938, the conflict remained 
unresolved.77  This was shortly to have severe consequences for the Lithuanian 
government, which despite its best efforts over the preceding two years, had failed to 
develop the relationships with Germany and Poland that it desired.  Partly because of 
both governments’ lack of need and partly due to the Smetona regime’s unwillingness to 
remove the historic capital from its conditions, no movement was possible and this 
resulted in Lithuania being stuck in much the same position it was before.  
 As it had been prior to March 1936, regional scheming remained paramount to the 
foreign policy designs of East Central Europe, although with the additional impetus of an 
increasingly aggressive Germany, grandiloquence tended to give way to pragmatism.  
Beck’s “Third Europe” concept, in each of its proposed forms, specifically had collective 
security as a counter to the menace presented by both Germany and the Soviet Union, 
although he broke from Piłsudski’s Międzymorze design by tactically setting aside overt 
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Polish dominance of the alliance system for the short term in an effort to generate 
interest.  However, Beck’s belief in his nation’s ability to hold its own in an increasingly 
antagonistic relationship with the Third Reich lessened the vigor with which he pursued 
constructing the bloc, resulting in limited progress towards that end. 
 Hungary, faced with increased German hegemony in Danubian Europe, found its 
“Free Hand” policy limited by a lack of options.  Germany’s growing domination of the 
country’s economy made moving against Berlin’s wishes a serious gamble, as Germany’s 
reach ensured that there would be consequences for any intransigence.  Hitler had in the 
past pledged not to instigate “swastika propaganda” directed at the Hungarian 
government, although this gesture could be reversed to the detriment of Hungary’s 
nationalistic government.78  The lack of a land border with the Reich afforded the 
Hungarian regime a degree of freedom to maneuver and entertain alternatives to 
following the German path, although the possibility of being rewarded for loyalty was 
equally persuasive.  Hitler’s vague promises of assisting in the repatriation of foreign-
ruled Magyars and the recovery of former Hungarian lands resonated with the core of the 
regime’s desires, making them too tempting to pass upon. 
 Titulescu’s dismissal ushered in a new phase of Romanian diplomacy that was 
primarily concerned with undoing the perceived damage that the former foreign 
minister’s policies had wrought.  This entailed a near total reversal of the government’s 
policies, although a complete reorientation was stopped just short.  Even after souring 
Romania’s relations with the Soviet Union, King Carol and his new foreign minister, 
Victor Antonescu, refused to move affirmatively towards Germany, instead choosing to 
follow a path similar to Poland.  The two had faith in the collective security offered by 
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the Little Entente, and the reinvigoration of the Polish alliance served as further support 
in the quest to pursue non-alignment.  In accordance with this policy, the improvement of 
relations with Germany was considered requisite, but with material resources to barter 
with, the Romanians were able to dictate somewhat their own terms.  However, this 
advantage was tenuous, as it was predicated upon the maintenance of a status quo that 
Romania was only partly able to influence.  Were the Entente to crack, Bucharest’s 
insulation from German pressure would evaporate, leaving the country exposed with little 
recourse other than submission.  Measures were taken to buttress the nation against this 
possibility, but, in the wake of the remilitarization of the Rhineland, they bore more 
resemblance to the intricate alliances of pre-Great War Europe than reinforcements of 
collective security.  For the moment, they were enough. 
CHAPTER 3: TOWARDS GERMANY 
 
The events of March 11-12, 1938, shattered the calm that had descended upon 
Europe following the reoccupation of the Rhineland by German troops in 1936.  In 
response to Austrian Chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg’s call for a plebiscite to determine 
whether Austria was to remain independent of Germany, Hitler issued an ultimatum on 
March 11 demanding that governmental power be transferred to the Austrian National 
Socialists by noon the next day or the country would be invaded.  Faced with no 
prospects of international assistance, Schuschnigg resigned his post and left President 
Wilhelm Miklas the unenviable responsibility for relinquishing governmental power to 
the Nazis, which he finally did at midnight.  Acceptance of Arthur Seyß-Inquart as 
Schuschnigg’s replacement was, by this point, irrelevant, as Hitler had already signed the 
order directing the Wehrmacht to march on Vienna two hours earlier.  The next day 
German troops crossed the border, initiating the Anschluss.  
 In little over twelve heated and confused hours, one of Hitler’s fundamental 
foreign policy initiatives was realized in a bold stroke that was a watershed for both the 
German dictator and his Third Reich.  Again, he had moved in violation of Versailles, 
and again the democracies of Western Europe had failed to challenge him, allowing the 
move to stand uncontested.  All of Central Europe was now under the dominion of the 
Rome-Berlin Axis, separating one side of Europe from the other behind a fascist curtain.  
Emboldened by the relative ease with which he had initiated and consolidated Germany’s 
first expansionist move, Hitler began to believe that the process he had once thought 
might require another “great leader” such as himself to complete could be realized in his 
own lifetime.1  He, and not a successor, could be master of the Great German Reich.  All 
that was left now was to initiate the end game, for with the Danubian basin cracked, the 
board was set.  Only the pieces remained to be propelled into motion.  
Following the Anschluss, the diplomatic activity of East Central Europe 
accelerated in response to German foreign policy aggression.  What resulted was a 
regional grab for gains either in conjunction with or in the wake of Hitler’s expansionism.  
This fomented greater intimacy between the governments of Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, 
and Romania as they attempted to fulfill their irredentist desires than had previously 
existed.  However, the consequence of this change was a loss of focus on collective 
security.  The Third Reich also became an omnipresent force, acting as either puppet-
master or regional arbiter.  For this reason, it is necessary to analyze the events following 
the German take-over of Austria until the beginning of war collectively so as to illustrate 
the particular facets of this phase accurately and in the proper context.  
I 
 The Anschluss had not surprised the Polish government, as the move had been 
expected for some time.  However, the timing of the event caught Beck off-guard as, on 
March 11, the foreign minister was in Rome attempting to gain support for his latest 
permutation of the “Third Europe” project and was forced to witness events from the 
Italian capital.  When he was informed of the events transpiring in Austria, news of a 
border incident between Polish and Lithuanian security forces that had resulted in the 
shooting death of a Polish soldier, Stanisław Serafin, near the village of Trasninkai was 
also reported.  Beck decided to use the Anschluss as cover to force the reestablishment of 
normal relations with Lithuania and, during his return to Warsaw, began formulating a 
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plan to that end.  At a conference at the Royal Castle between himself, the head of the 
Polish military Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły, the president, and other cabinet members, 
Beck forwarded a proposal for an ultimatum to be delivered to the Lithuanian 
government.  It was moderate in its aims, only requiring that affairs between the two 
Baltic neighbors be normalized.  All mention of Vilnius was excluded in the hope that 
this would result in its acceptance by the Lithuanian government.  Any demands too 
severe were likely to be rejected and, with collective security in mind, Beck wanted to 
prevent that possibility.  The failure of negotiations over the past five years had stalled 
his Baltic policy, since without Lithuania, Beck believed that Estonia and Latvia could 
not be brought into the fold.  To accomplish this broader aim, if forceful methods had to 
be utilized, then the ends would justify that means.2  
 On March 17, the ultimatum was issued to the Lithuanian government.  In it, 
Poland rejected the Lithuanian position that a commission be created to look into the 
Trasninkai incident.  Instead, the Poles required that an envoy be dispatched to Warsaw 
and one be accredited in the Lithuanian capital by March 31, in addition to the restoration 
of normal diplomatic relations.  The Smetona government was given forty-eight hours to 
reply.  Silence would be interpreted as a negative response.  Explicit or implicit rejection 
of the Polish demands would be followed by military action.  As further incentive, the 
Polish army was put on a state of high alert and four divisions (fifty thousand troops) 
were massed along the Polish-Lithuanian border.  About one hundred planes from the air-
force were concentrated outside of Vilnius and Lyda, and the Polish fleet was ordered to 
assume positions close to the Lithuanian shore.3  
 This sparked a flurry of calm, deliberate activity in Kaunas as the Smetona 
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government scrambled to discern the best course of action.  Inborn patriotism demanded 
that Lithuania resist the Polish affront, and internal surveillance confirmed that, should 
armed conflict result, the public overwhelmingly supported an aggressive defense of the 
country.  General Stasys Raštikis informed Smetona that mobilization of the army could 
take place in as little as twenty-four to seventy-two hours, offering 250,000 troops for a 
decentralized deployment.  However, diplomatic feelers put out by the Lithuanian 
government did not register the same positive prognosis, as international support was not 
forthcoming.  Both Great Britain and France urged Lithuania to accept the ultimatum as, 
in their view, the conflict between Warsaw and Kaunas did not warrant the risking of an 
already tenuous European peace due to their belief that the situation had arisen from 
German-Polish collusion.  Even Lithuania’s allies in the Baltic Entente abandoned the 
country, declining to take action in what both the Latvian and Estonian governments 
considered a strictly Polish-Lithuanian affair.  Smetona also turned to Germany for 
advice, but rather than the traditional anti-Polish support usually offered by Berlin, 
Foreign Minister Juozas Urbšys was informed by Joachim von Ribbentrop, von Neurath’s 
replacement as Reich Foreign Minister, that, in light of the current political realities, 
unconditional acceptance of Polish demands was the only prudent course of action.  The 
consequences of refusal were unforeseeable.  In the reply, von Ribbentrop also indicated 
that following the settlement of this conflict, a settling of German-Lithuanian issues 
would be next on Lithuania’s agenda.4  
 The German response was dictated in part by Hitler’s goal of reincorporating the 
Memelland into the Reich, as any conflict between Poland and Lithuania could result in 
that region being occupied by the Poles.  To counter this possibility, on March 18, Hitler 
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ordered German forces in East Prussia to be ready, in the event that Poland invaded 
Lithuania, to immediately enter the Klaipėda region to prevent it from falling into Polish 
hands.  This position was also made clear to Warsaw, likely in a bid to dissuade the 
Polish government from taking military action that would swallow the entire country.  To 
a degree, German fears were unnecessary, as Polish plans called only for a one-kilometer 
violation of the border should the deadline for the ultimatum expire as a show of force, 
with deeper incursions to follow should the Lithuanians fight.  Such resistance was still 
under consideration as an option as late as the evening of March 18, although at the final 
cabinet meeting, General Raštikis was the deciding figure that averted war.  He told the 
Lithuanian government that, despite the vigor and exuberance of the soldiers and 
citizenry, the ultimate outcome of the conflict could not be in doubt.  Ringed by enemies 
with far superior numbers and material, Lithuania would fall.  The next morning an 
exchange of notes between Polish and Lithuanian envoys took place, followed by acting 
Prime Minister Jokubas Stanisauskis reading the official government reply before the 
Siemas.  The Lithuanian parliament accepted the government’s settlement of the issue 
with only one adjustment to the language of the official response, adding “that we 
accepted because of force” to the end of the document.5  
 Poland had flexed its muscle and Lithuania bent under the pressure.  Partly 
inspired by Hitler’s tactics with Austria and partly relying upon Berlin’s need for a period 
of calm following the annexation of Austria to achieve his ends, Beck again played the 
role of a statesmen representative of a Great Power.  As had been the case with Hitler, his 
target was weak and without international support, virtually guaranteeing the success of 
his action, although Polish aims were more limited in scope than German objectives.  
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This made the ultimatum palatable to the international community, though it was not 
excused.  Poland appeared no better than the Nazi regime and, despite the incidental 
nature of the two governments’ collaboration, the stigma endured.  As architect of the 
scheme, Beck was, for the moment, free to revel in his personal glory. 
 The Polish ultimatum to Lithuania was significant beyond the change in the 
political relationship of two of the region’s nations, for in this instance Hitler reacted to 
an East Central European government rather than the reverse.  To a degree, a German 
precedent had been followed by another power in an effort to effect its own ends that, 
though limited at the outset, held the potential to develop into something far larger, as 
had happened with the Anschluss.6  Had Lithuania chosen to fight, total absorption of the 
country, either through direct annexation or, more likely, the establishment of a puppet-
government similar to Beck’s designs for Slovakia, was possible, and it was this fear that 
spurred the Germans into action.  Although the Reich’s own interests in the Memelland 
were paramount, Berlin wished to keep Lithuania independent so as to retain the 
possibility of exchanging its annexation for the Polish Corridor.7  However, now was not 
a fortuitous time for such action, and, consequently, subtle indications were made that 
Germany would take the necessary precautions to ensure that its interests were protected.  
Without the Danzig issue settled and Beck afraid of bringing the country into direct 
conflict with the Third Reich over a purely Polish political aim, he was forced to respect 
Berlin’s position.  As the boldness of Hitler’s plans increased, this microcosm would be 
repeated.  
 The impact of the Polish ultimatum was minimal.  The quick resolution ensured 
that the entire episode was merely a ripple in the water within the scope of continent-
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wide diplomacy, as larger events soon resumed the place of international importance.  
Though relations were now normalized, Lithuanian policy towards Poland failed to 
change in any substantial way.8  As the Polish government sidestepped the Vilnius issue, 
this implicitly meant that no resolution to the situation technically existed, keeping the 
potential for its return alive, even if remote.  At its core, Polish policy towards Lithuania 
remained equally unchanged, although now Beck was able to pursue his agenda in a more 
concrete manner.  However, the way in which ties were established limited the usefulness 
of what he had forged, as the animosity it bred did not rapidly dissipate, even in the 
shadow of a mutual threat.9  
 Shortly after the acceptance of the Polish ultimatum, the Lithuanian government 
was struck with a similar demand from Berlin.  The German ultimatum required 
Lithuania to adhere to a detailed, eleven-point memorandum that provided for absolute 
freedom of action for the pro-Nazi elements in the Klaipėda region.  The language of the 
memorandum was vague, a measure taken by the Germans to ensure that no matter how 
diligently the Smetona regime observed the barely disguised dikat, at a later point it could 
be claimed that the Lithuanians failed to abide by its tenets and thus justify any 
subsequent action.  Technically, the presentation of the memorandum violated the Memel 
Statute, although in light of the international community’s failure to act in Lithuania’s 
defense during the Polish crisis, the country’s government had little faith that the 
signatory powers would intervene in any meaningful way.  To ward off German pressure, 
the Lithuanian government chose delaying tactics as its primary defense, promising to 
concede most of Berlin’s demands in exchange for guarantees on border security and a 
non-aggression pact.  Neither Lithuanian proposal interested the Germans, and both were 
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ignored.  Hitler preferred to let the situation in Klaipėda deteriorate on its own, though 
with substantial support for the National Socialist elements, rather than force the issue.  
He did not have to wait long.  By December the pro-German parties had gained a 
crushing majority over the Lithuanian groups in the Memel parliament and quickly 
presented Kaunas with another list of demands, this time requiring that the secret state 
police apparatus within Memel be dismantled, which the Smetona government did.10  
 To the Lithuanians, it appeared that following the presentation of both 
memorandums in March and December, the Reich inexplicably lost interest in delivering 
the final blow when the opportunity to do so was within easy reach.  This temporary 
reprieve that spared Kaunas from the full potential of a concerted German onslaught was 
ephemeral and came at the expense of German interest being directed elsewhere.  In 
March 1938, shortly after the Anschluss, Hitler turned his full attention to 
Czechoslovakia, the country he considered a “cancerous tumor,” and Saisonstaat, which 
had been integral to his expansionist foreign policy designs since 1937.11  German 
agitation over the treatment of the Sudeten-Germans had been fairly consistent 
throughout 1937 and into 1938.  Following the conclusion of the Austrian affair, the 
pressure on Prague was again to be ramped up, though now with the objective of forcing 
a resolution. 
 Integral to Hitler’s strategy for dismantling Czechoslovakia was its isolation from 
the rest of the European community.  In this endeavor, Germany could not act alone.  The 
nations of East Central Europe were needed to play an active role in encircling Hitler’s 
victim to prevent outside interference by assisting in the kurtz und vives military 
operation envisioned for Czechoslovakia’s dismemberment.  This would enable Germany 
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to present a fait accompli to the international community before aid could be rendered.  
Such absolute and brutal rejection of the “artificial” state’s existence by all of its 
neighbors would also inherently justify Hitler’s long-standing negative conception of the 
country.12  Aspects of this plan had already been central to Berlin’s discourse with the 
Hungarian government for quite some time.  Since Gömbös had first visited Hitler in 
June 1933, the Germans had attempted to focus Hungarian revisionism northward. Now 
Hitler would call on the Magyars to act.  
 Despite previous assurances from Budapest that the Hungarian government would 
be a willing participant in Czechoslovakia’s destruction, the resoluteness of Britain and 
France in response to the breaking-off of negotiations between the Sudeten- German 
party and the Czechoslovak government in mid-May had weakened its determination.  
Horthy in particular was fearful of being harangued into a conflict that he believed 
Germany had no hope of winning, but with the Third Reich now far less remote than it 
had previously been, he was forced to tread carefully.  Flatly rejecting Hitler held the 
potential for disaster; Hitler’s annexation of Austria had put Hungary’s only other major 
trading partner under German control, and offending Berlin could result in serious 
economic consequences.  Still, the need for Hungarian participation in Hitler’s planned 
action against Czechoslovakia ensured that alternative options to becoming completely 
subservient to Germany remained open.13  
 In an effort to demonstrate this independence, in late August representatives of 
the Hungarian government and member nations of the Little Entente met at Bled, 
Yugoslavia, ostensibly for the purpose of settling long-standing differences.  Kálmán de 
Kánya, the Hungarian foreign minister, approached the conference with this objective in 
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mind.  However, the change in Europe’s political climate since March 1936, and the 
deteriorating internal dynamic of the Little Entente indicated to him that an appropriate 
moment to wrench concessions from the alliance had arrived.  To this end, he presented 
the Romanian and Yugoslav representatives with three Hungarian demands calling for a 
mutual declaration renouncing war as a means to conflict resolution, an unconditional 
recognition of Hungary’s right to rearm and the conclusion of separate agreements for the 
protection of Magyar minorities.  Of critical importance was the last demand, which, due 
to the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia already receiving the best treatment in any 
Entente state, Kánya required that Prague extend even further guarantees than he was 
asking of the Romanians and Yugoslavs.  He did this in the hope that this would cause 
the Czechoslovak government to reject the proposal and isolate itself from its alliance 
partners.  The plan worked and, contrary to earlier promises by the Entente to negotiate 
collectively, Belgrade and Bucharest abandoned their ally and concluded individual 
agreements with Budapest on August 23.14 
 Later that same day a communiqué was issued that stated an accord had been 
reached between Hungary and the Little Entente on the first two points of the agreement, 
but Kánya withheld the fact that its activation was contingent upon acceptance of the 
entire document.  The rationale for this is unclear, although it appears that this was done 
to indicate to Germany that despite Hungarian reliance upon the Reich, it could and 
would pursue independent action in to its own interests.  However, the timing of the 
announcement could not have been less opportune, as it came during a state visit by 
Horthy to Kiel to witness the launching of the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen the previous 
day.  During political discussions, the Hungarian regent had pushed Hitler to delay his 
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planned operations against Czechoslovakia until the next spring so that Hungary would 
be able to fully participate.  When news of the agreement reached the German dictator, he 
launched into a tirade, blasting Horthy and the Hungarians for attempting to move away 
from Germany and renouncing the use of force against Czechoslovakia just when military 
action against Prague was imminent, a sentiment echoed by von Ribbentrop.  Calmly 
enduring the tantrum, the Admiral related to Hitler that his government’s actions were 
dictated by the low state of the army’s readiness, exacerbated by a lack of large-caliber 
guns, few planes, and shortage of ammunition.  Further, any action against a member 
state of the Little Entente would be impossible without Germany guaranteeing Hungary’s 
border with Yugoslavia, as any commitment of Budapest’s forces in a Czechoslovak 
campaign would necessitate leaving the country’s southern border minimally defended.15  
 With the Bled Agreement, the Hungarian government attempted to satisfy two 
divergent aims, and with the exception of the short upset it caused in relations between 
Berlin and Budapest, the result was a success.  It demonstrated to both the international 
community and the Hungarian government itself that the regime was not a German vassal 
and could conduct its own affairs as dictated by its own interests.  The technical language 
of the accords and the fact that an agreement had not been reached with Prague also kept 
open the option of pursuing a revisionist agenda against Czechoslovakia, thereby 
ameliorating German concerns as well.  Though the will to resist becoming too closely 
aligned with Germany was strong, the need to give expression to the nation’s irredentist 
desires was an equally powerful force.  In a limited way, the Hungarian government had 
successfully managed to balance both prerogatives simultaneously, and empowered by 
this demonstration of political acumen, pursued this dual line further.  
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 The next opportunity to do so came shortly after the Kiel conference when, on 
September 8, the Hungarian representative in Warsaw suggested to Beck that the two 
countries conclude a gentlemen’s agreement concerning policy coordination in light of 
the Czechoslovak situation that was likely to soon erupt.  Such an arrangement would 
build upon the already existing policy framework that Beck and Kánya had worked out in 
February, although meaningful collaboration was hindered by conflicting Hungarian 
desires.  On the one hand, Budapest was willing to collude with Warsaw and Berlin to 
regain its lost territories and achieve a common border with Poland in the interest of 
Beck’s “Third Europe” bloc.  On the other, it would not risk war to satisfy those aims.16  
Still, the allure of bringing Slovakia back to the “motherland” and acquiring sub-
Carpathian Ruthenia proved to be incentive enough and, pressured by both Poland and 
Germany to act, Hungary became a conspirator in Czechoslovakia’s demise.17  
 Although both Warsaw and Berlin viewed Hungarian participation as essential to 
dealing with Czechoslovakia, their underlying motivations were essentially different.  
Beck had decided to use Hitler’s reckoning with Prague as an opportunity to settle 
Poland’s long-standing dispute with the Czechoslovak government over the Teschen 
district, which, during the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Poles had 
claimed on historic and ethnic grounds, but were denied in the redrawing of Europe at the 
peace conference in 1919.  Understanding that Czechoslovakia’s days as an independent 
nation were numbered, Beck also wanted to use the situation to advance his “Third 
Europe” concept and finally achieve the common border with Hungary he believed to be 
essential to the project.  If this objective was accomplished and a Hungarian 
rapprochement with Romania and Yugoslavia realized, the structural aspects of the plan 
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would be in place, leaving the remaining political aspects to diplomacy.  The method 
Beck had chosen to pursue this scheme was also theoretically beneficial to the objective.  
Accusations of conspiracy could be disavowed once the dust had settled, as there was no 
true German-Polish collaboration over Czechoslovakia’s demise.18  Warsaw, limiting its 
argument to equal treatment for the Polish minority in Czechoslovakia, would not appear 
as a conspirator, leaving Germany fully responsible for the aggression.  If Hungary made 
similar claims based upon the same justification, this would inherently lend credence to 
the Polish position, and assuming the territorial readjustments went according to plan, 
result in a doubly favorable outcome.  Beck’s confidence in the scheme was dictated by 
his belief that the western powers would not act to save Czechoslovakia, and though he 
tried to impart this to Kánya, it was not enough to overcome the Hungarian foreign 
minister’s timidity.19  
 The subtlety of Beck’s machinations were completely absent from Hitler’s 
attempts to persuade Budapest to act, as the German argument revolved around the need 
for the operation to be swift and decisive.  Berlin had become aware of Polish intentions 
earlier in the summer and, though not orchestrated or conceived by the German 
government, the additional  pressure offered by Warsaw’s independent scheming fit 
within the larger scope of Hitler’s plans.  Consequently, it was given approval.  With two 
of Czechoslovakia’s frontiers threatened, all that was needed was to close the door on the 
third.  If Budapest could be enticed into taking military action against Prague, the 
resulting conflict would be decided too quickly for British and French intervention to 
take place.  This would leave the western powers with the difficult choice of fighting for 
a country that no longer existed or accepting the fait accompli.  Faced with these 
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alternatives, the German dictator felt assured that the pacifist elements in Paris and 
London would prevail and there would be no war.  Thus, the potential rewards for 
Hungary’s participation were great in exchange for what were believed to be minimal 
risks, as Hitler was prepared to offer the Hungarians the Magyar areas of Czechoslovakia 
and possibly even the whole of Slovakia if Budapest would march when called upon.20  
 Despite these promises and reassurances from both the Germans and the Poles, 
when events reached their climax following Hitler’s rejection of his agreement with 
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain at Berchtesgaden on September 16, 1938, 
Hungarian resolve began to crumble.  Hitler wanted war in order to be able to swallow 
Czechoslovakia all at once, and with the British and French willing to negotiate, it was 
clear that the psychological moment to act had arrived.  There would be no defense of the 
republic.  Polish offers of assistance to Romania in the event that the Soviet Union 
attempted to deliver aid to Czechoslovakia across Romania’s frontier stiffened 
Bucharest’s resolve to deny the Red Army transit, preventing aid from reaching Prague 
from the east.21  The Germans had also done their part to keep Romania a spectator, 
having penetrated the country so thoroughly in the economic sphere during the spring and 
summer of 1938 that honoring the government’s commitments to its ally would have 
risked severe consequences for the nation’s heavily German-funded industrialization and 
rearmament programs.  Intimidation alone was likely enough to prevent any Romanian 
involvement, although in exchange for complicity, Hitler related that he was prepared to 
guarantee the Hungarian-Romanian border, providing further incentive for the neutrality 
that Carol and his ministers were already inclined towards anyway.22  In the end, it was 
not enough to assuage Hungarian fears, and ultimately the government only offered to 
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send troops into Czechoslovakia after the Wehrmacht commenced its operations.23  
 With Budapest’s refusal to march, Hitler felt that the opportunity for a quick and 
decisive military resolution to the Czechoslovak issue was untenable.  Deprived of the 
concentric attack he envisioned, he accepted Chamberlain’s eleventh-hour proposal for a 
four-power conference to decide Czechoslovakia’s fate.24  On September 29, Hitler, 
Chamberlain, Mussolini, and the French Prime Minister Édouard Daladier, met at the 
newly constructed Führerbau in Munich, and after thirteen hours of negotiation, signed an 
agreement that handed over the Sudetenland to Germany and provided for its occupation 
by the Wehrmacht over the next ten days.  The Czechoslovak government was not invited 
to the conference and, when presented with the accord, was given the option of accepting 
or rejecting it.  If the resolution were declined, Prague would face Berlin alone.  
Reluctantly, it was accepted.  Though denied his war, Hitler left Czechoslovakia a rump 
of its former self.  His mood had been exuberant in the hours immediately following the 
Munich Agreement, but it soured quickly.25  The French and British had forced Prague to 
make concessions and the Hungarians and Poles had backed out of his plans, in his mind 
giving the Western Powers the breathing room necessary to impose arbitration upon the 
Czechoslovak government.  As punishment for this perceived betrayal, Hitler ignored 
Warsaw and Budapest’s revisionist interests that he had promised to represent at Munich, 
leaving the task of standing with his co-conspirators to Mussolini, who managed only to 
gain the promise that these issues would be sorted out at a later date through four-power 
arbitration.  With the Czechoslovakia crisis apparently resolved, Paris and London soon 
lost all interest in pursuing any resolution of their claims.26  
 With a favorable set of circumstances for a quick settlement of the Czechoslovak 
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issue to the benefit of both Poland and Hungary, their inaction during the crisis demands 
further inquiry.  Certainly the German plan as Hitler had conceived it was feasible.  The 
gains to be had as a reward for participation were significant, but to attain the territories 
promised by Berlin, a very large gamble was required.  Germany could risk war.  Its 
rearmament program had provided the country with a menacing “big stick,” one that 
Hitler was eager to use.27  Hungary could not take that risk.  Budapest’s army was small, 
and an invasion of Czechoslovakia, even if coordinated with the Wehrmacht, would leave 
the country vulnerable to threats from another power.  During the Czechoslovak crisis, 
the primary Hungarian fear was that any military aggression directed against 
Czechoslovakia would trigger the mutual assistance of the Little Entente, resulting in 
military action from Yugoslavia and Romania.  With the border only lightly defended, it 
would be a short march to Budapest, resulting in unforeseeable, but undoubtedly 
negative, consequences.  A public announcement from Hitler that the German 
government guaranteed Hungary’s borders would have done a great deal to assuage that 
fear, though, for his own reasons, Hitler refused to offer one.28  Without this assurance, 
the likelihood of Budapest’s active participation in Czechoslovakia’s dismemberment 
was minimal, as the excuse to follow the peaceful revisionist path Kánya favored was too 
convenient to pass upon.  Forces within Germany also conspired to keep the Hungarians 
from participating as well.  Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, the head of the Abwehr, the Reich 
intelligence organization, and General Ludwig Beck warned Horthy and Kánya via a 
secret envoy that, although Hitler was immovable in his desire for war, they and others in 
the Wehrmacht had little faith in the plan.29  Also significant was a reluctance to be 
aligned, even if only due to a commonality of interest, with the Reich.  This would have 
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ended Kánya’s “Free Hand” policy and left the Hungarian government with no other 
recourse than to move completely into the German orbit, a proposition that, despite the 
drive to see its irredentist desires fulfilled, Budapest was not yet willing to embrace.  
 Poland chose not to participate for much the same reason, and while Beck 
harbored no moral compunctions about benefiting from Czechoslovakia’s demise, he did 
not wish to be caught on the same side as Germany, should there be war.30  This factor 
determined the course Warsaw followed, which entailed remaining aloof from direct 
involvement with Berlin and limiting its objective to the recovery of Teschen based upon 
the same ethnic minority justification that Hitler used with the Sudetenland.  In this way, 
Beck believed it would be possible to settle the border dispute without appearing as an 
aggressor.31  However, Hitler’s failure to raise the issue of Polish and Hungarian interests 
at Munich and the fear that German designs now included the strip of territory he desired 
forced Beck to act.  On September 30, 1938, he issued an ultimatum to the Czechoslovak 
government demanding that the region be ceded to Poland.32  Fresh from the Munich 
settlement and abandoned by its former Little Entente allies, Prague acquiesced.  The 
next day Polish troops began to occupy the territory.  In an eerily prophetic exchange 
between the incoming General Władysław Bortnowski and his departing Czechoslovak 
counterpart, the latter noted that, although Poland was now taking the territory from 
Czechoslovakia, it would not be long before it was ceded again, this time to Germany 
from Poland.33  In the confusion of events, Beck hoped that this action to prevent the 
Germans from controlling a strategically important rail-hub in the town of Bohumín 
would go unnoticed.  It did not, and the aggressive methods used by Warsaw to gain the 
district helped to foster exactly the international sentiments that Beck had sought to 
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avoid.34  
 During the entire episode, Romania remained a vitally important factor in the 
calculations of all parties, exerting enormous influence on the eventual course of events 
without raising a finger in the process.  Both Germany and Poland attempted to keep the 
country passive with promises that were designed to assuage Bucharest’s specific 
security concerns: the Poles by bolstering Carol’s position in regard to the Soviet Union 
and the Germans by guaranteeing Romania’s continued possession of Transylvania.  
Though Beck’s actions pertained more to his “Third Europe” concept than they did to the 
Czechoslovakia issue, his bolstering of the Romanian alliance ensured that the only road 
to Prague went through Poland.  To deliver aid to its ally, Russia would have to violate its 
1932 non-aggression pact with Warsaw.  This would trigger Poland’s defensive alliance 
with Romania, leading to an uncertain series of events that held the potential to ignite 
another world war.  However, concern about the Soviet Union was eliminated with the 
sacrificial offering of Czechoslovakia at Munich, alleviating Polish and Romanian 
concerns on that particular front.  The Reich also based its Romanian policy on security, 
as its offer to guarantee the country’s border with Hungary was an effective cure-all for 
nearly two decades of anxiety.  All that Hitler required of Carol was a pledge to remain 
neutral should events lead to war.  This was immensely important to the German 
dictator’s conception of the operation, to which, before his meeting with Chamberlain at 
Bad Godesberg, Hungarian involvement had been integral.  Without this guarantee to 
stay uninvolved, Budapest’s fears of becoming embroiled in a conflict with the Little 
Entente could not be allayed, limiting Hungarian usefulness to the entire endeavor.  On 
this issue, the Romanian government could not be swayed.  While Carol wished to avoid 
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being forced into conflict with Germany, he also felt compelled to honor Bucharest’s 
commitment to Czechoslovakia.  Technically, this made a resolution of the situation 
simple, for as long as there was no Hungarian aggression against Czechoslovakia, 
Romania would not be obliged to come to her defense.35  Although this position allowed 
Carol to wash his hands of culpability in the crisis, it complicated both German and 
Polish designs, and by eliminating the possibility of Hungarian participation, prolonged 
Czechoslovakia’s existence another five and a half months.  
 This result was not a consequence of any particular desire to provide assistance to 
the Czechoslovaks, as foremost in Romanian decision-making was the power-dynamic 
between Romania and Hungary.  Were Hungary to gain the whole of Slovakia and 
Ruthenia, Carol feared that this would extend Hungarian influence into the sub-
Carpathian region and threaten Romania’s hold on Transylvania, setting a revisionist 
precedent that could have severe consequences for Romania, were the trend allowed to 
continue.  This would also upset the geopolitical balance of the region, as with increased 
territory and manpower reserves, Hungary would be able to compete for influence in East 
Central Europe and the protection of the Great Powers that Romania currently enjoyed.  
Though Hitler would not provide assurance that Budapest would be restrained as events 
reached their culmination, Mussolini’s Italy was willing to do so.  Foreign minister Count 
Galeazzo Ciano provided assurances to the Romanian ambassador in Rome that the 
Hungarian government “would not commit any imprudence” and limit itself to ethnic 
revision.36  This vague promise was enough, and Carol resigned his former ally to his 
fate. 
 The decision to abandon Czechoslovakia following Munich proved to be the final 
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death-knell for the Little Entente.  It finalized a process begun shortly after the 
remilitarization of the Rhineland, when both Bucharest and Belgrade dismissed 
Czechoslovak suggestions that would have transformed the alliance from a limited 
arrangement directed against Hungarian revisionism to one of general mutual assistance, 
and continued with the separate treaties resulting from the Bled conference.  Fear of 
becoming entangled in the conflict brewing between Germany and Czechoslovakia 
dictated that response, with the events of September 1938 retroactively proving that 
decision to be correct.  As long as the Hungarians did not become involved, there was no 
technical aspect of the agreement that would draw Romania or Yugoslavia into the fray, 
unless moral sympathies prevailed.  However, such sentiments were in short supply and 
restrained by an even greater desire to preserve national independence, which, if they 
were drawn into a regional conflict, there was no guarantee of ensuring.  To further 
distance the remainder of the Little Entente from the rump (renamed Czecho-Slovakia), 
Carol and the Yugoslavian Prime Minister Milan Stojadinović renounced all obligations 
to Prague, justifying the act based upon the flimsy argument that, since Czechoslovakia 
had compromised its territorial integrity, the nation with which they had entered into 
alliance no longer existed.  This absolved Bucharest and Belgrade of their commitments.  
Though a weak case, it was little more than a confirmation of their previous September 
26 decision when they privately agreed, along with a double-dealing Beck, that it was 
better to feed Czechoslovakia to the wolves and preserve their own security than become 
victims of another nation’s aggression.37  
 The feast commenced shortly after the ink had dried on the Munich Agreement.  
On October 9, in Komárom, a city on the Hungarian-Slovak border, the Hungarian and 
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Czechoslovak governments entered into negotiations to settle their border dispute as 
dictated by the relevant provisions of the accord.38  Warsaw was required to do so as well 
but had instead decided that negotiations and possible arbitration might result in the 
Teschen region being denied to Poland and claimed by Germany, prompting the 
government to move unilaterally and annex the territory on October 1.39  Without a 
military option, Budapest was forced to the table.  However, after the Czechoslovak 
delegation rejected Kánya’s demands that would have ceded the Magyar majority areas in 
southern Slovakia and Ruthenia to Hungary and provided for self-determinant plebiscites 
in the remainder of those regions, the discussions broke down and he was compelled to 
seek out an alternative course.  The possibility of gaining the whole of Slovakia seemed 
remote, and conceding that, he abandoned the idea of pursuing it further.  Instead, Kánya 
focused on regaining the ethnic Hungarian areas and pushed for the creation of a common 
Polish-Hungarian border via annexation of sub-Carpathian Ruthenia.  This met with 
German opposition, as Hitler viewed a mutual Polish-Hungarian frontier as a threat to 
Berlin’s interests with its potential to facilitate the creation of an anti-German bloc.40  To 
counter this dual Polish and Hungarian threat, the Germans increased their support for the 
now dependent Czechoslovaks, utilizing the same ethnic minority principle they had 
previously used to wrench the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia, in the country’s 
defense of its continued possession of Ruthenia.  When the Hungarians, through their 
envoy in Berlin, Kálmán Darányi, informed Hitler that they were prepared to fight for 
their claims, the German dictator replied that if Budapest chose that path, they would do 
so without the support of the Reich.41  Taking the cue, the Hungarians resumed 
negotiations on October 22, rejecting a proposal from Czechoslovakia that would have 
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given Hungary roughly half of what had originally been asked for and, after Kánya 
declared that the discussions had again failed, the two sides decided to seek arbitration.42   
 By asking for arbitration, it was understood that the judgment was final.  The 
Hungarian government was confident, though, that the parallel diplomacy it had 
conducted with the Italians would enable them to net greater gains than through direct 
negotiations with Prague.  On that front, Count István Csáky had been sent to Rome to 
convince Ciano and Mussolini that Italian support for Hungary’s claims was a strategic 
necessity to counter increased German influence as a result of the Munich settlement.  A 
strong Hungary, he argued, would better be able to resist German pressure and thereby be 
able to align itself more closely to Rome, buttressing Italy’s faltering position in the Axis.  
Ciano agreed to this in principle but warned Csáky that, by proceeding with arbitration, 
all Hungarian hopes of regaining sub-Carpathian Ruthenia would be extinguished.  Since 
Budapest, working with Warsaw, had already begun instigating an alternative plan for 
acquiring the region, the Hungarians acquiesced, and a date for the adjudication was 
shortly set for November 2, 1938, in Vienna.43  
 Originally intended to be a four-power arbitration similar to the Munich 
conference, Britain and France had little interest in the issue and relieved themselves of 
the burden of further parceling out Czechoslovak territory, leaving that duty to the 
Germans and Italians.  Ribbentrop and Ciano, after hearing arguments from Prague and 
the autonomous Slovak and Hungarian delegations, retired behind closed doors.  After 
wrangling over the final border that had more to do with the interests of their own 
governments than those of the Czechs, Slovaks, or Magyars, they returned with a 
decision.  A line drawn from Kassa (Košice), Csua, Losonc (Lučenec), Ungvár 
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(Uzhorod), and Munkals was to be the new border, with all the Slovak and sub-
Carpathian Ruthenian lands south of the line to be annexed to Hungary.  The subsequent 
agreement was to be final, and both von Ribbentrop and Ciano warned the Hungarians 
that they were to go no further than the award, implying that the judgment was an act of 
benevolence.  Budapest’s designs for acquiring sub-Carpathian Ruthenia to forge a 
common border with Poland would not be tolerated.44  
 The Vienna Award satisfied a portion of Hungary’s revisionist aims and, though 
the government had not achieved the decision on its own, resulted in the first true 
“success” that the Horthy regime could claim.  However, it came at a price.  Hungary was 
now fully culpable in Czechoslovakia’s dismemberment, and this guilt was noticed 
throughout the international community.  This limited Hungary’s options for friendship to 
the Axis or the German dominated bloc’s collaborators. The era of Kánya’s “Free Hand” 
policy was at an end.  Although there was still some room for maneuver, Hungary was 
now bound to Germany. 
 Though not a part of the negotiation and arbitration process, Poland, guided by 
Beck’s increasingly active diplomacy, still played an integral role in the events 
surrounding the settlement.  Following the breaking-off of the original talks between the 
Czechoslovak and Hungarian governments at Komárom on October 13, Kánya began 
discussions with Beck to formulate an alternative method by which to gain possession of 
sub-Carpathian Ruthenia.  The two eventually decided upon a course of action that 
involved instigating a popular uprising in the region and, once an appropriate level of 
violence had been achieved, sending in troops under the auspice of restoring order.  
Annexation would be subsequent upon request by the Polish- and Hungarian-controlled 
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leaders of the revolt.  In a bid to ensure the operation went according to plan, Beck 
traveled to Galaţi, on the Romanian Black Sea coast, to discuss the situation with Carol.  
During their meeting, Beck emphasized the importance of linking the Polish and 
Hungarian frontiers as a barrier to further German expansion in the Danubian region.  
Although understanding the king’s reluctance to see Hungary aggrandized at 
Czechoslovakia’s expense, he stressed the need to deal with the realities of the new 
European landscape and to acquiesce in Budapest’s control of the area.  To soften the 
blow, Beck suggested that Romania take possession of the very eastern portion of sub-
Carpathian Ruthenia, which, in addition to the compensatory value, would also provide a 
strategically important second rail-link between Poland and Romania.  Further, Beck 
offered to act as mediator in all disputes between Budapest and Bucharest, noting that 
dialogue was the only constructive path to a general détente in their relations.  This would 
have numerous benefits, the most important being the implied result that would have the 
three East Central European neighbors becoming the foundation of an anti-German 
defensive bloc.45  
 Although interested in the framework presented by Beck, Carol was reluctant to 
commit himself or his country to such a radical proposition, particularly in light of 
foreign and domestic sentiments to the contrary.  The Germans had made their position 
on the matter clear and, faced with an ascendant Germany and weakening West, divided 
opinion both inside and out of the Romanian government prohibited any action.  Equally 
important to Carol were the lingering scruples he still harbored concerning Romania’s 
former ally.  While he and Stojadinović had abandoned Czechoslovakia, participating in 
its dismemberment was not morally permissible.  Even in its diminished form, 
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Czechoslovakia was still useful to Romania, especially regarding armaments.  The 
railway used to ship them from the Škoda factories to the depots in Romania traversed 
sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, and for this reason it was important to maintain a semi-
independent Czechoslovak state.  This ensured that Czechoslovakia would continue to 
have access to the Black Sea and the Balkan markets for its goods, which Bucharest 
considered vital to the country’s longevity.  Were Czechoslovakia to collapse politically 
and economically, the Romanian government feared that Hungary would waste no time 
in seizing the remainder of Slovakia, altering the regional power-dynamic to Romania’s 
detriment.46 
 This setback did not deter Beck, and on his return from Galaţi he wired Lipski 
with instructions to sound out the scheme to Göring, who, from the information gathered 
in the course of the conversation with Carol and Petrescu-Comnen, was identified as the 
Romanian source on German regional policy.47  The next day, Lipski met Göring at 
Karinhall, relating to him the essence of the Polish argument for returning sub-Carpathian 
Ruthenia to Hungary, although couched in pre-Trianon terms.  After explaining to the 
Field Marshal that the Romanian government believed Berlin to be opposed to a common 
Polish-Hungarian frontier, Göring exploded.  He calmed down after subjecting Lipski to 
a lengthy tirade decrying Petrescu-Comnen’s limited understanding of the situation in 
Central Europe, and admitted that, as he had not been in contact with Hitler for a few 
days, he was not himself sure if the official German policy had changed.  Göring was not 
against the idea of a Polish-Hungarian border, believing the danger to Germany from the 
incorporation of sub-Carpathian Ruthenia into Hungary to be a creation of Western 
propaganda.48  However, without the authority to speak conclusively regarding the true 
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German position, Göring’s opinions were of little use.  This forced Lipski to search 
elsewhere for the information he sought, and in light of decisions made by Hitler 
unknown to his Luftwaffe head, he temporarily delayed the dropping of a diplomatic 
bombshell. 
 On October 24, Lipski met with von Ribbentrop in Berchtesgaden to discuss the 
matters raised with Göring, but rather than substantive dialogue on the Polish-Hungarian 
border issue, the German foreign minister instead presented the Polish ambassador with a 
list of demands for the settlement of outstanding German-Polish differences.  This 
included the reunion of Danzig with the Reich, the construction of the oft-suggested 
extraterritorial railway across the Corridor, and Warsaw’s adherence to the anti-
Comintern pact.  In exchange, Germany would offer guarantees of Polish rights and 
access to the city.  Poland’s frontiers would be similarly insured.  The Germans also 
offered to extend the 1934 non-aggression pact to a term of twenty-five years and to 
acquiesce to Hungarian possession of sub-Carpathian Ruthenia.49  This caught Lipski off-
guard, as there had been no indication from the German government that a policy shift 
away from the détente that had characterized relations between the two governments was 
nearing its end.  Ribbentrop’s words were that signal.  The future of German-Polish 
relations now hinged upon Warsaw’s subservience to Hitler’s will. 
 Once related to Beck, these revelations brought the Polish government and its 
foreign policy to a crossroad.  On the one hand, Warsaw could accept the German 
proposal, as there were benefits both practical and exploitable.  Hitler’s consent to a 
common Polish-Hungarian border would have fulfilled a portion of Beck’s “Third 
Europe” concept without any risk.  It also would have provided for a tactical outflanking 
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of the Reich in sub-Carpathian Ruthenia should relations deteriorate in the future.50  This 
would be traded for nothing that Warsaw had not previously offered, as the Poles had 
already suggested the idea of an extraterritorial corridor across the Corridor, making that 
demand acceptable.  Even the question of Danzig’s continued status as a free city was not 
inviolable, as within government circles, there had been some thought given to the 
matter.  At various junctures, Beck had contemplated allowing for the return of the city to 
Germany as long as special privileges were retained.  Following subsequent conferences 
with Hitler and von Ribbentrop in Berchtesgaden, Munich, and Warsaw, respectively, 
during late December and early January 1939, he began to consider the feasibility of 
dividing the city between the two countries, giving Germany the eastern two-thirds of 
Danzig and Poland the remaining western portion.  This latter scheme would have 
potentially forestalled any immediate armed conflict with Berlin, affording Poland more 
time to complete its rearmament and work towards building a regional security bloc.  It 
would also have the benefit of widening the Corridor and, with the construction of a canal 
linking the city to Gdynia, reduced Polish dependence upon Danzig as the nation’s 
primary harbor.51 
 However, there were aspects of the German overtures that were dangerous.  None 
of these potential benefits could be derived without a reorientation of Polish foreign 
policy along German lines.  Though Warsaw had previously demonstrated a willingness 
to work with Berlin on initiatives that were complimentary to Polish designs, Beck 
harbored no illusions as to what abject subservience to Hitler’s aims entailed.  The 
original demands forwarded by von Ribbentrop on October 24 had indicated to both Beck 
and Lipski that in Danzig, a situation that had once been finalized could become subject 
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to further revision.  This made the promised border guarantee little more than an olive-
branch concealing a dagger.  Adherence to the Anti-Comintern pact was equally 
hazardous, as aside from placing Poland in the German orbit, it carried the possibility of 
realizing one of Warsaw’s greatest fears: placing the country in the center of a conflict 
between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union.  Such a move was, in Beck’s mind, 
almost certain to incur Moscow’s wrath and likely alienate Poland from France, leaving 
servile friendship with Germany the only option left available.  
 Maintaining the status quo carried with it an entirely different set of risks, 
foremost among them the possibility of war with Germany.  However, Beck believed that 
in having to choose between the lesser of two evils, this second choice offered the better 
chance for continued national independence by keeping all options on the table.  With 
that in mind, he countered German pressure throughout the winter and into the spring 
with stubborn but polite refusal of Hitler’s demands, hoping that firm rejection devoid of 
inflammatory rhetoric would prevent any action being contemplated in Berlin.52  In this 
endeavor, Beck was aided by Hitler’s attention being focused elsewhere, since before 
Hitler could deal with Poland, he had to attend to other issues first.  
 For the Germans, the presentation of demands on October 24 not only inaugurated 
a new Polish policy but served in a tactical capacity as well.  During the negotiations 
preceding the Vienna Award, the Hungarian and Polish governments had both been 
searching for a workable method to bring about Budapest’s acquisition of sub-Carpathian 
Ruthenia, and with the option of arbitration available, they privately agreed that the 
region could be annexed by Hungary with Warsaw’s support during the adjudication.  
The German government was aware of this collusion, and as Hitler was still opposed to 
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the creation of a common Polish-Hungarian border in early October, used the situation to 
remove Warsaw’s influence from events and initiate a policy that had long been at the 
heart of German aims.  By forwarding demands that Berlin knew the Polish government 
would, at least initially, not accept, Hitler placed the Poles in a position that held the 
potential for conflict, and with the negative international perception of the regime still 
fresh from the Sudeten crisis, limited its recourse, forcing them to back down.  Without 
support from Poland, the Hungarians were hesitant to press for further gains beyond what 
the Germans would allow and accepted the arbitration as it was. 
 The effects of this were temporary and impacted only the official policies pursued 
by the Polish and Hungarian governments.  As has been previously stated, plans to 
instigate a popular uprising through the infiltration of sub-Carpathian Ruthenia with 
Polish and Hungarian agents had already been discussed.  In November, that scheme was 
initiated.  Taking a page out of Hitler’s tactical manual, both Warsaw and Budapest 
launched their own propaganda campaigns against the Czechoslovak administration of 
sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, which, combined with the effects of the agitators, resulted in an 
orchestrated chaos that awaited only the request for Hungarian troops to quell.  
Preparations for the move had already been undertaken.   Logistical and material support 
from both the Polish and Italian governments had been secured.53  All that remained was 
the order to march.  However, on the eve of the operation, Horthy and Kánya’s resolve 
wavered as it had previously during the Czechoslovak crisis in September, and the 
invasion was postponed.  
 At the heart of the eleventh-hour stay was the Hungarian concern over the 
potential German reaction to the move that carried with it the possibility of incurring a 
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wrath that would be disastrous for the regime.  Horthy’s and Kánya’s anxiety was not 
unjustified.  With the annexation of Austria, the Wehrmacht was poised to smash through 
the Hungarian border with little opposition and would be within easy striking distance of 
Budapest in a matter of hours.  The Hungarian army was in no condition to match its 
German counterpart, and, according to the Hungarian government’s assessment, neither 
were the Polish or Italian militaries.54  Support from Romania or Yugoslavia was also 
discounted as a possibility, as Berlin’s dismemberment of their former ally had instilled a 
fear of the Reich within both governments that had reoriented their policies towards 
Germany with emphasis on non-confrontation and accommodation.  A healthy mistrust of 
Hungarian intentions and trepidation over Budapest’s irredentist aspirations to the south 
and east further guaranteed their inaction. 
 Faced with this nightmare scenario, Kánya decided that Hungary was in no 
position to present Hitler with a fait accompli and, on November 18, contacted Berlin to 
probe the Germans on the plan.  Without divulging that the entire operation was 
dependent upon their consent, Kánya related only that a crisis had developed in the 
Carpatho-Ukraine and that Budapest had received requests from the local administration 
to send in troops to subdue the violence and, in accordance with wishes of the populace, 
annex the area.  The reply he received the next day was negative but vague, stating only 
that “if Hungarian action gave rise to difficulties, Germany could not support Hungary,” 
and that Hitler considered the moment for action “inopportune.”55  The intent of the 
message, unequivocally a warning to abort the invasion, was not lost upon Kánya. 
However, he saw opportunity in the obscure wording.  He purposefully misinterpreted it 
to mean that Germany would not come to Hungary’s aid if the invasion became mired in 
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difficulties, but that otherwise Hitler had no objections to Hungarian occupation of sub-
Carpathian Ruthenia.  Subsequently, he informed Rome and Warsaw that Hitler had 
given his approval of the scheme according to this misleading interpretation.  Whether 
Kánya knew his intrigue was sustainable is doubtful.  It appears he intended it only to 
serve the immediate need of acquiring Italian aircraft for the operation and hoped that, 
even if Hitler’s true position on the subject became apparent, there would be a 
continuation of the anti-German collaboration similar to that between Ciano and Csáky 
prior to the Vienna arbitration.  This would allow for gains to be made even if confronted 
with opposition from the Reich.  In hedging his bets on this set of developments, Kánya 
misjudged the situation.  Once the actual German position became known to the Italians, 
Mussolini became livid, reproaching the Hungarians for their duplicity and canceling the 
planes he had previously promised.  The plan and any further notion of independent 
action was put to an end on November 21 following the joint issuing of a strongly worded 
German-Italian démarche warning the Hungarian government of the consequences of 
moving against sub-Carpathian Ruthenia.56  
 The stalling of Hungarian designs to annex the Carpatho-Ukraine halted all 
further regional revision for the next four months.  German power and Berlin’s ability to 
project that strength was a significant factor in this moratorium on revision.  Without a 
challenge to his burgeoning hegemony, Hitler was able to impose his will upon East 
Central Europe and shape events according to his own concepts.  This was the beginning 
of the end of independence.  Though the Polish, Hungarian, Lithuanian, and Romanian 
governments did not know this, each was aware of the force that was to be integral in the 
reshaping of the region.  The Third Reich did not yet have the ability to dictate the terms 
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of the region’s various national prerogatives, but its power made German policy an 
omnipresent consideration for all future decisions.  However, the gravity of this 
development was temporarily alleviated by Hitler’s need for international quiet in the 
wake of the Czechoslovak affair and its chaotic aftermath.  Quiet, though, did not entail 
inaction, and Berlin maintained a steady pressure on East Central Europe that kept 
German interests at the fore of regional intrigue and national considerations.  
 Throughout the winter and into the spring of 1939, both the Polish and Lithuanian 
governments were subjected to subtle but stern warnings that a continuation of their 
current relationships with Germany were no longer adequate.  Following the conclusion 
of the Czechoslovakia issue, the Memelland and Danzig questions were to be addressed 
with allusions to a final settlement.57  However, the language and tone of the messages to 
each government was different in character.  Those related to Kaunas were more akin to 
threats of inevitable action, whereas the firm but subdued “negotiations” with Warsaw 
reflected Hitler’s still wavering conceptions of how Poland was to fit into his 
reorganization of East Central Europe.  As in September 1938, the German dictator still 
believed that Polish action against the rump Czechoslovak state would be beneficial to a 
quick resolution of the affair, and the tone of the diplomatic exchanges over the winter 
and early spring of 1939 reflected this position.  The restraint, misinterpreted by Beck, 
was intended to preserve the possibility of Polish participation in Czechoslovakia’s final 
demise until Hitler finalized his decisions regarding the ultimate fate of both countries.  
However, contingents both for Warsaw’s participation in and exclusion from events 
existed.  
 The Hungarian government, in the aftermath of its attempt to annex sub-
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Carpathian Ruthenia, was also required to confront a new set of political realities.   
Indirect pressure exercised through political organization and domestic agitation by the 
country’s German minority, in addition to clamoring by the homegrown Hungarian 
fascist Arrow Cross Party for closer cooperation with Germany and the Axis, resulted in 
a reshuffling of the government.58  Horthy, in an attempt both to appease Hitler and 
subdue the Magyar pro-Nazi political elements, replaced the unpopular Kánya with 
Csáky as foreign minister, as he was more favorably disposed to and received by Berlin.  
To further cement this new relationship and signal Hitler that Hungary was, in the future, 
to be a more cooperative partner in foreign policy initiatives, in January 1939 Csáky 
promised Hitler that he would sign the Anti-Comintern Pact and terminate Hungary’s 
membership in the League of Nations.59   
Although prompted by German pressure, there were specific Hungarian concerns 
that also dictated moving into closer alignment with Berlin.  Foremost among these were 
the subtle signs that Germany and Romania were working towards a rapprochement.60  
Were this to occur, Budapest feared that without any improvement of its relations with 
the Reich, Hungarian revisionist aims would be compromised in favor of the maintenance 
of Romania’s current borders or, worse, a truncation of the country’s frontiers.  Shifting 
headlong into the German orbit provided the only apparent security against such a 
possibility, and it was hoped that by virtue of the political gestures and an expressed 
willingness to participate in Hitler’s future endeavors, Hungary’s revisionist interests 
would be given priority over that of other nations.  
 Though binding the country to the Third Reich was dangerous in the long-term, 
the potential for significant, immediate gains was alluring.  Certainly, the fear of such 
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gains being made at Hungary’s own expense was an integral factor in the underlying 
motivations for the decision, but there were domestic considerations as well.  The 
acquisition of Slovak lands provided Hungarian extreme-right political parties with a 
taste of revisionist success.  Because, in their view, Hungary’s territorial acquisitions 
were the result of fascist power, groups like the Arrow Cross and the German-endorsed 
National Socialist Party of Hungary viewed alignment with the Reich as the only way 
that a Nagy-Magyarország, or Greater Hungary, could be realized.  Appeasing those 
parties and promising government expression of their desires bought the Horthy regime 
political capital that also secured its position against the domestic threat they posed.  It 
also purchased the Hungarian government renewed credit with Hitler, who despite having 
been forced into arbitration at Munich because of Budapest’s hesitancy, now decided that 
the Magyars should be granted another opportunity to demonstrate their newly professed 
obeisance.  However, for Budapest to be allowed to share in the final destruction of 
Czechoslovakia, the Hungarians would be required to follow precisely his timing and 
work according to his designs.61  
 This meant no acceleration of the timetable in an effort to seize sub-Carpathian 
Ruthenia before Hitler was ready to strike.  Such action would be resented by Berlin and 
result in German, rather than Hungarian, occupation of the region.62  Budapest was also 
to restrain its relations with Romania, restricting itself to efforts that held the potential for 
positive ends, even if these were only limited in scope.63  More important to Hitler than 
any meaningful rapprochement between Hungary and Romania was achieving quiet on 
his southern front.  This would prevent any interruption in the delivery of oil and grains, 
both vital supplies for his military machine.  Economic deals that secured these had 
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already been worked out during November and December of 1938, although mistrust 
between Hitler and King Carol of Romania resulted in a tense situation that could quickly 
become unsettled.  Any Hungarian agitation for revision was enough to negate the 
inroads Berlin had made with the Romanian government.  It was also possible that such 
rhetoric could drive Bucharest towards the West, upsetting both Hitler’s timetable and 
strategic framework.  In an effort to keep the Hungarians quiet, Hitler sweetened his offer 
of the Carpatho-Ukraine in its entirety with a further promise that none of the region 
would have to be shared with hated Romania.64 This promise, along with subtle 
intimidation, proved to be an effective combination that reined the Hungarians in and 
ensured that they would follow Hitler’s plan.  
 To gain Romanian acquiescence to his plans for Czechoslovakia’s final 
dismantling, Hitler relied upon indirect methods.  At the heart of his policy was economic 
domination of Romania, which, with varying degrees of success, Carol and his 
government had resisted.  This kept Germany’s market penetration at a manageable level 
of twenty-five percent.  This number and, by extension, economic dependence upon the 
Reich increased to nearly forty percent as a result of the trade agreements signed between 
Bucharest and Berlin, although this was tempered through favorable agreement language 
and trade balances that provided more material benefit to Romania than was received by 
Germany.65  The arrangements, however, had an effect that was incalculably more 
valuable to the Reich, for they contributed to the further eroding of ties between Romania 
and the Western Great Powers.  The arms for oil deal signed in November 1938 
particularly had this as a consequence, with Germany replacing France as the primary 
armaments supplier for the Romanian military.  By picking up the French deficit in return 
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for petroleum and a promise that Germany’s arms not be used against the Reich, the little 
confidence that remained in France’s continued commitment to the country was severely 
shaken.  Despite this success, further attempts to force a reorientation of the Romanian 
economy towards German needs were blocked, as Carol understood that allowing Berlin 
any greater influence upon his kingdom would threaten independence.  With Hitler’s 
policy based upon material need, the king believed that this afforded him an advantage in 
dealing with the Germans and enabled him to maintain positive relations without 
becoming subservient to the Reich.66  This policy was, though, contingent upon 
alternative outlets for Romanian goods and the insurance provided by collective security, 
rending it untenable if either of its foundations were threatened.  A turn of events in 
November 1938 offered Hitler the opportunity he needed to expose and exploit the 
weakness in Carol’s foreign policy of balance, and begin the process of drawing Romania 
tighter into the German sphere.  
 The murder of Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, the imprisoned, charismatic head of the 
Iron Guard, on November 30, 1938, offered Hitler exactly the excuse he needed to launch 
an aggressive propaganda campaign against the Romanian government, in the hopes of 
bullying Bucharest into submission where negotiation and subtle influence had failed.  
Hitler had no particular sympathies for Codreanu and the Iron Guard, preferring the 
official regime and dealing with the traditional institutions of power over a group of 
politically unstable fascist adherents.  However, the German dictator was willing to 
utilize such revolutionaries as an expedient when necessary, only to cast them aside when 
his particular objective had been realized.  He had already demonstrated a willingness to 
do this during the Röhm affair with the SA and now, as he had with his brown-shirts, the 
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green-shirted Iron Guard was to be exploited for political gain.  
 Hitler portrayed the murder as a personal affront against him by Carol and used it 
as a demonstration of Romanian malicious intent towards Germany despite having 
remained vague and non-committal regarding Codreanu’s fate when the king had 
broached the subject with him personally the week before.  Carol had suspected that the 
Germans desired to retain the Iron Guard’s leader as a form of political blackmail, 
unleashing him and the movement to exercise influence on Romanian internal affairs and 
pulling the organization back when those objectives had been realized.  Hitler’s inquiries 
as to Codreanu’s whereabouts and the conditions of his confinement, coupled with a 
sudden, violent increase in Iron Guard terrorism during Carol’s state visit, seemed to 
confirm such a relationship.  The subsequent execution was intended both to decapitate 
the Iron Guard and eliminate a means for Berlin to influence Romanian policy.  However, 
no program coordination existed between the Iron Guard and the German government, 
rendering Codreanu’s bullet-riddled, acid-dissolved, concrete-encased corpse little more 
than a convenient excuse for Hitler to forward his existing agenda.67  
 The Germans did this with considerable vigor, portraying Carol as they had 
Edvard Beneš, the former President of Czechoslovakia, during the September crisis, and 
discreetly indicating to the Romanian government that an acceptable replacement had 
already been designated.  Though the occupation of Romania and the installation of a 
new, potentially Iron Guard-dominated regime was beyond the extent of German aims, 
the fear of military intervention and removal of the monarchy forced Carol to reexamine 
his foreign policy and determine what assistance his government could expect from the 
international community.  The prognosis was poor.  Diplomatic feelers extended to the 
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British and French confirmed a lack of interest in Romania and the region.  Both London 
and Paris urged that Bucharest concede to Germany’s demands, explaining that economic 
incursion was not a serious enough issue over which to start a war, and as conciliation, 
offered the Romanians limited economic assistance packages to mitigate Bucharest’s 
dependence upon German trade.  Though accepted, these deals did little to alleviate 
Romania’s predicament and confirmed that the west had abandoned the country to the 
Reich in the interest of peace.  Even Italy, previously the intra-Axis counterbalance to 
Germany, was hesitant to engage the situation in any meaningful way, deferring to 
Berlin’s view.  Poland was encumbered with its own difficulties with the Germans, 
negating any possibility of aid from that quarter as well.  Going into 1939, Romania had 
to face Hitler alone.68  
The one advantage that Romania had during the crisis was the understanding that 
economic need was the motivation for German action, and as long as Bucharest kept this 
issue central to its diplomacy, the storm could be weathered.  Consequently, Carol made 
personnel moves at the foreign ministry reflecting his change of policy, replacing the 
collective security advocate Petrescu-Comnen with the more realistic Grigore Gafencu.   
Gafencu, after assessing Romania’s geopolitical position, believed in the necessity of 
making certain economic concessions to the Reich.  The country’s independence did not 
need to be compromised, as he thought that, contrary to the intelligence being received 
from the state secret service, conquest was not an immediate German aim.69 
 With this in mind, both he and Carol worked to resolve the crisis.  The first step 
they took was to extend preferential treatment to Romania’s German minority.  Later, 
they appointed many of the minority’s political leaders into positions of authority in the 
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new Front for National Rebirth, a government-invented, state-controlled political “mass 
movement.”  This offered Germany an approved alternative to the Iron Guard.  The 
gesture was ignored, and it was not until January 1939 that Berlin responded to the 
overtures.  The Germans demanded that a long-term, all-inclusive economic plan be 
arranged between the two countries.  Such an agreement was the only way in which 
Romania could convince those in Berlin who still doubted the usefulness of friendship 
with Bucharest otherwise.  As further incentive, Wilhelm Fabricus, the German minister 
to Romania, informed Carol that although no specific offer of support for Hungarian 
revisionism had been given to Budapest, the only way in which Romania could ensure 
that its borders would not become subject to readjustment was to strive for relations as 
good as, or better than, those Germany shared with Hungary.70 
 The threat was not lost on Carol, and in response to the German “suggestions,” he 
replaced his pro-Western economics minister Mitiţă Constantinescu with Ion Bujoiu, who 
was more acceptable to Berlin.  Together with Gafencu, Bujoiu formulated an economic 
collaboration program that was designed to enable Germany to regain its pre-World War 
I position of economic preponderance in Romania, presenting it without details or 
specifics.  Bucharest’s tradition of promising much while offering little resulted in 
confusion as to the intent of the Romanian program, which the Germans believed to be a 
capitulation to their demands.  However, when their delegation presented its own formal 
proposal, which included a comprehensive restructuring of Romania’s economy and gave 
Germany full responsibility for developing nearly all its sectors, the true gulf that existed 
between the two sides became evident.  Though not explicit in the German arrangement, 
Gafencu and Bujoiu were apprehensive about the implied political and economic control 
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the proposal granted Berlin.  In an effort to secure protection against any such overt 
predominance, they demanded that the accord be linked to specific guarantees for the 
security of Romania’s frontiers and Carol’s regime.71  This stalled the negotiations but, 
more importantly, alleviated some of the pressure being applied by the Germans.   
 The calm was illusory.  Hitler had not abandoned his objective of forcing an 
economic arrangement upon Romania, but he was now considering alternative methods 
to achieve about his desired end.  Direct negotiations had resulted in stalemate, and any 
further pressure threatened to drive Bucharest towards the West.  However, there were 
alternative approaches available.  A demonstration of force that played upon Romanian 
fears in connection with a firm restatement of Germany’s demands was one such 
possibility, although for the moment, the situation was not opportune.  However, the time 
to settle the Romanian issue, as well as Hitler’s other outstanding foreign policy 
objectives, would soon be at hand.  With this in mind, he was prepared to act swiftly and 
decisively when that hour arrived. 
II 
 On March 15, 1939, the Wehrmacht crossed the Czech border, finalizing the 
process that Hitler had initiated five months previously.  In one swift action that drew 
only verbal protests from Great Britain and France, Czechoslovakia was crushed.  
However, this triumph was entirely different than his previous conquests.  Upon his 
arrival in Prague the next day, the only adoring crowds greeting him were the columns of 
German soldiers his motorcade overtook on its journey to Hradschin Castle, the 
traditional seat of the Bohemian kings.  The local population had deserted the streets, and 
the only Czechs who responded to his outstretched arm with a reciprocal gesture did so 
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with a defiant clenched fist.  Back in Germany, the jubilant crowds that had once 
celebrated Hitler’s prior victories were as reticent as the Czechs.   Hitler’s justification 
for destroying the remainder of Czechoslovakia as part of his program to restore 
Germany’s historic living space in an area relatively devoid of ethnic Germans was 
utterly lost upon the average German.  The prestige boost was, however, undeniable, 
allowing all objections and criticism to be cast aside.  For the moment, at least, Hitler was 
the “greatest German in history.”72 
 In addition to satisfying German strategic aims, the final dismemberment of 
Czechoslovakia also served to propel Hitler’s broader foreign policy agenda in East 
Central Europe and was representative of the manner in which he planned to execute his 
designs.  The Czechs had been crushed through the delivery of an ultimatum that had 
threatened violence as the only alternative to accepting Hitler’s demands.  Though it was 
the most visible policy action undertaken by the Reich, it was not the first in what was a 
two-week succession of similar démarches that initiated a final phase of German 
diplomacy.  In the past, Hitler had vacillated considerably on his methodology, usually 
acting out of convenience when a fortuitous set of circumstances was presented to him.  
Now, as indicated by his demeanor in the ultimatum he had presented to the Romanians 
and those he was to shortly present to the Polish and Lithuanian governments, he had 
firmly settled upon a course of action.  In East Central Europe, Hitler was going for broke 
in his bid to establish German hegemony over region. 
 The first ultimatum presented by the German government came, in fact, five days 
earlier than the one delivered to Emil Hácha on March 12, although it was far more subtle 
than the chaotic scene played out in the Reich Chancellery that evening.  With the 
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Romanian economic negotiations deadlocked since the end of February, Hitler and 
Helmuth Wohlthat, the chief of the German delegation to Bucharest, had been searching 
for a way in which to bring about Germany’s desired ends without compromising 
Berlin’s Hungarian policy.  With the settling of the Czechoslovak issue scheduled for 
mid-March, any gesture towards Romania carried the possibility of upsetting Budapest’s 
commitment to the operation.73   
Although not integral from a military aspect, Hungarian participation and seizure 
of the Carpatho-Ukraine would almost completely bind the country to the Reich, making 
its contribution useful politically.  Consequently, the Germans decided to achieve both 
ends simultaniously and, on March 10, submitted a new proposal that was a hardening of 
their original position, amounting to the total submission of Romanian agriculture, 
forestry, and industry to German requirements.74  While the deal was still being 
considered in Bucharest, Czechoslovakia disappeared.  The message was clear: stand 
against the Reich and share Czechoslovakia’s fate.  Even without that message, 
Romania’s previously manageable problems were now complicated by the new regional 
realities.  Germany, following the occupation of its puppet-state Slovakia, was now 
within striking distance of the country’s frontiers, with the only barrier being Hungary, 
which, in light of Budapest’s recent behavior, seemed to have no compunctions about 
acting upon its revisionist aspirations.  Were these to be given expression, naturally 
bolstered by German support, then a compromise of Romania’s territorial integrity was a 
very real possibility, leaving Bucharest with little recourse.   
These considerations brought the Romanians to the negotiating table in March 
1939, with the fear of open German support for Hungary providing the necessary 
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motivation.  An eleventh-hour plea to Britain and France for investment capital and 
material support to mitigate the substantial German economic penetration of the country, 
in an effort to bolster Bucharest’s bargaining position, resulted in renewed promises of 
Western commitment to Romania and Southeastern Europe.  However, very little of the 
promised economic assistance was actually delivered.75  The confidence Carol and his 
government had previously placed in London and Paris was dramatically shaken as a 
consequence of their inaction during the events on March 15.  In light of the altered 
European landscape, the king made the choice to cast Romania’s lot with Germany.  
 On March 23, 1939, the Treaty for the Promotion of Economic Relations between 
Germany and Romania was signed.  This effectively handed the keys to the kingdom, 
both figuratively and literally, to the Reich.  Due to the language of the agreement, each 
government was able to claim victory in the aftermath of the affair.  Bucharest had 
weathered the storm and, from its perspective, come through no worse for the wear.  The 
treaty only provided for general guidelines of economic coordination, which were to be 
mutually consulted upon during periodic meetings between German and Romanian 
commissions.  This was intended to offset most of Berlin’s more drastic demands and led 
the Romanian government to believe that those could be favorably negotiated in the 
future from a position of greater strength.  On other issues that arose during the 
agreement talks, such as devaluing the leu against the Reichsmark to enable Germany to 
purchase a greater amount of Romanian oil and agricultural surplus, along with Berlin’s 
promise to respect Romania’s right to maintain economic relations with other nations, the 
Romanians held firm in their resistance to German pressure for their acceptance.  As a 
reward for their perseverance, they were granted those concessions.76  However, such 
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technical victories deluded Bucharest into a false sense of security.  While the vagueness 
and loose framework that characterized much of the accord was viewed as beneficial, the 
Germans were equally capable of utilizing those same aspects of the treaty to force their 
own conceptions of economic coordination upon Romania.  All that was required was an 
increase in pressure in conjunction with the removal of Romania’s economic alternatives, 
leaving Bucharest no other options than those offered by Berlin.  Such a policy could be 
conducted indirectly and at Germany’s convenience, as the foundations of Romania’s 
market-dependence had already been set.  For all intents and purposes, the economic 
conquest long desired by Hitler was now complete.77 
 Hungary’s transformation into a German satellite came as a byproduct of the 
Romanian and Czechoslovak ultimatums.  Although Budapest had not received 
categorical threats as had both Bucharest and Prague, the warnings that any deviation 
from Berlin’s plan would not be tolerated were no less ominous.78  Fear of Hitler 
choosing Romania as his new primary collaborator in Danubian Europe worked to ensure 
Budapest’s adherence to his conceptions of the region’s reorganization, although the 
restructuring of the Hungarian national economy as part of the price for participation in 
Czechoslovakia’s demise was equally significant.79  Imposed economic coordination 
with the Reich deepened Budapest’s dependence upon Berlin and, as a result of the 
increasing scale of German investment, led to a virtual conquest of the country.  This, in 
addition to the debt the Hungarian government owed Hitler for his allowing of Hungary 
to annex sub-Carpathian Ruthenia and select districts of eastern Slovakia, inexorably tied 
the two countries together politically.  These two factors provided Berlin with an almost 
unlimited amount of influence in the country’s domestic affairs and firmly anchored 
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Hungary’s place in orbit around the Third Reich.  As was the case with Romania, there 
was still some room for maneuver, although it was extremely limited and of little 
consolation.  In one fell swoop, Hitler had seized Danubian Europe and brought it under 
his sway.  Now only affairs in the north needed to be attended to. 
 Since December 1938 Hitler had largely ignored Lithuania, having satisfied 
himself with the domination of the Memelland parliament and a thorough Nazification of 
the local German population.  With the more pressing matter of Czechoslovakia’s 
liquidation completed, he returned his attention to the Baltic republic.  Throughout the 
winter and early spring of 1939, the Germans kept a steady pressure on the Lithuanian 
government, reminding it that the loss of the Klaipėda region was inevitable and that, 
despite this lull, Berlin had not forgotten about its promised settlement of the issue amid 
the general European upheaval.  These threats were enough to elicit a conciliatory 
attitude from the Lithuanians for most of the winter, although Hitler’s delay on any action 
directed at the republic may have deceived Smetona and his cabinet into believing that, as 
a consequence of the international impact of the Munich settlement, the following calm 
would be of significant duration.   
Taking the gamble, the Lithuanians reversed their policy of accommodation 
towards Germany, rescinded their previously announced deference to Berlin’s 
interpretation of the Memel Statue, and informed the Germans that if the document were 
violated, Kaunas would in the future use all means at its disposal to defend both the 
region and the country.  As a demonstration of resolve, in early March, a portion of 
Lithuania’s armored forces were deployed in Klaipėda and the surrounding territory.80 
 Hitler’s focus on destroying Czechoslovakia required the affront to be temporarily 
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ignored, although once that issue was resolved, the Germans were free to act.  As they 
had with Romania, Hitler used Prague’s fall as leverage in effecting his foreign policy 
initiatives.  On March 20, the German government issued its third ultimatum, presenting 
the Lithuanian Foreign Minister, Juozas Urbšys, with two stark alternatives: surrender the 
Memelland to Germany or face an invasion.  Ribbentrop warned that if Lithuania chose 
the latter option there could be no guarantee as to where the Wehrmacht would halt.  The 
threat posed to his country’s independence was not lost on Urbšys and, in an effort to buy 
time, he informed von Ribbentrop that his government had not authorized him to discuss 
Klaipėda in this context, necessitating his return to Kaunas to deliver the German demand 
in person.  Just before Urbšys’s departure, he was informed that Hitler had set March 22 
as the deadline for a decision, and he would be expected back in Berlin with a reply on 
that date.  He was also instructed not to consult with any other governments, possibly as a 
result of German anxiety over a second territorial grab coming so quickly after 
Czechoslovakia’s disappearance, and fear that this would spur the Western Powers into 
action.81    
 Upon learning of the German ultimatum later that evening, the Smetona 
government was faced with a dilemma.  Public opinion was in favor of accepting the 
challenge, partly as a consequence of the humiliation endured at the hands of Poland the 
previous year.82  That embarrassment had cost the government credibility and now, faced 
with this new demand, it was expected that the regime would stand firm against Germany 
and united with the people.  However, the situation required prudence.  The Lithuanian 
military was no match for the Wehrmacht, and with inquiries as to the possibility of 
receiving assistance from Britain, France, Poland, and the Soviet Union given a negative 
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reply, Smetona had no options available to him.  With units of the German military 
already taking up positions for an attack, the Lithuanian government accepted the 
necessity of acquiescing to Hitler’s ultimatum and dispatched Urbšys to Berlin to sign the 
documents, completing the transfer of territory to the Reich.  To soften the blow 
domestically, news of the decision was characterized as a temporary retreat in the face of 
an incredibly volatile international situation in which Lithuania was overwhelmingly 
disadvantaged.  Kaunas would recover the region when the Third Reich fell.83  
 By the time Urbšys arrived in Berlin to sign the accord, Hitler had already left 
aboard the battleship Deutschland along with a small armada of vessels in anticipation of 
the annexation, leaving von Ribbentrop to conduct affairs with the Lithuanian envoy.  On 
March 23, the agreement was signed just hours before Hitler set foot on the soil of his 
newest acquisition.  The dictator spent a little under three hours in the city, departing as 
quickly as he came, and was back in Berlin by noon the next day.  No fanfare welcomed 
him.  Not only were most Germans uninterested in the tiny Baltic port, but the regime had 
expressly forbidden a triumphal return.  Hitler did not want such events to become 
routine.84  Certainly, he expected celebrations of far greater importance and magnitude to 
be in Germany’s future, although those would require sacrifice that had not yet been 
asked for.  Besides the minor propaganda value, the act was not particularly worth 
celebrating anyway.  The strategic value was limited to securing another Baltic port for 
the Kriegsmarine, and if Lithuania could be converted into a satellite, a slight extension 
of the already existing border on Poland’s flank.  In any event, with the addition of this 
territory and the newly available frontier offered through control of the Slovak puppet-
state, this acquisition permitted Germany to exert only a slightly greater degree of 
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pressure on Warsaw than Berlin was already able to apply in the negotiations for the 
return of Danzig and the Corridor.  However, the use of Slovakia’s territory for any 
potential offensive operation was far more valuable.  
 For Lithuania, the surrender of Klaipėda was devastating.  Though only six 
percent of the national territory and five percent of the population, more than a third of 
the country’s industry was located in the region and seventy percent of its trade passed 
through the port.85  Monetarily, Kaunas lost more than 42.28 million Litai from banks 
and credit institutions.86  This unbalanced Lithuania economically and resulted in a loss 
of the substantial investments the government had put into the region’s industry and 
infrastructure.  The strategic situation of the country was also jeopardized, leaving 
Kaunas far more susceptible to German and Polish influence, although the pressure from 
the latter was alleviated by Hitler’s subsequent foreign policy focus.  In a bitter twist, 
Lithuania did receive some marginal benefit from the loss of Klaipėda in the form of 
amicable relations with Germany, though there was nothing genuine about Berlin’s 
change of demeanor.  Hitler, as part of his shifting focus to Lithuania’s southern 
neighbor, sought, if possible, to bring Kaunas into the fold as part of his encirclement of 
Poland.  If the Smetona regime played according to his rules, similar to Hungary during 
the Czechoslovak affair, then it would be rewarded with the realization of Lithuania’s 
primary foreign policy objective: the return of Vilnius.87  The Lithuanians were initially 
reluctant to take the bait, and consequently the German government continued to present 
overtures to them throughout the summer, eventually reaching a point where a decision 
on the issue would have to be made. 
 The fourth and final ultimatum came as rapidly as the previous three, coinciding 
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with the finalization of the agreement that transferred the Klaipėda region from Lithuania 
to Germany.  On March 21, von Ribbentrop met with Lipski in Berlin and reiterated the 
routine “suggestion” of returning Danzig to the Reich and agreeing to the construction of 
a highway and railroad across the Corridor.  As he had before, Lipski respectfully 
declined to discuss the issue, instead redirecting the conversation towards the Polish 
government’s concern over the Reich’s occupation of Slovakia and the anti-Polish 
aspects of this move.  Despite this polite and tactical diversion, the German foreign 
minister was dogged in his determination to bring about a resolution of the question.  
Unexpectedly, he insisted that Lipski personally deliver a message to Beck indicating that 
Hitler wished the Polish foreign minister to come to Berlin, as Hácha had, to sign a 
treaty.  Although silent on the exact nature of the document, von Ribbentrop was explicit 
as to the consequences of refusing the invitation: the end of Poland through partition by 
Germany and the Soviet Union.88  
 The next day Lipski returned to Warsaw in a dejected mood, one that was further 
exacerbated by the inexplicable optimism of several officials at the foreign ministry.  
However, Beck, to his ambassador’s relief, shared with Lipski the realization that the 
policy Poland had until now been conducting towards Germany was at an end.  After 
reviewing the situation over the evening, Beck, in an internal memorandum, outlined 
what he believed to be the problems facing Poland regarding Germany and forwarded his 
new strategy for confronting those issues.  First was the question of calculability, a 
quality that the Polish foreign minister thought the Third Reich and its leader had lost.  In 
the realm of foreign policy, this created numerous difficulties and prohibited the 
formulation of a cohesive agenda that Warsaw could pursue.  The solution to this 
152 
 
problem was, Beck stated, to define the limits of accommodation.  These he held to be 
the inviolability of Poland’s frontiers and the acceptance of the country’s right to exist.  
Danzig was integral to both aspects of this limit, as its reunion with Germany would 
place Poland among the number of eastern states that had bowed to Hitler’s will and 
allowed the rules of the game to be dictated to them.  Giving in on this issue would invite 
Berlin to make further demands and, if Hitler was still not satisfied, would bring about 
even more requirements in a cycle that could potentially end with Poland’s disappearance 
from the map of Europe.  For this reason, Danzig was to become symbolic of Warsaw’s 
will to resist Germany’s “nine division” march across the continent.  Only a firm 
demonstration of strength was necessary.  If Hitler escalated the situation to the brink of 
war, Beck believed that Poland entered the arena “with all the trump cards in our 
hands.”89 
 In accordance with this new policy directive, Warsaw responded to the German 
ultimatum by partly mobilizing the army and deploying it for maneuvers in the Corridor 
as a show of strength, while officially offering a polite refusal to the German government.  
Lipski also reminded von Ribbentrop that Hitler had promised to respect Poland’s 
interests in the Free City.  This sent the German foreign minister into a rage and, 
exceeding his instructions from Hitler, he angrily indicated to Lipski that any aggression 
against Danzig, possibly referring to the Pomeranian exercises being conducted by the 
Polish military, would be viewed as if it were directed at the Reich.  Lipski responded by 
calmly stating that any further attempts by Germany to bring about the return of Danzig 
would result in war.  This position was confirmed by Beck during a conversation with 
von Moltke on March 28.90  Poland had drawn its line in the sand.  
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 This set the tone for German-Polish relations for the remainder of the spring and 
throughout the summer, although Beck sought to prevent conflict by issuing further 
policy outlines that belied the unyielding rhetoric of the late March exchanges.  On April 
1, he informed Polish diplomats at home and abroad that, unless Germany landed troops 
in Danzig, necessitating a military response in kind, all matters pertaining to the city were 
to be kept localized and as peaceable as possible.  The entry of the Kriegsmarine into the 
harbor was to be treated as a strictly isolated diplomatic incident, as was any popular 
uprising not directly involving the Wehrmacht.  If any situation arose, it would be 
Germany, not Poland, that escalated it beyond the realm of diplomacy.  All the while, 
Beck kept the possibility of reaching an understanding with Hitler open, but would only 
negotiate if the Germans did so with “peaceful intentions” and according to “peaceful 
methods of procedure.91”  Peace had a definite price.  
 Hitler was not prepared to pay such a cost.  At the end of March, Hitler told 
General Walther von Brauchitsch, Commander in Chief of the Army, that if diplomatic 
methods failed to yield results with the Poles, he was prepared to use force to achieve his 
ends.  He simultaneously ordered the General Staff to initiate operational planning for an 
invasion of Poland.  By April 3, the army had generated Fall Weiß, or Case White.  From 
this point on, there was no turning back.  The opposition to the military solution that had 
permeated the upper echelons of the high command during the Czechoslovakia crisis in 
1938 was virtually non-existent.  Now, the vast majority of the officer corps relished the 
opportunity to smash Poland in a kurtz und vives, or short and lively, campaign.  This was 
due in part to Case White giving expression to the more traditional “Prussian” sentiments 
of the General Staff that were absent from the Czechoslovak Fall Grün, or Case Green.92  
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Indications that Berlin had largely abandoned any ideas of a diplomatic resolution to the 
crisis became apparent in May when, as per orders from the Wilhelmstrasse, German 
diplomats in both Poland and abroad became more aloof and evasive towards their Polish 
counterparts.  This resulted in a virtual moratorium on the exchange of view between the 
two governments.93  
 This development was not lost upon Beck, and as the summer waned, he 
abandoned his strategy of foreign policy independence and Great Power posturing.  In a 
reversal of orientation, he threw Warsaw back towards alignment with Great Britain and 
France as completely as his own reading of the situation permitted.  With assurances 
from Paris that the alliance between the two countries was still effective, he opened 
discussions to forge a military alliance with Britain during the summer.  These, however, 
became stalled by Beck’s belief that war could be averted simply by bringing London to 
the table.  To actually follow through with the finalization of an agreement was viewed as 
too provocative a measure, and Beck feared that an alliance might actually force Hitler to 
act impetuously rather than serve as a deterrent.94  Partly due to this rationale and partly 
due to the Polish foreign minister’s own bloated ego, he delayed the conclusion of the 
military arrangement by several days through insistence upon Britain’s recognition of 
Poland’s right to colonies for “prestige, materials and immigration,” even as Germany 
increasingly set itself on a war footing.95  Although these demands seem ludicrous in 
retrospect, they are indicative of Beck’s confidence that Hitler was bluffing and, in 
accordance with his diplomatic style, were attempts to maximize gains on both ends of 
the spectrum. 
 It was not until mid-August that, as a consequence of increased German military 
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activity on Poland’s borders, Beck began to accept the possibility of a very real German 
threat.96  Since May, he had understood that concessions of some sort would be required 
to alleviate the situation, and his negotiations to form an alliance with the Western 
Powers had been conducted with that in mind.  His objective was to place the Polish 
government in a position of increased strength for that process.97  This would offset some 
of the expected economic pressure from Berlin while preventing any German attempt to 
achieve its goals via a fait accompli.98  However, Hitler was not interested in bargaining 
and had chosen war as the only means of recourse.  In a further weakening of Warsaw’s 
already tenuous position, on August 24, Poland’s greatest fear was realized: the coming 
together of the nation’s two traditional enemies, Germany and Russia.  The Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact, ostensibly a non-aggression treaty that secured the Reich’s eastern front, 
also contained a secret protocol that divided East Central Europe into respective spheres 
of influence and, as it pertained to Poland, divided up the country between Germany and 
the Soviet Union.  This event signaled to Beck that British and French efforts to conclude 
an agreement of their own with the Soviets had failed.  The next day Warsaw formally 
entered into an alliance with Great Britain. 
 The German invasion had originally been set to commence on August 26, but at 
the last minute, partly due to the circumstances surrounding von Ribbentrop’s journey to 
Moscow to work out the details of the non-aggression treaty and partly to provide Berlin 
with one last opportunity to further isolate Poland diplomatically, Hitler called off the 
attack.99   It was rescheduled for September 1.  The German government acted at a 
frenzied pace and even made a weak attempt to wrench Britain from its new ally.100  On 
the other side of Europe, the Germans were far more successful, although not exactly in 
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the manner that they had planned. 
 Throughout the summer, in conjunction with the pressure the Third Reich was 
applying to Poland, equal treatment was being delivered to the governments of Hungary, 
Romania, and Lithuania so as to secure their participation in Poland’s liquidation.  This 
time, Hitler’s overtures fell upon deaf ears.  Lithuania, the most recent victim of German 
expansionism, was offered the opportunity to realize its fundamental foreign policy 
objective of the past two decades, the return of its historic capital Vilnius and possibly 
more, if it would march when called upon.  Though an alluring proposition, Berlin’s 
advances were declined on the grounds that the issue of Vilnius was a diplomatic rather 
than a military question and that the acquisition of the city through forceful methods was 
an unacceptable course of action.  Perhaps more important to the Lithuanian decision was 
the explicit fear of becoming a de facto German ally as a result of aggressive action 
against Poland.  Kaunas had no faith in Germany’s chances for victory in the war Hitler 
was intent on launching and was loathe to sit beside the Reich during what Smetona and 
his regime viewed as an inevitable final judgment.  This resulted in a declaration of firm 
neutrality, which the government hoped would exclude Lithuania from the increasingly 
complicated situation developing to the south.101 
 Neutrality was not an easy course to maintain.  Although the Lithuanians had 
given Warsaw assurances in May that it need not worry about any aggression from its 
quarter and that Poland could redeploy troops stationed along its border without fear of 
aggression in order to concentrate its forces against Germany, this failed to remove the 
small Baltic country from both German and Polish machinations.102  As the date for 
which Hitler planned his attack approached, proposals from both the German and Polish 
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governments attempting to sway Lithuania to actively participate in the coming conflict 
increased.  Berlin repeated its standing offer but included the entire region surrounding 
Vilnius and possibly more as part of Kaunas’ potential territorial gains.  The Poles 
countered by hinting that Lithuania’s support could result in the recovery of Klaipėda and 
its environs, in addition to portions of East Prussia.103  Though both lucrative offers, each 
was filled with danger that was dependent upon the decisions of the other powers 
involved in the crisis.  
 Aligning with Germany risked retribution from Britain and France, as each was 
capable of indirectly inflicting damage to the country.  A march on Vilnius, even if fears 
of inciting Poland’s Western allies could be allayed, was made hazardous by the 
unknown quality of the Soviet reaction to such a move.  Moscow harbored its own 
designs towards the region and, even after August 24, the obscure nature of Stalin’s 
disposition to the German proposal made such an endeavor perilous.  Before and 
especially after the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, siding with Poland ran 
the risk of providing an opportunity and, later, a pretext for a Soviet invasion which, with 
the memory of imperialist Russian domination still fresh, proved to be an effective 
deterrent.  These geopolitical considerations, in addition to sympathy for Warsaw’s 
predicament, or, perhaps more likely, antipathy towards Germany as a consequence of 
Poland’s prior handling of relations with Kaunas, mandated that Lithuania preserve its 
own vital interests, the foremost of which was the maintenance of national independence.  
The prudent course and, given the dangers of the various hypothetical scenarios, the only 
viable policy decision was strict neutrality.  However, unknown to the Lithuanian 
government, this pragmatic choice ultimately sealed Lithuania’s fate, although it would 
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be some months before the full ramifications were felt.104 
 The Hungarians were equally hesitant to participate in offensive operations 
against a nation with which Budapest had shared a long and historic friendship.  Despite 
German pressure and the promise of great rewards, Horthy and Count Pál Teleki, the new 
prime minister, diplomatically maneuvered themselves out of the order of battle, 
affirming to Hitler Hungary’s continued commitment to the Axis, but declining the 
Reich’s offer on moral grounds.  This angered Hitler, who was quick to remind Budapest 
who its friends really were: a reminder to Horthy of who had allowed Hungarian 
revisionism to occur.105  The threat, coupled with Berlin’s subsequent offers of the small, 
oil-rich southeastern portion of Poland in exchange only for the passage of troops and the 
use of the Kassa (Košice) railway, steeled Horthy and Teleki’s resolve to deny their 
support to Hitler.  On this issue, Hungary held the advantage.  In a meager attempt to 
render assistance to Poland, Budapest denied the Germans use of its territory and, as a 
result, shortened the front of opposition that the Poles would initially be forced to face.  
This was a gamble.  However, if Hitler decided to press the issue and impose his will 
upon Hungary, Horthy and Teleki had made preparations for a last act of defiance in 
order to uphold the national honor.  Bridges and railways near the Polish border were 
mined, and the Hungarian army was instructed to destroy them if the Wehrmacht violated 
the frontier.  Plans were also made to create a government in exile, either in the United 
States or Great Britain, in the event that Germany occupied the country as punishment for 
Budapest’s intransigence.106  
 Such a sudden outburst of previously dormant moral compunction is conspicuous 
as a motivating factor in Horthy’s rationale, although it is lent some credence given the 
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admiral’s propensity for traditional chivalric values pertaining to honor.  The Regent had 
demonstrated this behavior before, perhaps most notably when, in a drafted but unsent 
letter, he challenged Czechoslovakia’s President Hácha  to a sword duel, with the two 
leaders acting as champions of their nations, as a means of settling their governments’ 
differences.  Within this context, Horthy also felt betrayed by Germany’s non-aggression, 
mutual-assistance pact with Soviet Russia, which, through his personal litmus-test of 
anti-communism in practice, indicated to him that Hitler was not truly the “right” 
thinking statesman he presented himself to be.107  Coupled with his belief in Germany’s 
inability to triumph in any protracted conflict against the Western Powers, especially 
Great Britain, he solidified his resolve to keep Hungary out of the brewing conflict. 
 Though limited in its ability to influence events, Hungary acted in the capacity 
that it could.108  Although this altruism was tempered by the opportunistic, irredentist 
character of Budapest’s policies towards other countries – Romania and Yugoslavia in 
particular – the restraint exhibited towards Poland forced Germany to react and, by the 
very nature of the Wehrmacht’s desire to utilize Hungarian territory for its attack, alter its 
plans.  The significance of this, though minimal in the grand scheme of Germany’s 
military preparations for the Polish operation, was to become evident later in the waning 
days of the Polish Second Republic. 
 The Romanian government also sought to abstain from involvement in the Polish 
crisis.  In the months preceding the final climax of the conflict between Germany and 
Poland, Bucharest acted according to the tenets of its policy of balance between the 
European Great Powers.  At its core, the policy formulated by Carol and Armand 
Călinescu, his new prime minister, mandated the maintenance of Romania’s non-
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alignment with any nation for as long as possible.  Only when the situation had developed 
fortuitously and the army, which was in a pitiful state of readiness, achieved an adequate 
level of rearmament would Romania participate in the war its government viewed as 
inevitable.109  Until then, Carol felt compelled to limit his diplomatic entanglements so as 
not to provoke Germany, the one power that he feared would act against him unprovoked.  
This required careful diplomacy with the British and French, as both governments 
believed Romania to be an essential component of regional security and attempted to 
solicit Bucharest as a partner in a revived alliance system with German encirclement as 
its aim.   A first and necessary step in that process was the expansion of Romania’s 
existing defensive arrangement with Poland.  However, gaining Bucharest’s acquiescence 
to this proved to be exceedingly difficult, as the Romanians were hesitant to violate the 
policy that they viewed as the only viable defense against aggression in an increasingly 
unstable Europe.  
 The issue that stalled the negotiations was Bucharest’s insistence upon linking the 
widening of its defensive accord with Warsaw to include an unconditional security 
guarantee from both Paris and London.  The Romanian government believed this to be a 
fair price for aligning the country against the Third Reich.  However, as Romania was not 
threatened in the same way as Poland, the British and French were hesitant to offer such a 
far-reaching promise to Carol.  Their goal was to build an anti-German coalition, not to 
singularly act as the guardians of Europe.  They saw no need to offer any such 
commitment as, from their perspective, they thought it to be implicit as part of collective 
security and incumbent with that obligation.  To the Romanians, this was not nearly as 
evident, and it was precisely this differing view that prevented movement on the issue.  
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Whereas the British and French were thinking in the long term and implementing their 
policies accordingly, Romania, by virtue of its limitations and regional encumbrances, 
held a shorter perspective.  With virtually no offensive military capability and an 
economy permeated by German investment, a unilateral alignment with the Western 
Powers risked instigating a conflict with the Reich for which the country was not 
prepared.110  Time to rearm and mitigate the influence of Germany’s economic 
domination was essential for enabling an open declaration of allegiance to the West.  
Consequently, this required – at least for the interim – that equilibrium be pursued as 
official policy.111  The extension of an unconditional guarantee would have alleviated 
some of the pressure from Germany, but it did not ensure that the entire endeavor would 
be worthwhile.112 
 This the British were unable to guarantee, as the value of their collective security 
scheme was dependent upon the perceived mutual benefit of widening Poland’s and 
Romania’s defensive alliance by those two governments, which both failed to see.  In 
exchange for security, each was being asked to take on the problems of the other.  But 
just as the Romanian government wanted no part of Poland’s conflict with Germany, 
neither did Warsaw wish to encumber itself with Romania’s complicated and antagonistic 
Hungarian relationship.  In early April, Beck still believed Hitler’s threat of a military 
solution to the Danzig question was a bluff, and he was hesitant to burden his government 
with any additional commitments following the expected conclusions of the crisis, 
particularly when the impetus to do so would later be revealed to be of little 
importance.113   Working under this assumption, he was purposefully vague, elusive, and 
mercurial towards the British during his conference with Chamberlain and Lord Halifax 
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in London.  With the extension of Britain’s unconditional guarantee to Poland two weeks 
earlier and no pressure from London to expand Warsaw’s existing agreement with 
Bucharest a condition for a formal alliance, Beck was under no obligation to act, so he 
remained inert.114  
 Where Western diplomacy had failed, Axis action succeeded, although not in the 
manner expected by the British.  On April 7, Mussolini ordered the invasion and 
annexation of Albania, a move that prompted Britain to extend a guarantee of 
independence to Greece, as that country was now exposed to the Rome-Berlin threat.  
The French government, traditionally more interested in Southeastern Europe than the 
British, was perplexed by Romania’s exclusion.  Paris viewed Romania as an equally 
important case with which to demonstrate the determination of the Western Powers to 
resist German ambitions within the region.  To protect Greece and abandon Romania 
would have indicated to Hitler that Bucharest had been abandoned, a move that would 
have sent exactly the wrong message, signaling to Berlin that the Western Powers were 
discordant.  On April 12, the day before Great Britain planned to announce its guarantee 
of independence to Greece, the French government communicated to London its intent to 
issue a similar extension of protection to Romania, with or without the British.  Aware of 
the developing rift between the two allies, Gafencu, the Romanian foreign minister, 
decided to use the circumstance to his advantage.  During a meeting the same day with 
Sir Reginald Hoare, London’s ambassador to Bucharest, he pressed the British 
representative to tell his government that he had recently received confirmation from the 
Germans that Hitler was now ready to extend the political guarantee he had long dangled 
before Romania.  The details were to be worked out shortly in Berlin, on April 18.  To 
163 
 
prevent any extortion of further economic concessions, he extolled to Hoare during the 
negotiations the great benefit a guarantee from Britain and France would be, as it would 
allow Gafencu to resist the inevitable German pressure.115  It was all a lie.  It was also 
ineffective.  
 By chance, a spontaneous Hungarian démarche provided the impetus that 
Gafencu and his fabrications could not.  In response to the mobilized status of Romanian 
divisions along the Carpatho-Ukrainian border, Budapest announced that it was forced to 
counter this threat with military measures of its own.  Though the Hungarians intended to 
draw attention to their own concerns, the move had exactly the opposite effect and 
inadvertently focused international attention on Romanian security.  This enabled 
Gafencu to use the situation as further leverage with the British and, in conjunction with 
French pressure, finally gain London’s acquiescence to granting the coveted security 
guarantee without the required expansion of Bucharest’s alliance with Warsaw.116 
 After receiving the Anglo-French guarantee, Bucharest’s interest in developing 
more intimate relations with the Western Powers waned.  There was no need to pursue 
that avenue further.  An explicit warning from Berlin indicated the guarantee would be 
tolerated but also made clear that any attempts to expand its scope or move towards 
alignment with the West would have detrimental consequences.  This ensured that similar 
dealings were at an end.  The point was reiterated when Gafencu visited Hitler and 
Göring in mid-April.  Now, however, the threat was tempered with a conditional 
guarantee promising equitable relations as long as Romania maintained its neutrality and 
remained a strong trading partner for the Reich.  Any deviation from that course could 
direct Germany’s hunger for territory in a southeasterly direction.117  Although 
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technically a setback to German aims, the impact of the Anglo-French guarantee was 
limited.  Though it satisfied Bucharest’s objectives, it did not impede Berlin’s.  A 
minimal outlay of force, restricted to an oral threat, kept the Romanians in line and 
served to enforce the neutrality Bucharest had adopted as official policy.  With the 
complacency of Poland’s last neighbor attained, Hither was free to initiate his end game.  
 On August 30 all the preparations for Poland’s liquidation were in place.  Direct 
contact between Berlin and Warsaw had been non-existent for some time.  The previous 
evening, Hitler had requested that a Polish plenipotentiary be dispatched to Berlin by the 
next day to negotiate or, more accurately, to accept Germany’s demands for the return of 
Danzig and a plebiscite to be held regarding the fate of the Corridor.  This was 
impossible.  Predictably, none arrived.  The task of receiving Hitler’s ultimatum fell to 
Neville Henderson, the British ambassador to Germany.  What ensued upon his arrival at 
the meeting with von Ribbentrop would have been comical were it not for the gravity of 
the situation.  The German Foreign Minister read aloud Hitler’s demands in German too 
quickly for Henderson, who was not fluent in the language.  This prevented him from 
making any notes.  When he asked to be allowed to read the document, von Ribbentrop 
refused and then tossed it on the table, stating that it was now out of date, as no Polish 
emissary had arrived by midnight in accordance with Hitler’s communiqué from the 
previous evening.118  There was no turning back.  The die had been cast.  
 The last day of European peace passed with a deceptive normality that belied the 
tension brewing on both sides of the German-Polish border.  The Wehrmacht was ready, 
in position and poised to strike when the order to march was given.  In Poland, the army 
was in the midst of its mobilization, although the process begun three days before was 
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nearing completion.119  The delay had been deliberate, as Warsaw had sought to balance 
political, defense, and economic concerns until the last possible moment.  Yet with war 
now only a question of when, there was no need for prudence.  Even amid this calamitous 
backdrop, however, the Poles still harbored hope of averting disaster and achieving a 
détente with Germany through negotiation and concession.  During the evening, Lipski 
met with von Ribbentrop in a final effort to maintain peace, but without authorization 
from Warsaw to do anything more than receive Hitler’s demands and promise to relate 
them directly to the Polish government, the eleventh-hour bid failed.120  Even if Beck had 
granted Lipski plenipotentiary powers, it is unlikely that at this late stage it would have 
mattered.  Whether von Ribbentrop even informed Hitler that the Poles were ready to 
deal was irrelevant.  By the time Lipski arrived in Berlin, the orders to commence 
offensive operations had already been signed.  Border incidents rather than diplomacy 
foreshadowed what was to come.  A staged “Polish attack” on a German radio station in 
Gleiwitz carried out by the SS in Polish military guise provided the necessary pretext.  At 
4:45 a.m., Fall Weiß commenced with an opening salvo from the German battleship 
Schleswig-Holstein in the Danzig harbor that struck the Polish garrison on the 
Westerplatte and coincided with the general advance of the Wehrmacht as it rolled across 
the frontier into Poland.  The Luftwaffe had struck minutes earlier, destroying the town of 
Wielun.  Hitler’s war had begun.  Beck received the official German declaration as the 
first wave of He 111 bombers delivered their payloads upon Warsaw.   
THE END 
 
Shortly before the German declaration of war on Poland, Lipski met with Göring 
in Berlin.  Over the years, the Polish Ambassador had developed a working relationship 
with the German.  During their discussion, Göring expressed regret that the policy of 
friendship he had advocated and pursued towards Poland was now at an end.  With the 
coming of war, he was required to lead his Luftwaffe against Germany’s eastern 
neighbor.  Without missing a beat, Lipski replied that he was also upset at this 
development, as he was forced to respond to the call of duty and join the Polish army so 
he could shoot down the invading planes.  Though he would not see action on his home 
soil, Lipski, as an enlisted man, fought with distinction against the Wehrmacht 
throughout the war.1 
 The diplomat became a soldier, an act as symbolic as it was patriotic.  In a 
microcosm, this was reflective of the wider changes imposed upon Poland by Hitler and 
the Third Reich, as with the onset of war, Polish diplomacy came to an end.  Though 
caught by surprise, Warsaw carried on its defense valiantly for over a month, only 
succumbing to the Wehrmacht and the Red Army on October 6, when the last operational 
Polish units under General Franciszek Kleeberg surrendered near Lublin after expending 
all their ammunition.2  With their capitulation, so fell the Second Republic. 
 In defiance of Hitler, the governments of Lithuania, Romania, and Hungary each 
refused to participate in the liquidation of Poland.  Although officially neutral, each 
offered Warsaw an escape avenue, so that even with the totality of Polish territory 
conquered, the nation’s prosecution of its war effort could continue.  The Lithuanians 
allowed several thousand Polish troops to flee from the Wehrmacht through its territory, 
as did Budapest, which permitted 70,000 soldiers to escape and resume fighting in 
France.3  The Romanians, despite breaking their defensive alliance with Poland, restored 
their honor by enabling thousands of Polish civilians and most of the government to seek 
refuge from the bloodshed and acted as a supply depot and staging ground for British 
arms and relief forces.4  These gestures and declarations of neutrality were the region’s 
last meaningful acts of defiance to Hitler.   
 With Poland’s liquidation, Germany finalized a process Hitler began with the 
Anschluss in 1938, achieving total dominance over East Central Europe and ending the 
independence of Lithuanian, Hungarian, and Romanian foreign policy.  The fates of those 
governments subsequently rested upon the German dictator’s whims and their ability to 
remain in his good graces.  This entailed accommodation of, and subservience to, 
Berlin’s policy directives.  The cost of failing to comply, with Poland and 
Czechoslovakia as examples, was evident.  One by one, each nation paid the price. 
 Lithuania was the first.  As punishment for refusing to assist Hitler in destroying 
Poland, on September 25 he transferred the Baltic nation from Germany’s sphere of 
influence to the Soviet Union’s, trading the country to Stalin for a greater slice of 
occupied Polish territory.  As Moscow harbored more immediate and direct interests in 
Lithuania, this act accelerated the pace of an already rapidly dwindling clock on the 
country’s continued independence.  It ran out sooner than expected.  On October 10, 
1939, the Lithuanian government was forced to sign a mutual-assistance treaty with the 
Soviet Union.  With no international recourse, acceptance was the only option.  Vilnius 
was returned, fulfilling Kaunas’ twenty-year ambition, but the price for that success was 
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the stationing of Soviet troops on Lithuanian soil.  This shadow independence lasted until 
June 15, 1940, when, following another ultimatum from Stalin, the Red Army crossed the 
border and formalized the process of annexation.  It was finalized on July 21, with the 
inclusion of the new Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic into the Soviet Union.5  
 Romania was next to fall.  King Carol’s policy of non-alignment proved to be 
untenable when confronted with the realities of German hegemony in Danubian Europe, 
and throughout the remainder of 1939 and into 1940, Bucharest moved into the German 
sphere.  Economic domination, intimidation, and a limiting of the country’s options in 
both trade and alignment had, without firing a shot, indirectly brought about the conquest 
of Romania exactly as Hitler had envisioned.6  The subjugation of the country through 
economic means afforded the Germans nearly unlimited influence in Romanian domestic 
affairs, which Berlin utilized to great effect in the latter half of 1940.  Carol was 
compelled to include the Iron Guard in the government, and most pro-Western ministers 
were sacked in favor of pro-German counterparts.  Revision was also imposed upon 
Romania, which, as a result of the Secret Protocol to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and 
Second Vienna Award, marked the end of România Mare and precipitated Carol’s fall.7  
With Carol forced to abdicate in the face of massive public outrage at the humiliation and 
political maneuverings of his pro-German prime minister, Genral Ion Antonescu, who 
invited German troops into the country, the final curtain closed on Romanian 
independence.8  
 Hungary fared the best of all these four East Central European nations, retaining 
nominal independence until March 19, 1944, when it was overrun by the Wehrmacht in 
Operation Margarethe I to prevent the government from concluding an armistice with the 
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Allies.  However, during the interim, Budapest greatly benefited from continued 
collaboration with Hitler, gaining the nothern portion of Transylvania from Romania and 
the Vojvodina region from Yugoslavia.  Though these acquisitions anchored Hungary in 
the German orbit, the circumstances of war afforded the government room to manevuer, 
which it exploited to procure those particular spoils.9  Such a policy was fraught with 
peril, however, as the maintenance of Hungary’s revisionist acquisitions became 
inexorably tied to Hitler’s ultimate triumph.  When the tide of the war turned against 
Germany, it also turned against the fortunes of Hungary’s foreign policy gamble, 
resulting in its abject failure. 
 To accredit the failure of Polish, Hungarian, Lithuanian, and Romanian foreign 
policy from 1933 to 1939 entirely to the malevolent character of Hitler’s aggressive 
policy tells only part of the tale.  The German dictator and the Third Reich were 
contributory factors, but if sole responsibility for the region’s failings is attributed to 
Hitler, then the leadership of those nations is given an undeserved pass on their own 
culpability.  Warsaw, Budapest, Kaunas, and Bucharest each were instrumental in their 
own downfalls.  On an individual basis, they all made the decision to use the revisionist 
opportunities provided by Hitler and Germany as a vehicle for the realization of their own 
nationalist regional aspirations.  In doing so they collectively sacrificed the unity each 
government recognized as essential for checking German irredentism and ensuring their 
continued independence.  This resulted in a chronically myopic implementation of 
foreign policy moves that ultimately served Hitler’s long-term strategic goals.  By 
enabling Berlin, particularly after the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936, to 
capitalize on the various rivalries between the regional governments, Germany was able 
170 
 
171 
 
to achieve its ends with the assistance of one regime or another to the detriment of the 
region as a whole. 
 Though an old strategy, Hitler’s policy of divide and conquer that he pursued 
towards the region was highly effective, simply because it undermined the weak regional 
commitment to collective security and exacerbated precisely the weakness the region’s 
governments understood to be essential to their own national security, by offering the 
potential for the rapid realization of national aims.  Without solidarity, expressed either 
through the League of Nations or a broad, regional bloc, Hitler was able to slowly isolate 
each nation and impose upon their governments a new international paradigm, one that 
they could either profit from or be destroyed by.  A strong League of Nations and greater 
commitment to that institution and collective security on the part of Europe’s Great 
Powers would have mitigated Germany’s power over Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, and 
Romania by providing a legitimate alternative for alignment.  However, the reluctance of 
those powers to act as guarantors of a fledgling system or offer an alternate type of 
support forced the regional governments to revert to the old European order and ensure 
their own security as best they could.  In the end, as a result of these four nation’s 
inability to set aside their rivalries to face a common threat, it was a charge in which they 
all failed.  With that failure came the realization of the nightmare scenario shared by each 
of the various national leaderships: the end of independence and subjection to the rule of 
the Soviet Union. 
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